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SUMMARY 
 
This study is about labour dispute resolution in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The study 
involves an extensive examination of the political philosophy, methods, structures and rules 
of engagement comprehensively described as ‘emerging’ trends. It concerns labour relations 
in developing African countries and is necessarily located along the continuum of the socio-
legal and historical context of each country.  
 
The study asserts that there is an indisputable connection between the past colonial state and 
the post-colonial state. It contends that the post-colonial elite openly assimilated the 
regulatory legal framework of the colonial master and consolidated this framework soon after 
independence. The study therefore examines the mode of buttressing the status quo and the 
sustenance of command and control inherent in labour legislation. This tendency was 
rationalised by a misguided fear that those advocating for reforms, particularly those with 
economic power exerting a diluting influence on the dominant position of the state. The 
research demonstrates how such orientation accounts for subsequent reluctant tinkering with 
transformational efforts. It also resulted in sporadic, reactive and generally incremental 
concessions in the direction of workplace democracy. 
 
Essentially, this study is about societies in conjunction with law. Inferentially, this means the 
impact of legal rules and agencies on society in the finding of solutions to societal problems. 
The study is not based on an assumed premise on the basis of which a credibility test may be 
made or comparisons drawn. The study sets out to study each society as a unique, discrete 
entity within a particular blend of social, historical, political and legal contextual 
permutations. The primary objective therefore is to examine and try to understand and 
appreciate the strengths, weaknesses, threats and both missed and potential opportunities of 
each, in addressing a specific social issue such as labour disputes. 
 
 This study adopts a ‘law in context’ approach as a sub-text within the broad framework of 
socio-legal studies. It does not derive from any abstract theoretical hypothesis. It is not based 
on any quantitative survey approach that warrants the administration of questionnaire. It is 
strictly an academic observation of distinct, discrete social formations. These are then 
considered as in transition along the continuum of their socio-economic developmental 
xviii 
 
trajectories. It also ascertains the ground realities such as the political economy of labour 
disputes. This study required an interdisciplinary perspective, using a sociological approach 
to the study of law. By consciously focusing on the central institutions of substantive law, it 
demonstrates the weakness of law’s claim to autonomy, its factual interpenetration of all 
levels with more general structures of government power,  
 
In effect, the conclusion drawn is that the attempt at effective dispute resolution, via the 
instrumentality of legislation, can lead to juridification, the multiplicity of institutionalised 
structures, over- administration and eventual dysfunction. 
 
KEY WORDS: Labour Disputes, Dispute Resolution, The State, Labour Relations, 
Juridification, Command, Regulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
1.1   Background to the study  
 
This study examines how three nation-states in the southern region of Africa, namely, 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, are grappling with the ever-growing complexity and 
sophistication of labour disputes. Rooted in administrative policy formulation, employment 
relations and the legal processes involved, this study extensively examines the political 
philosophy, methods, structures and rules of engagement that are comprehensively described 
as ‘emerging’ trends or realities. The study is an inductive research project, not a simple re-
statement of doctrinal precepts or statutory law, and concerns itself with labour relations in 
these developing African countries within particular historical and social contexts. This is 
primarily because of the connection between the colonial state and the post-colonial state.  
 
Part of this connection lies in the attitudes to labour issues that were initially reflected in the 
form, shape and scope of legislation. These attitudes were brought to bear on these societies, 
and the post-colonial society appears to have openly assimilated these attributes soon after 
independence. The post-colonial state then proceeded to consolidate them and only much 
later seems to be undergoing a reform of both its attitude and the legal framework that has 
been used to buttress its dominant position. Even then, the processes of transformation appear 
to be sporadic, reactive and generally incremental. 
 
Secondly, the study asserts that the existence of a functional relationship to legal history 
lends relevance to the development of legal rules. Thirdly, such a relationship allows an 
understanding of how such regimes of labour law have been contextually developed and 
utilised along the path of each society’s socio-legal evolution.1 At another level, the 
subsumed path of the development of legal rules implies the movement of the general 
material conditions of that particular society. 
 
This can help to explain, for example, why the common-law notion of a private transaction 
between two equal parties in a contradictory master–servant relationship was foisted upon the 
                                                          
1 Aguda ‘Legal Development in Botswana from 1885 to 1966’ (1973) 5 Botswana Notes and Records 4. 
2 
 
colonies. In reality, this questionable market place equality was only a political or social 
justification for perpetuating the exploitation of the colonised. This notion was subsequently 
incorporated into the legal regimes that have since come to define certain forms of social 
transactions. 
 
Relating these outcomes to the colonial state, one is led to conclude that, rather than enacting 
legislation in response to the actual realities of the territories, a mixture of labour legislation 
was introduced from different colonies into Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland, as 
they were then known. The primary purpose of these laws was subjugation. Inevitably, this 
mode of legislation also produced certain peculiar results. Firstly, the laws were complex. 
Secondly, these laws were considered alien, overly restrictive and punitive. Thirdly, 
considering the levels of socio-economic development, the laws were irrelevant.  
 
These societies comprised essentially rural, pastoral people engaged in subsistence farming. 
Apart from the mines in South Africa and the rail transport system from Northern Rhodesia 
to the mines, there was no formal employment, no organised industries, no organised 
employers and therefore no formal employment environment.2 The strategic partnership 
between the traditional authorities and the colonial master only succeeded in creating a more 
invidious form of dependency, exploitation and enslavement.3 
 
Therefore, there could not have been workplace sub-cultures such as internalised 
dissatisfaction with working conditions or worker radicalism. In simple terms, the labour 
laws were far in advance of the pace of socio-economic development before and after 
independence. The longer they were retained intact, the greater were their chances of proving 
ultimately restrictive, unpopular and a potent source of labour disputes in the future.  
 
Concepts of disputation and the institutionalisation of disputes are modern usages in terms of 
the language of disagreements and, at independence, had not filtered into the terminology of 
labour disputes. This is not to say that labour relations and the dynamics of the workplace did 
not have their own conflict-generating capacity. The public sector, the first area of formal 
wage and salaried employment, became the first localised formal grouping of workers with 
                                                          
2 Tlou A History of Botswana (1984). 
3 Dale ‘A Functional Web of Interdependence between pre-independence Botswana and South Africa: A 
Preliminary Study’ (1974) 6 Botswana Notes and Records 120. 
3 
 
common interests. Formal, organised labour agitation was born with the advent of statutory 
provisions defining trade disputes as disputes of interest and disputes of right.4 Therefore, any 
study of the phenomenon of collective labour disputes requires one to examine the effects of 
labour legislation and policy formulation on industrial relations and labour dispute resolution. 
This is the aim of this study. 
 
The study argues that reality has demonstrated that industrial conflict poses certain 
challenges. These challenges include the attainment of industrial stability and socio-economic 
development. Secondly, for the study to achieve its aims, it must demonstrate a relationship 
with the immediate socio-legal and historical past. Another reason for this is that there may 
be latent, historically embedded, structured social stratifications and cleavages that are only 
now manifesting themselves. These may in turn explain the sporadic explosions of collective 
worker consciousness commonly characterised as industrial disputes. In reality, such 
manifestations of worker dissatisfaction may be instrumental in achieving short-term, wage-
driven objectives rather than long-term political goals, as might be erroneously presumed.  
 
It is argued in this study that the legislative focus of the political state could be misdirected if 
it is concentrated only towards dominance and the sustaining thereof. Most importantly, the 
pivotal role of labour law as the prime mover cannot be overlooked. In the following section 
therefore, the study introduces a range of issues pertaining to labour law, which will be 
debated in detail in chapter 3.  
 
Definitions of the terms used in the study are presented in the next section. 
 
1.2     Definition of terminology 
 
This section provides a functional rather than a traditional definition of labour law and its 
elements. Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland could be described as coming from a similar 
mixed legal background, and therefore they would exhibit similar frameworks of labour law. 
In these countries, responsibility for labour dispute adjudication is allocated to the 
bureaucratic structures assigned to labour matters. Industrial courts have been established, 
clothed in most instances with exclusive jurisdiction over trade disputes. Emerging 
                                                          
4 Part 1 of the Preliminary Trade Disputes Act [Cap 48:02] section 2. 
4 
 
interventions in disputes form a critical part of the study because there is evidence of how 
external influences have assisted in some domestication of international minimum labour 
standards. The desirability of labour peace and stability as the rationale for any re-
conceptualisation of labour law is implied. How these issues play out creates a functional 
context for both labour law and disputes.  
 
1.2.1 Perspectives on labour law and labour disputes  
 
Work relations are partially reflective of social dynamics. Therefore, in examining issues 
relating to disputes within the field of labour law, an exploration of a combination of factors 
becomes necessary. These include the statutory framework, principles of contract, property 
relations, obligations and the political philosophy of the state.5 Labour relations have been 
defined in terms of the polarisation of relations between employers and employees. This is 
what Kahn-Freund referred to as ‘relations of power’.6 Previously, modern trade unions were 
seen only as the vibrant successors to the trade guilds and vocational groupings. Their roles 
included winning concessions and making gains from the employer in a regulated manner. 
 
Labour legislation has since moved from the notion of conferring rights on workers to one of 
regulating the business environment by balancing management autonomy and worker 
protection.7 The regulatory mechanism leaves scope for common-law principles and judicial 
decisions, neither of which has proven to be adequate. In effect, legislative intervention, 
common-law principles and judicial rulings have neither assuaged the anxieties nor lessened 
the aspirations of workers, because workplace arrangements cannot always be justified as 
grounded in consent.8   
 
This study argues that the function of labour law is to acknowledge the need to strike a 
balance between determination from outside through regulatory controls and the level of 
intervention required to open up a wider range of choice for employees to challenge 
perceived bad practices by employers.9 Regulation can therefore be described as mainly state 
                                                          
5 Mitchell (ed) A New Scope and a New Task for Labour Law – Redefining Labour Law (1995) 5   
6 Kahn-Freund Labour and the Law (1972) 8.  
7 Davis & Freedland Labour Legislation and Public Policy: A Contemporary History (1993) xxxiii - 692  
8 Grint The Sociology of Work: An Introduction (1994) 15. 
9 Davis & Freedland supra. 
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intervention in private spheres of activity to achieve public goals.10 From the foregoing, the 
regulation of labour disputes indicates their capacity to destabilise the industrial environment. 
Taken to their logical conclusion, labour disputes have the capacity to destabilise the state 
and social structures. The function of labour law should therefore be to mediate. 
 
This study suggests that disputes are inherent in the workplace and should be handled within 
appropriate contexts, as this would provide a better orientation and approach towards dispute 
resolution. Legislation and policy could then be informed by the need to balance the positive 
and negative effects of intervention, provided such intervention also enables employers and 
employees to continue to engage with each other constructively in the workplace. 
    
Over the past two or more decades, there has been a growing revisionist school of thought 
that considers the dysfunctional qualities of traditional labour law. The group, including 
Hepple,11 Ewing,12  Mitchell13 and Creighton,14 advocate a labour law paradigm that responds 
more empathetically to the realities of the workplace. Teubner15 and Watson16 postulate that 
opening up domestic juristic regimes to external influences through transplantation could 
rejuvenate the traditional labour law framework. Orucu,17 among others, argues that 
comparisons facilitate the internationalisation of labour law, now due in view of 
globalisation. The ILO considers its principles to be the incontrovertible normative tenets for 
international labour law.18 
 
1.2.2 Disputes and conflicts 
 
Conflict connotes an intractable, interminable collision of opposing principles or 
incompatible perspectives. It is manifested through emphatic assertions often aggravated by 
                                                          
10 Ibid 5. 
11 Hepple ‘The Future of Labour Law’ (1995) 24 ILJ  303  
12  Ewing ‘The Death of Labour Law?’ (1988) 8 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 293 
13  Mitchell (ed)  Redefining Labour Law: New Perspectives on the Future of Teaching and Research (1995) vii-
xv 
14 Creighton, ‘The Internationalization of Labour Law’ (1995) 90-120 
15  Teubner  Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or how Unifying Law ends up  in New Divergences 
(1998) 61 MLR 11 
16  Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law(1974) 
17  Orucu, Critical Comparative Law: Considering Paradoxes for Legal Systems in Transition (2000)  4 (1) 
ECJL 1-116 
18  Ezzy, Globalization and Labour Standards: A Review of Issues (2000) International Labour Review 136 and 
Sappia, ‘ILO Labour Justice and Alternative Dispute Resolution of Collective and Individual Labour Conflicts’ 
(IACML/ILO Project) Working Paper 147. Also Committee of  Freedom of Association Report (2001) 326 and 
the ILO Declaration of Fundamental  Principles and Rights (1998) 
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the hardening of assumed positions. With determination it may be managed, moderated or 
avoided. On the other hand, disputes suggest arguments over the correctness of assertions or 
alleged facts with a desire to convince. It is therefore debatable whether conflicts really exist 
in the employment arena and, if they do, whether they are easier to resolve than disputes. 
Rights arise from the terms of a contract and interests are threatened only when the applicable 
interpretations are not acceptable to either party. The question at hand would appear to be the 
levels of conflict, the acts of commission and omission that may constitute conflict, and 
which of these can be defined as disputes. In any case, whether conflicts can be solved 
without recourse to accepted procedures is equally debatable.   
 
For example, statutes define a ‘trade dispute’,19 but none appears to define a conflict. A 
dispute conveys disagreement between parties over a specific issue or subject matter. It does 
not imply a permanent impasse. It is posited that conflict has now become more descriptive 
of acrimonious relations between countries or internal power struggles than workplace 
contractual misinterpretations or disagreements. However, the terms are used interchangeably 
in this study. Since the issue of disputes is central to the study, this will be debated in detail in 
chapter 3. 
 
1.2.3 Industrial relations 
 
For the purposes of this study, labour relations is seen as an area where legislative 
intervention, in addition to management doctrines and practices, could promote industrial 
democracy.20 Industrial relations is usually that web of interrelations between employers and 
employees. Labour disputes occur within the production environment, ostensibly mediated by 
labour relations systems. The state is both an employer and an arbiter in labour relations.21 It 
follows then that where the state adopts an interventionist role in labour relations, it reacts as 
a stakeholder. Thus state-driven industrial relations can be seen as a process of structuring the 
labour market in order to achieve a stable socio-economic environment. Such a method is 
reminiscent of both the colonial legislative framework and the logic of capitalist 
development.22   
                                                          
19 Trade Disputes Act [Cap 48:02] of Botswana Part 1 – (Interpretation: Part 1). 
20 Landbury & Versevis, The Future of Industrial Relations: Global Change and Challenges The Future of 
Industrial Relations: Global Change and Challenges (1995) 5. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
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In sanctioning compulsory dispute resolution, the state assumes a defensive posture on behalf 
of the public in labour relations. By curtailing strikes and other manifestations of dispute, the 
state contains conflict and maintains civil peace.23 More importantly, through legislation, the 
state steers labour relations in a preferred direction, using the law as an agent to regulate the 
parameters of workplace relations.24  
 
1.2.4 Institutions and institutionalisation 
 
The institutionalisation process is central to the general notion of labour law. According to 
Crouch, an institution is constituted as– 
 
patterns of human action and relationships that persist and reproduce themselves over time, 
independently of the identity of the biological individuals performing within them. Sociologists 
have long understood such a concept, but much of this earlier history has been ignored by 
recent political scientists and others who have come autonomously to the idea of the institution 
as they sought to convey the idea of behaviour being shaped and routinized, fitting into 
patterns, which are not necessarily those that would be freely chosen by a rational actor needing 
to decide what to do.25 
 
All institutions undergo change. Institutional change is defined as change in an entire class of 
organisations. Institutional change at its deepest level refers to changes in the ideas that 
govern institutions, for example, the employment contract, and, as these ideas change, rules 
and practices shift as well. Institutional change on the shop floor may suggest that this clear-
cut division is replaced by fragmented vertical and horizontal levels of labour relations. 
Institutions and structures change in diverse ways. A specific form of response to 
developments may require new adaptation or transformative change. Such change could 
result in a re-definition of workplace conduct or even stability. Change may also occur if a 
political institution redefines loyalty, legality and stability, thus applying new standards.26   
                                                          
23 Bellace (1992) The Role of the State in Industrial Relations  (1992) Proceedings of the World 9th Congress 
IIRA, Sydney, Australia  
24 Park, S. ‘The Role of the State in Industrial Relations: The Case of Korea’(1992)  9th World Congress of the 
International Industrial Relations Research Association (IIRA) No.32 of Note 27  
25 Crouch Capitalist Diversity and Change – Recombinant Governance and Institutional Entrepreneurs (2005) 
10. 
26 Freedland & Kountouris ‘Towards a Comparative Theory of the Contractual Construction of Personal Work 
Relations in Europe’ (2008) 37(1) Industrial Law Journal 49–74. 
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In effect, legal concepts such as labour law, when formulated, ultimately create institutions 
through the complex process of identifying crystallised patterns of socialised conduct and by 
analysing them within an ideological context. This process produces a normative institution 
that applies to the state, regulation or the employment contract. Private organisations then 
forage among these institutionalised structures in search of jurisdictions that can be the most 
sympathetic regulatory environment. These may include the location of labour markets and 
entrepreneurship.27 
  
1.2.5 Regulation and juridification 
 
Regulation presupposes that the essence of the state within societies is primarily to impose a 
form of structured control, whose ultimate objective is to sustain the political status quo. The 
state sets the limits on private conduct within the ethical parameters of the political and 
ideological choices it makes. Formal institutional structures act as agents for the forms and 
nature of various social formations or groupings.28   
 
Juridification is a term increasingly occurring in the widest range of contexts. Its use is, 
however, probably nowhere more justified than in a discussion of the structure and the 
objectives of labour regulations. It could be said that labour law constitutes the classic 
paradigm for juridification. In terms of both the background and the evolution of the 
juridification process, the context of the origin and the development of labour law provides a 
practically suitable environment.29 This captures the phenomenon of path dependency, where 
the past indirectly exerts sway over the present.30 Juridification also occurs because the state, 
unable to make substantive laws anymore, vests such authority in its bureaucratic agencies to 
make even more regulations and rules.31  
 
1.3    The research problem 
1.3.1      Introduction 
                                                          
27 Freedland & Kountouris, op cit. 
28 Menocal, ‘And if there was no State? Critical Reflections on Bates, Polanyi and Evans on the Role of the 
State in Promoting Development’ (2004) 25(4) Third World Quarterly 765–777.  
29 Simitis ‘The Juridification of Labour Relations’ (1986)   Comparative Labour Law and Policy Journal, 7  
30 Ibid. 
31 Teubner ‘Substantive and Reflexive Elements in Modern Law’ (1983) 17 Law and Society Review 239–285. 
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In the light of the explanations above, it is necessary to lay down a functional premise for 
determining the problems that generated this study. Essentially, this study appreciates the 
significance of labour disputes. Therefore, it probes certain issues which, though legal in 
nature, are also political and administrative. The study is about three countries studied and 
observed in transition. This resulted in the analysis of certain events, including the actions of 
legal rules, structures and processes. These actions impact on these specific communities in 
terms of how the challenges generated by a particular set of problems are being met.   
 
The study sets out to examine each society as a unique and discrete entity existing within a 
particular contextual blend of social, historical, political and legal permutations. The primary 
objective is not to compare or contrast the societies, but to try to understand and appreciate 
their strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities with regard to the resolution of labour 
disputes. In addition, the study is also mindful of both the missed and potential opportunities 
of each country in meeting the challenges of social issues such as labour disputes. 
 
1.3.2   Specifics of the research problem  
 
The thesis revolves around a research problem which is summarised below: 
 
Post-colonial societies in Southern Africa have gradually been coming to terms with the need 
to industrialise and diversify their raw material-based economies. This calls for a close 
identification with organised, bureaucratic and corporatist modes of capitalist production. 
One major result of this is the creation of the employment contract under which an employee 
has to sell his or her labour power under specific conditions in order to obtain rewards that 
are market-related. In this atmosphere, problems are bound to emerge. In their different 
forms, conflict, disagreement, incompatibilities and frictions are then generally described as 
disputes. 
 
Disputes cause labour and industrial instability and at times political upheavals. Ideally, they 
need to be pre-empted and settled whenever and wherever they surface. Unfortunately, the 
efforts of state and international best practice interventions in Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland do not appear to be meeting these goals effectively. As such, labour-related 
disputes are virtually institutionalised. The objective therefore is to locate the patent and 
latent causes of these disputes, and examine how they occur. Finally, the aim is to investigate 
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why the current methods appear to be inadequate and suggest how best the current situation 
may be improved.  
 
The study implicitly acknowledges that admirable efforts have so far been made in the area of 
labour dispute resolution in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. These may be collectively 
referred to as ‘emerging trends’. Despite these progressive trends, the regressive ‘current 
realities’ convey a picture of inadequacies in relation to the desired levels of labour justice, 
peace and industrial stability. 
 
Given that the study is about labour dispute resolution, an interdisciplinary and holistic 
approach was adopted. This is to allow for an informed evaluation of existing approaches and 
present state-driven legislative and policy interventions. In terms of labour dispute resolution, 
there is a preoccupation with structures and institutions at the expense of a thorough 
comprehension and conceptualisation of labour disputes. Labour disputes are located within 
social processes. Therefore, the primary concern should be with a proper contextualised 
understanding of the disputes and the environment in which they occur. Another issue is 
whether superimposing formalised structures on social processes and formations has 
minimised labour disputes or has only created dysfunctional institutions and structures. 
 
The study also argues that although the legal framework within which the process of 
identifying and resolving disputes occurs is the applicable local labour law regime, this 
regime’s connection to local social history and therefore development must not be ignored. 
Furthermore, the legal environment of dispute resolution is entwined with the regulation of 
conduct within the wider society, such as in the arena of labour market regulation and 
industrial relations values.32 This indicates that one way to understand the causes of disputes 
and the current efforts to resolve them is to examine and evaluate the form, function and 
purpose of the legal rules that were created to regulate social power. 
 
1.4   Research concerns and questions 
 
Trade dispute resolution covers a wide range of issues. The focus of this study, however, is to 
try to examine the policy-directed functions of institutions, the philosophy of the state, and 
                                                          
32 Felstiner et al ‘The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming’ (1981) 15 Law 
and Society Review 198-401.   
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how these inform the approach to the problem both legally and administratively. The study is 
therefore guided by certain concerns whose formulation is intended to assist in the 
examination of the key issues as identified. These issues are stated below:   
 
a. To examine the methods currently used to resolve labour disputes in 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland; 
b. To identify the indicators currently used to measure the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the form and processes of interventions in these countries; 
c. To investigate, locate and explain how certain factors, patent and latent, with 
roots in the recent colonial past have contributed to the intransigence of 
workers and the intractability of labour disputes; 
d. To explore the possibility of utilising other methods to eliminate, reduce or 
manage the explosive potential of labour disputes in these countries; and 
e. To specifically locate any elements in the makeup of the post-colonial state 
that can explain its role in labour disputes today. 
 
1.5      Research objectives  
 
In line with the exploratory concerns above, the study addresses, among others, the following 
issues: 
 
a. The nature, functions and effect of interventionist policies (emerging trends) 
in labour relations and labour dispute resolution in Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland; 
b. The nature, roles and impact of the state on labour relations and disputes, both 
as an employer and mediator, and in relation to other social actors in labour 
relations in these countries; 
c. The suitability (or not) of transplanting legal reforms, and the capacities of 
institutions and structures in the context of the realities on the ground in these 
countries; 
d. The environmental factors accounting for variations in the effect of similar 
institutions performing similar functions in these neighbouring countries with 
common colonial, geo-political and socio-economic backgrounds. 
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1.6     Research justification  
 
From the foregoing, the value of this study lies in its close, continuous observation of how 
these three members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are 
addressing the problems of labour disputes. Secondly, the study examines the impact of these 
countries’ legal and other institutional frameworks or emerging trends and realities on labour 
dispute resolution. The study also indirectly assesses the degree and efficacy of efforts to 
domesticate some aspects of international labour standards. Looking to the future, the 
findings of the study are important in the context of a framework for regional integration and 
comparative studies. 
 
Although the study is not intended to discuss international labour standards, it assumes the 
position that these standards underpin fundamental rights and equality of treatment in 
employment. These elements of doctrinal issues are also regarded as being generally accepted 
as benchmark indicators. This study expects a combination of results that reflect the complex 
and interrelated nature of social and relational issues. In light of international developments, 
regionalism and also a new form of social accountability, the study expects to push the 
frontiers of current debates in an area where law must account for its expected reflection of 
social reality.   
 
This study argues that the radicalisation and polarisation of workplace relations, and 
perennial conflict and tension are an indictment of the legal and political systems operating in 
these countries. They therefore pose interesting challenges and are sufficient reasons for such 
a study. 
 
1.7     Research methodology 
 
This study adopts a law in context approach.  As said elsewhere, this study is an observation 
of social processes in three countries from an interdisciplinary perspective. The perspective is 
anchored in labour law principles and precepts. Its intention is to study, observe, and draw 
conclusions, which will convey the interdisciplinary scope of the research. 
 
The thesis is strictly a desk-top study of distinct, discrete countries from the perspective of 
labour law and relations and other regulatory frameworks. It is therefore necessary to first 
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identify the particular legal function in question, such as statutory labour dispute resolution, 
among others, using appropriate concepts and methods deriving from the sociology of law. It 
must be reiterated that this study is based on the interdisciplinary perspective of the 
researcher, drawing its strength from law, political and administrative science, and 
employment relations.  
 
In adopting this approach, the study draws upon Cotterell, who advises that by using a 
sociological approach to the study of law, and by consciously focusing on the central 
institutions of state law, one can attempt– 
 
to show the weakness of law’s claim to autonomy as explained earlier. Such sociological 
approach is capable of the interpenetration of all levels within the more general structures of 
government power, wider currents of ideology and diverse but often interconnected forms of 
knowledge usually considered external to law.33  
 
For example, the state bureaucratic structure wields both administrative and political power, 
which may not have been conferred by any statute, and this situation can result in over-
regulation, the over-administration of organised labour and dysfunctional dispute resolution 
procedures. 
 
The study deals with Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland in terms of whether they are 
achieving at least significantly reduced levels of labour disputes. The study examines both 
primary and secondary data within the relevant social and legal contexts. This provides an 
insight into the regimes of law currently applicable and also the current literature on the 
subject matter. The intention is to capture not only the letter but also the spirit of labour 
policies, the laws and their ground effects.   
 
1.8   Structure of the study 
 
The study is divided into nine chapters. Chapter 1 comprises a brief introduction to the broad 
range of issues that will be raised in the study. Chapter 2 covers a broad historical and 
conceptual framework for labour law and labour disputes. This chapter is pivotal to the study 
                                                          
33  Cotterell, R. ‘Law and Sociology: Notes on the Constitution and Confrontation of Disciplines’ (1986) 13 
Journal of Law and Society, 312.  
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because the fundamental premise of the study is that contemporary structures and regulatory 
and arbitration measures may fail, and there may be lessons from the past that suggest that 
the causes of labour disputes may not be so easily discernible.  
 
Chapter 3 provides a review of key concepts on the subject matter. As the chapter covering 
the literature review, it attempts to locate relevant themes in intellectual debates and 
discussions about labour law, dispute resolution, and related emerging trends. Chapter 4 
identifies the structures, agencies and other actors that have been created for the 
implementation of policies, the realities of such activities, and their effects on labour 
disputes. The chapter first delineates a general investigative framework that encompasses the 
constitutions, legislation and the international law dimensions as represented by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO). It then creates country-level purposive sub-sets. 
This framework is then used to measure the degrees to which disputes related to these 
elements of the employment relations have been successfully resolved, settled or managed.  
 
Chapter 5 examines the state as the dominant actor in the area of employment relations. 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 cover Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland respectively. In chapter 9, an 
integrated synthesis is adopted to determine points of incidental convergences and 
divergences in legal rule formation, policy formulation and implementation. This chapter also 
covers institutional functions, effects and constraints. A review of the main themes presented 
in the study is then undertaken. The conclusion examines future prospects, challenges and the 
direction of labour policy in these countries.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
A Historical Overview of Labour Relations and Disputes in Africa 
 
2.1     Introduction 
 
The overall aim of chapter 1 was to set out the structure of the study. The chapter also 
provided a preliminary background and gave a definitive scope to the study. One of its 
objectives was to underscore the role of labour disputes, which form the basis of this study. 
This goal was to establish what efforts are being made in relation to understanding trade 
disputes, their causes, and workable methods of preventing, settling or resolving them. Each 
section of the chapter dealt with components, including the conceptual and methodological 
issues. The chapter also laid the foundation for underscoring the role of historical continuity 
or inter-relationships between the colonial and post-colonial state. 
 
Chapter 2 continues in this vein, but provides a social, legal and historical basis for the study.  
The chapter surveys the global terrain and narrows it down to the African situation where the 
study is located. The study is premised on the assertion that, firstly, labour issues cross 
geographical boundaries in humanity’s existential and acquisitive endeavours. By 
implication, the processes of the division of labour and their attendant inequalities have been 
a sociological fact all along.  
 
Secondly, within the context of this study, colonialism did not only come with invidious 
intentions, but also left in its wake long-term debilitating effects, including societal 
polarisation, segmentation and deep-rooted, sustained socio-economic disparities. These 
phenomena are intricately connected to workplace relations which in turn are characterised 
by the needs, desires and aspirations of the worker. The chapter affirms therefore that it 
would be a misinterpretation of African labour history to assume that the colonising powers 
wished to promote progressive industrial relations.  
 
Thirdly, the conduct of the colonialists prior to independence was dictated by unexpected 
events. These included the inevitable political awareness of the people and the increasingly 
radical demands for greater political influence.  
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Fourthly, and more importantly, people’s gradual realisation of the exploitative nature of 
industrial relations triggered the numerous strikes that occurred in the supposedly docile 
British East and West Africa and the High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, 
Basutoland and Swaziland, either overtly or in subtle ways. 
 
In addition, the most obvious lessons from this past, as shown in this study, are the modes of 
utilising legal regimes to institutionalise the conflict between employees and employers. Such 
conflicts resulted from dissatisfaction with depressed wages and the high cost of living, 
together with profitable industrialisation. A priori, the stage was set for the post-independent 
state to continue from where the colonial master left off.34 For example, there was the 
perception that migrant workers from Northern and Southern Rhodesia were potential 
importers of labour agitation into Botswana. The reality, however, was that these employees, 
not open to collective union culture, became victims of the post-colonial state.35 Such an 
uninformed attitude found its way into the laws enacted with regard to trade unions and their 
office-bearers. It must be noted that the grand scheme of dispossession, either blatantly or by 
subterfuge and impoverishment of the natives, was conducted within the general framework 
of a dubious evangelising and civilising mandate and mission. This mission created 
questionable justification for the importation and application of legal regimes that fostered 
the restriction and control of particular aspects of socio-economic life.  
 
This is the context that was defined in terms of a labour law and labour relations 
environment. However, law, at whatever stage of a society’s development, is a reflection of 
the dynamics, shape and form of the material and social conditions, and therefore the history 
of that society.36 With regard to the colonial realities, therefore, although labour law ought to 
have been concerned with workers and their problems, it became an instrument for the 
regulation of details such as wages and taxation, and the movement and location of the 
colonised.37   
 
In this instance, labour law simply performed a more direct role of legalising but not 
legitimising the expropriation process within the general legal framework. Colonial labour 
history is thus replete with records of forms of imported and engineered administrative 
                                                          
34 Cooper in Gutkind et al African Labour History (1978) 225. 
35 Ibid 266. 
36 Shivji I.G. ‘Law, State and the Working Class in Tanzania’ (1986) www.alibris.com (27/10/2015) 
37 Beyeme Challenge to Power (1980) 256. 
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strategies necessitating the implanting of alien culture and institutional sub-cultures in those  
local assistants identified to facilitate the extraction and expropriation processes. As noted by 
Saul, one historic function of imperial penetration was to transform a segment of the able-
bodied males into wage labour while another was trained to staff the lower echelons of the 
colonial state apparatus. Another segment was compelled to work the extractive and (later) 
semi-industrial sectors developed by such penetration.38 
 
While this practice resulted in the concentration of cheap labour, it also led to the breeding of 
a local cadre imbued with the colonisers’ attributes. These attributes included the application 
of forms of regulation, legislation and policy formulation. This allowed for the imposition of 
compliance and coercion using different methods. It is accepted that not all colonial policy 
was repressive. There were instances of incremental improvement but these were only after 
mediation, both internal and external.39 It must be observed that the Fabian Society did admit 
that ‘our relatively high standard of living is maintained, in part, by the low standards 
obtaining in other lands, especially in the colonial territories. [However], the large body of 
poorly paid colonial labour also constitutes a threat, conversely, to the higher standards at 
home and forms an infectious centre of discontent.’40  
 
Essentially, the colonial era demonstrates how localised labour law became a typical example 
of the transformation of foreign legal rules. Such rules became the machinery for the 
exploitation of labour. The rules were also aimed at consistently relegating workers to a 
perpetually subordinate position. It is argued in this study that subsequent events have shown 
the close affinity of the post-colonial state to the previous one. An example is the penchant 
for juridification. The goal of exploitation and the extraction of wealth in non-wage and pre-
capitalist societies became the formalised relationships of master and servant. This became a 
key factor and, therefore, a cause of subsequent labour disputes.  
 
For example, the process of profit-making led the colonial system to unwittingly initiate the 
conditions for structural and systemic differentiations. This in turn came to underpin 
employment relations in the future as these societies became de jure and de facto sovereign 
nation-states. This study demonstrates the degree of the colonial impact, and then ascertains 
                                                          
38 Saul in Sandbrook & Cohen The Development of an African Working Class (1975) 305. 
39 Despatch No. 101 (21/04/1942) Colonial Labour Problems Fabian Society Research Services Release No. 61, 
1942.  
40 Ibid. 
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to what extent the post-independence states have shed their colonial baggage. The next step is 
to distil the inherent contradictions that persist and examine how these are stoking the fires of 
workplace agitation. 
 
This chapter restricts itself to the African historical context as much as possible. The study 
argues that this historical framework is necessary, primarily because those who refuse to 
learn from the mistakes of history repeat them. The present mirrors the past just as it will 
mirror the future. Further, the study suggests that within the oppressive aspects of work in the 
past could be embedded some latent causes of the intractability of labour disputes today. 
Volatile and disruptive labour disputes are mainly periodic episodes in the evolution of 
workplace social relations. These derive from the nature of social formations and their 
relations with each other, along either a pre-determined historical path or an inevitable 
realisation of incompatibility. 
 
It appears that labour relations are therefore microcosmic reflections of societies, especially 
those in relative transition, and the dynamics of interpersonal relations between employers 
and the employed. History also helps to explain and illustrate how conflicting social interests 
have been accommodated, mediated and resolved. This chapter revisits labour or social 
history to illustrate the roles of key social actors over time and how these could help in 
understanding the complexities of labour-related issues and why disputes form such an 
integral part of today’s bureaucratically organised workplaces.  
 
Labour has, since antiquity, been considered as work done by the mind or body, either partly 
or wholly for the purpose of utilities.41 However, ‘labour’ used without qualification has 
come to denote the doer of work or hired labour. Even this definition was socio-economically 
differentiated and used more in reference to hired, unskilled, manual workers than to self-
employed workers. While labour also means work, it has come to mean more of a 
conceptualised labouring class. This class would then include the pre-Industrial Revolution 
reproducers of their own labour potential, agricultural tenants, serfs and contract artisans.  
Subsequently, this would come to include all wage-dependent workers. Modern legal rules 
have contributed to this state although there were processes of alleviation and mediation of 
the gross imbalances in the allocation of and access to social and economic resources.  In 
                                                          
41 Catholic Encyclopaedia;  Labour and Labour Legislation  vol. III (1910) available at 
www.newadvent.org/cathen/08719.htm  (2001)  
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essence, the study contends that labour disputes are embedded in socio-economic and labour 
history. In effect, labour history dates back to Roman times. 
 
The common-law contract of employment and its actualisation dates back to Roman law, 
specifically the concept of locatio conductio. This included the locatio conductio rei, the 
locatio conductio operis and the locatio coductio operarum. The contract of service was 
available only to a given class who engaged in operae illiberales or menial tasks. Voet and 
Grotius noted a close similarity between the locatio conductio rei and the locatio conductio 
operarum. This is largely because slaves in Roman times could not let their services for hire. 
Therefore, the contract of employment subsequently made more sense with the advent of 
capital and factory employment. Before then, the incidence of ‘hired’ labour occurred mostly 
at the domestic level and in relation to apprenticeships.42 
 
In Roman law locatio conductio operarum is defined as– 
 
a consensual contract whereby a labourer, workman or servant as employee (locator operarum) 
undertook to place his personal services (operae suae) for a certain period of time at the 
disposal of an employer (conductor operarum) who in turn undertook to pay him the wages or 
salary (merces) agreed upon in consideration of his services.43 
 
As observed, these fine distinctions did not mean that Roman law was just. In fact, the law 
did not apply equally and if a wrongdoer came from the wealthy classes, then he might 
escape punishment, whereas a poor man could not. One outcome of this inherent injustice of 
the law was the emergence of disputes. Aristotle proposed a philosophical basis for dispute 
resolution. In the Ethics he stated that– 
 
the equitable is better than a certain kind of ‘the just’. So ‘the just’ and ‘the equitable’ are the 
same, both are good but ‘the equitable’ is superior. The difficulty arises because ‘the equitable’ 
is just but not ‘just according to the law’. It is a correction of legal justice. Law is general and it 
is not possible to deal generally with some matters.44  
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43 Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 (A) at 56–57. 
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Factually, events in Europe did not radically shift from the Roman era’s sociology of law.  
 
Whatever injustices and grievances might have been generated under Roman law followed 
the Roman Empire into Europe and ultimately to Africa via colonialism. This is why the 
colonial masters could not design contextually appropriate legislation for each of the 
colonies45. The colonial state imposed wage ceilings, fixed prices and acted as a buffer for the 
elite against the peasants. However, over time, the weaker social groups – serfs, artisans, and 
others, through socialisation and collective mobilisation – won greater shares of power and 
resources, using their associations as bargaining entities. They also then made opportunistic 
alliances with rival groups above their stratum. Their numerical strength became crucial as an 
indicator of the combinations or unions of the future.  
 
Most importantly, the underpinning element in their agitation was a growing dissatisfaction 
with the status quo.46 The evolution towards the individualisation of employment had certain 
results which paradoxically included a need by labourers to band together to safeguard their 
common interests. Herein lies the genesis of the subsequent formalistic evolution of labour 
relations or industrial relations.  
 
2.2     The African context 
 
In this section, the study contends that the colonial state demonstrated little evidence of 
consulting the colonised, whose lives were regulated and regimented through labour 
legislation and its politics. The rationale for this contention is provided below.  
 
2.2.1   The pre-colonial era 
 
Before discussing the role of the colonial state in employment relations it is necessary to 
examine the previous status quo relative to dispute resolution in traditional African societies. 
In the absence of a money economy, transactions were characterised by barter. There was 
communal exchange of labour which was voluntary, and suitors might often work on the in-
laws’ farm to demonstrate capacity. Individuals could offer themselves to prosperous families 
for apprenticeship. There were instances of indentured labour and people were hired to 
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provide contract specific services or daily labour for wages. The usufruct was also utilised to 
provide access to land and proceeds from cultivations. 
 
In the event of disputes, complaints went through the family to the chief where fines were 
imposed. Arbitration and other dispute resolution mechanisms were thus not colonial imports, 
as African societies had always used them in governance and judicial processes. Formal 
adjudication was done through elders, headmen and the courts of chiefs and kings. 
Customary arbitration decisions were published and parties were often compelled to comply 
by an inherent obligation to obey the chief.47  
 
The advent of colonialism brought the statutory formalisation of dispute resolution and the 
split into Anglophone and Francophone arbitral rules and practices. The importation of 
political, economic and social arrangements, a cash economy, forms and structures of 
exchange, and the formalisation of transactions brought with them significant changes. Laws, 
rules and regulations followed these practices and transformed these societies and most 
institutions of social order. Among the changes were imported and imposed labour laws, the 
subsequently institutionalised common-law contract of employment, and attendant structured 
relationships, some of which are examined below. 
 
2.2.2       The Southern African perspective 
 
The Southern African region is discussed as a collective since the historical issues addressed 
affect the sub-region in an integrated manner. This recognises the fact that much legislative 
activity emanated ex cathedra from South Africa, mainly from the Cape Colony, which was 
the seat of the British High Commission. This examination takes into account the predatory 
nature of colonial penetration and how this evoked resistance and rebellion. In contemporary 
terms, these reactions would have been variously described as organised group anarchy, 
conspiracy, insubordination or industrial sabotage. These were genuine reactions to 
aggressive dispossession, and the cumulative effects of dislocation from ancestral lands and 
forms of economic and subsistence activity. 
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In 1820, 5,000 British settlers from economically depressed areas in Britain arrived in the 
Eastern Cape, where for ten years labourers had started apprenticeships at the age of eight. In 
1823, the Cape administration introduced laws that attempted to regulate the hours of work 
and the provision of food for slaves. It is not surprising that the first recorded uprising by 
slaves and Khoi-Khoi labourers against their owners occurred in 1825. At this point, there 
were two poignant by-products. First, the British Parliament enacted the Abolition Act. While 
this Act abolished the system of slavery, it introduced an indentured labour system, and gave 
it the same ‘apprenticeship’ description. Actually, this Act ensured that slave-based economic 
exploitation in the British Empire remained intact. As a result, slaves embarked on different 
forms of passive resistance and about 59,000 slaves disappeared from their workplaces. Thus, 
desertion and insubordination became characteristics of the slave–master relationship.48 
 
This shows that the colonial state was patently dishonest and predatory. It should be noted 
that reaction to perceived injustice, within and outside the workplace in a capitalist or pre-
capitalist environment, is expressible in various forms that are symptomatic of labour-based 
disputes. Worse still, the advent of a cash economy meant there was a need for more hitherto 
cheap labour which had become scarce due to the weak but enabling environment. It meant 
other methods had to be used to keep black labour in bondage and harness. The few 
privileges accorded to the dispossessed natives were taken away by subterfuge or through the 
sheer belligerence of the white settlers long before apartheid was born.49 
 
Thus, in South Africa, while it would have been appropriate to view labour policy as a 
product of industrial society, the processes of rule-making were driven more by the need of 
the state to protect its interests by mediating in the power play between employers and 
employees. Thus, along the way, the South African state engineered different modes of legal 
containment including strong corporatism, co-optation or reward and appeasement.  
 
By 1924, two goals defined the then South African government’s domestic policies. On one 
hand, the government needed to entrench the colour bar in industry and on the other to 
consolidate the ‘two-stream’ concept of South African nationhood. The state distinguished 
between ‘civilised’ (white) and ‘uncivilised’ (black or African) labour. It then sought to 
entrench the positions of whites through laws such as the Wages Act (1925) and the Mines 
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and Works Act (1926). While the Wages Act provided for the unilateral determination of 
wages and conditions of work by the white employer, this was permitted only if there was no 
agreement between him and the white employees. This was provided for under the Industrial 
Conciliation Act (1924), which sought to centralise labour relations.  
 
There was no such statutory bargaining position accorded to blacks. South African labour 
relations were also influenced by Verwoerd’s ‘Bantustan’ master plan. For example, in South 
West Africa, the 1964 Odendaal Commission Report recommended that 40 per cent of the 
territory should be sub-divided into ‘homelands’ or ‘Bantustans’ for the natives and the rest 
permanently reserved for whites. This entailed the forced relocation of about 40,000 Africans 
from reserves, farms or urban locations.50 
 
In South Africa, therefore, the main thrust of state activity from the colonial era until recently 
had been a legislative regime that promoted the supremacy of the white employer and the 
formalisation of a dual system of labour relations. The most definitive statutes of the 
structured social cleavage were the Masters and Servants Acts. These Acts, which were 
passed between 1856 and 1904 (in the four territories), remained in force after the ratification 
of the Union. They made it a criminal offence to breach the contract of employment as earlier 
indicated. Desertion, subjectively defined insolence, drunkenness, negligence and strikes 
were also criminal offences. Theoretically, these laws applied to all races, but the courts held 
that the laws applied only to unskilled work, which was performed mostly by black people.51  
 
Although the Masters and Servants Act had begun the process through the criminalisation of 
contractual breaches, the Black Labour Relations Act52 became the high water mark of this 
policy. It retained the penal provisions and imposed certain legal duties on both employers 
and employees.53 The Labour Relations Act, enacted after the Wiehahn Commission Report 
of 1979, did little to assuage the tension within the black populace, as it excluded farm and 
domestic workers.54 The labour unrests of 1973 around Durban and that of Soweto in 1976 
demonstrated the explosions of disenchantment at the levels of legalised discrimination and 
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exploitation. More importantly, such institutionalised social injustices found their way into 
the causes of labour disputes because of the socio-economic effects of wage dependency.  
 
2.2.3      The colonial experience in Swaziland 
 
In keeping with the structure of this study, an investigation of the history of labour and the 
embedded causes of disputes in Swaziland is required. This will provide not only a historical 
setting but a longitudinal perspective on the legislative and socio-political issues and policy 
reactions that shaped the present situation in Swaziland.  
 
Swaziland is a kingdom purportedly governed as a sort of modernised traditional monarchy. 
In reality, the king embodies legislative, judicial and executive powers. The legal system is a 
dualist mixture of unwritten law and custom, with enacted laws and administrative agencies 
created by a partially elected Parliament. The 1968 Constitution was abolished in 1973 and 
the political expression of opinion became possible only via the semi-elected Parliament and 
the ‘Tinkhundla’ system of village-level meetings of a supposedly non-partisan nature.55 
 
To a large extent, Swaziland is still what it was carved out to be: a dependent economy and a 
haven for entrepreneurs, mainly from South Africa. Most of the population engage in 
subsistence agriculture. Therefore, it operates a free market economy with little or no central 
intervention. The king, with his coalition elite, operates a quasi-corporate organisation by 
Royal Charter, which maintains large investments in the major sectors of the economy, such 
as industry, agriculture and services that need partnership with foreign investors.56 The Swazi 
king used ‘concessionairing’ as a trade-off for stability and security. The immediate but long-
lasting result of this was that the most viable areas of land were handed over to expatriates 
who, while achieving freehold rights, created the impression of being usufruct holders in 
conformity with the cultural norms of the Swazis in relation to communal property.   
 
2.2.3.1      Creating an exploitative environment 
 
The genesis of Swaziland’s labour laws lay in the perceived need to contain and 
accommodate socio-economic changes likely to flow from the structural economic disparities 
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that expropriation and starvation wages were likely to produce. In political terms, annexation 
was deemed to imply absolute jurisdiction and sovereignty. However, Swaziland remained 
essentially a protectorate, a labour reserve to be utilised by both South Africa and Britain at 
minimal cost. 
 
It needs to be remembered that the regime of laws was, for the most part, the same for all the 
three High Commission Territories (HCTs) that had identical judicial systems. These systems 
were later headed by an HCT Court of Appeal established by an Order in Council in 1955. It 
is equally important to remember that although judges, in theory, do not make law, by merely 
expounding on the unknown they turn it into law and thus impact on its shape and form. They 
were therefore equally instrumental in the evolution and impact of the legal framework.57 The 
first anti-labour law was the Swaziland African Labour Proclamation 45 of 1954. This was 
intended to consolidate and amend the law relating to the recruitment and the contracts of 
employment of African workers in Swaziland.   
 
The Proclamation defined a ‘contract’ contextually as service by a manual worker (para 2) 
and also provided for labour agents and runners. The Proclamation further defined a ‘worker’ 
as specifically an African and by implication excluded blacks from the purview of the 
common-law notions of contract.  It constructed a special contract status for Natives subject 
only to changes by the Resident Commissioner. This regime of laws also included the 
following statutes: the Aliens Act, the Employment of Women and Children Act,  Incitement 
of Natives to Rebellion Proclamation (1899), the Maintenance of Peace Act (1907), the 
Master and Servants Act (1925), the Native Administration (Consolidation) Acts (1941, 
1950), the  Native Labour Contracts of Employment Act (1942), the Trade Unions and Trade 
Disputes Act (1942), the Workmen’s Compensation Act (1949), and the Works and 
Machinery Act (1934), among others.  
 
Given the levels of socio-economic activity the only purpose of these laws could have been to 
severely regulate, control and, where necessary, exact free labour as punishment. Through 
these legislative mechanisms, the HCTs became labour reserves for the sugar plantations and 
mines in South Africa and Swaziland. This state of affairs produced the first indigenous 
labour agitation in the form of a strike in the Havelock Asbestos Mine in 1948.  By 1962, the 
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Swaziland Mining Workers Union was formally established and operational, with the next 
two years witnessing a spate of labour unrests, arrests, trials and imprisonment. These 
workplace reactions were protests against a system perceived to be inhumane, callous and 
exploitative. 
 
By 1960, the capitalist expansion through the repressive taxation and externalisation of 
labour power resulted in a shortage of labour for the domestic market. As a result, the need 
arose for some form of improvement in labour conditions for inducement and retention 
purposes. Between 1960 and 1980, events had created a situation that called for a new 
appraisal of labour issues. One event was the strike of 1963. The state reacted in fear and 
called for external assistance to quell the strike. 
 
2.2.4           The Basutoland experience 
 
The British did little to develop Basutoland, which increasingly became regarded as little 
more than a labour reserve to service the needs of the farmers of the Orange Free State and 
the gold mines of the Witwatersrand.58 This position was confirmed by Elredge.59 As with 
other British colonies, the contradictions between emerging and rapid social and economic 
change and the outmoded forms of indirect rule became pronounced.60 A new sense of 
nationalism and entitlement resulted in a challenge to the legitimacy of both the colonialist 
power and its collaborationist traditional elite. The emergence and impact of apartheid in the 
South African economic strata, where the majority of Basotho males worked and earned their 
living, had a direct and radicalising effect on the socio-economic and political dynamics of 
the society.61 For example, the kingdom’s most fertile land – and what would later be most of 
its mineral deposits – was ceded to South Africa.62 This left the Basotho with only barren 
mountains and isolated villages. 
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In the late 1970s, well over half of Lesotho’s labour force worked in South Africa, sending 
back remittances that comprised some 70 per cent of Lesotho’s rural household income.63 
The migrant labour pattern continued unabated as Sotho workers continued to pour into the 
mines to sell their labour for cash and firearms. The situation was the same in Bechuanaland. 
 
2.2.5          The colonial administration and labour in Bechuanaland 
 
The dual system in South Africa, which was creating a segregated social class system, was 
reflected in Bechuanaland laws such as the Native Affairs Proclamation, the African 
Education Proclamation and the Credit Sales to Natives Proclamation (1932). These and 
other laws were repealed only in 1964 under the General Law (Removal of Discrimination) 
Revision Law. The functional interdependence between Bechuanaland and South Africa was 
driven primarily by economics, but buttressed by legislation and the import of expatriates to 
run the administrative and regulatory affairs of the territory. By 1949, 495 out of 600 civil 
servants in the HCTs were South African whites.64 On the other hand, the Hut Tax 
Proclamation (1899) in Bechuanaland became the catalyst for externalising black labour to 
augment the local black South African workforce. The punitive repercussions of the hut tax 
induced labour to migrate to the farms and mines of South Africa in order to pay the levy 
imposed on all males to finance the protection of Bechuanaland. 
 
Proclamation No 7 of 1909 subsequently raised the hut tax, deepening the reliance on the 
externalised sale of labour power. It also compelled collaboration between the chiefs as 
commission earners or salaried supervisors, the colonial government and the mining 
industry.65 Drought, pestilence, taxation and collaboration therefore became instrumental in 
the structural transformation of the Protectorate into a labour pool. However, it was 
legislation that sustained the momentum, providing the coercive engine for the 
implementation of the process.   
 
The physical delimitation of tribal reserves intentionally resulted in the curtailing of 
traditional authority. The tribal reserves were reduced to 40 per cent of the most unproductive 
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parts of the territory. The 1893 Concessions Commission demarcated the rest into freeholds 
and Crown land.66 Through these laws, by 1960, out of a population of 526,000, 50,000 
Batswana became migrant contract workers in South African mines, 44 per cent of whom 
were below 16 years of age.67   
 
2.2.5.1 The regulatory state in Bechuanaland 
 
The General Law (Cape Statutes) Revision 2 (1959) set out to transfer certain laws of the 
Cape Colony of Good Hope into Bechuanaland, while repealing other laws. Some of these 
repealed laws had been declared to be irrelevant, obsolete and unnecessary in the 
circumstances of the territory and as such should no longer be in force. However, s 3(d) also 
provided that nothing implied the discontinuation of the application of Roman-Dutch 
common law in the territory. Therefore, by 1959, Roman-Dutch law had been firmly 
entrenched in the territory for 73 years. 
 
 As a result, these laws permeated all facets of civic life. The Native Administration 
Proclamation (Cap 56) legalised forced labour for public works and appropriated 60 days a 
year for civic duties.68 With regard to employment law, the most important law was the 
Master and Servants Act of 185669 of the Cape Colony.  Its main object was to provide for 
the regulation of the rights and duties of masters and servants. Though its definition of the 
‘employment contract’ has not changed to date, the implicit assumption of subordination was, 
at that time, implied in the concept of ‘master’ and ‘servant’.  
 
It appears therefore that a much longer period and further orientation is needed to rid post-
colonial countries of their contradictory attachment to the past when regulating the present 
and determining the future. 
 
2.2.5.2   Conclusion 
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Labour legislation, including the above-mentioned Act of 1963, a patchwork from Jamaica, 
Trinidad (1927) and Tanganyika (Employment Ordinance Cap 366 of 1955), was thus a 
concoction, usually with a South African origin and flavour. The generality of these 
employment-related laws was meant to facilitate regulation, control and exploitation.  
Nevertheless, their pervasive influence in several spheres cannot be ignored. First, it must be 
accepted that, in the British colonies, forced labour became a dominant defining character of 
the relationship between the colonial master and the colonised servant. Subsequent changes 
to fit the mould of the common-law notions of private transactions implying exchange of 
services for reward within a contractual framework were purely cosmetic.  
 
As has become clear, the hut tax was a subterfuge. It was supposed to provide revenue for the 
development of the colonies, but this revenue was in fact a pittance. In British Colonial 
Africa, there was an upsurge in the formation of trade unions and strikes. These unions were 
established in reaction to blatant socio-economic conditions or privation, deprivation and 
expropriation. Any demonstrations of political consciousness or maturity had a class 
character as workers became increasingly informed about socio-economic differentiation and 
administratively engineered stratifications. The question still remains whether, outside South 
Africa, most of the colonised countries in the sub-region deserved and still require the maze 
of labour law regimes with which they are burdened. 
 
The colonial experience in Africa suggests a nexus between labour policy, legislation and the 
shape and content of the social impact of their implementation. It also suggests a linkage 
between colonial and post-colonial labour policies and approaches that can only be described 
as ‘path dependency’. The outcomes in all these periods have been trade disputes and social 
and political conflict. The laws legalised oppressive workplace practices, which in turn 
triggered conflicts with repercussions for the wider society. In effect, throughout history, 
state-initiated interventions using legislation as a tool have been largely ineffectual in 
resolving workplace disputes. This is due mainly to structural contradictions inherent in the 
nature of the state, as has become increasingly evident. 
 
The essence of this chapter thus lies in its reliance on history, observations and anecdotal 
records to look back into the birth process of labour within the broad framework of social 
development. This is done with the intention of deriving certain linkages to modern social 
practices. Such linkages, it is hoped, will then assist in finding permanent and better solutions 
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to recurrent, intractable problems. An overarching caveat is that, given the varying layers of 
jurisdiction at play in any social structure or set-up, controversies between groups can be 
more pronounced than harmony because they symbolise differences in human expectations. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Conceptual Debates in the Context of Labour Law and Disputes 
 
3.1     Introduction  
 
In chapter 2, a case for contextual and historical dimensions to the study was presented on the 
understanding that much can be unravelled from an examination of the past, in terms of the 
evolution of ideas and the dynamics of societal events. The chapter sought to undertake a 
historical survey of labour legislation and potential sources of disputes both in Europe and in 
Africa, with particular attention being paid to Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. The chapter 
concluded that there is evidence of a linkage between the labour law regimes, the attitudes 
and ideological orientation of the state, socio-economic realities, and labour disputes.  
 
Chapter 3 provides a basis for the ideas that inform and guide this study in its 
interdisciplinary approach. It also forms the conceptual platform on which the study is 
premised as it seeks to confirm certain analytical conclusions. These theoretical issues that 
are relevant to the study need to be identified and explored. The chapter’s aim is thus to 
ascertain how these discourses inform and guide the study. The chapter is divided into several 
sections, each providing a summary of a theoretical position and its resulting debates. These 
sections include theories of labour law, work and employment, changes in labour law 
conceptualisation, the notions of law in society or law and society, law in context, disputes, 
industrial relations, labour disputes, the state, and forms of regulation and their impact on 
functional inter-relationships. 
 
This study asserts that all legal forms including labour law and its institutions are invariably 
linked to social reality. Furthermore, it appears that mainstream lawyers either do not 
understand or are simply dismissive of any mention of law that does not yield to the closed 
and exclusive nature of the legal profession. A survey of these concepts is intended to show 
that traditional law – which encompasses juridical tenets, common-law precedent, judicial 
decisions, case law and statutory rules – is not the only analytical tool for understanding 
society and social behaviour. The study shows further that a preoccupation with offences, 
defences, sentences and coercion deriving from substantive law is not adequate to explain 
why labour disputes frequently occur and appear to defy settlement and resolution. 
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3.2   Theories on labour law and disputes 
3.2.1    Introduction 
 
Ehrlich postulated that ‘the centre of gravity of legal development therefore from time 
immemorial has not lain in the activity of the state but in society itself, and must be sought 
there at the present time.’70 Therefore, the posited or ‘positive’, organic law would, in a 
sense, come into conflict with the ‘living law’ of a society. Such living law represents 
society’s implicit rules of conduct and not impositions by any rational legal authority. By 
deduction, the state is an intellectual construct that is subsequently manifested in institutions 
capable of wielding coercive authority. Its interventions in social arrangements, particularly 
regarding dispute resolution, without due consultation, can prove irksome. A sociology of 
law is therefore rooted in society, while law is only a contrived means of regulating society 
along some arbitrarily determined pattern rather than the determinant of societal formations. 
This statement may appear to contradict Luhman’s position where he elevates and gives 
prominence to law. As he sees it, 
 
[a]ll collective human life is directly shaped by law. Law is like knowledge, an essential and all 
pervasive fact of the social condition.71 
 
As opposed to Luhman’s perceptions, the conclusion by the study above stands and is 
supported by Habermas, who argues that law ought to be a system or an institution that 
responds to the popular interests of the ordinary man in his sphere of life. Law ought to 
facilitate both individual and public autonomy, the enjoyment of which the law must ensure 
to warrant its legitimisation.72 
 
With regard to socio-legal studies, Travers and Banakar see a close affinity between law and 
society or the study of law-in-society. This is because the sociology of law, seen as the source 
of socio-legal studies, employs social theories while applying socio-scientific methods to the 
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study of law.73 This is why Cotterell is supposed to have described the sociology of law 
without reference to sociology in general as ‘the systematic, theoretically grounded, empirical 
study of law as a set of social practices or an aspect of the field of social experience.’74 
Society pre-dates individual existence and therefore it is only natural to be curious about how 
organised groups and institutions are created to provide social order. To this extent, any legal 
system ought to be able to ensure institutions for the interpretation and application of 
meaningful legal rules.  
 
These institutions are embedded in normal life and therefore intrude into the life of the 
society. These realities are captured within the parameters of the sociology of law also 
because law could be viewed as bonding society.75 In the light of the discussions above, the 
method of this study may not be socio-legal but it is interdisciplinary, using society as its 
context and examining the role of law and its institutions therein. Essentially, law also 
evolves over time with new social and economic demands.76 However, much as this 
demonstrates an affinity between law and society, and therefore a justification of a sociology 
of law, the law can still be divided into ‘law in the books’ and ‘law in action’.77  
 
Friedman looks at the other side, describing socio-legal studies as ‘an inconclusive or 
incoherent jumble of case studies’.78 On the other hand, even Banakar and Travers consider 
socio-legal studies to be a source of innovation.79 Travers, in particular, clarifies their 
position when he describes socio-legal studies as a sub-field of social policy, ‘mainly 
concerned with influencing or serving government policy in the provision of legal services.’80  
As a result, the area of socio-legal studies has given up any aspirations it once had to develop 
general theories about the policy process.81 Socio-legal studies and research consider the law 
and the processes of law-making or legal procedure as going beyond the substantive legal text 
to include socio-political and economic considerations. Thomas raised the discourse bar by 
saying that a key belief that underpins socio-legal studies is its fully-fledged ‘law in context’ 
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approach. He states that ‘empirically, law is a component part of the wider social and 
political structure, is inextricably related to it in an infinite variety of ways, and can therefore 
only be properly understood if studied in that context.’82 
 
Socio-legal studies are about how ordinary people experience the imposition of legal 
authority, and deals with the historical purpose of law.83 Socio-legal studies can be described 
as dealing with the experiential values of law as an instrument of history and the inter- and 
multi-disciplinary character of history.84 If this is the case, then a study that covers the 
historical interplay of law in discrete societies may be considered socio-legal without the 
rigidities of socio-legal research methodology. Socio-legal studies are therefore a 
manifestation of a commitment to ‘a distinctly interdisciplinary analysis of law as a social 
phenomenon’,85 deriving from a basis in institutional legal history. 
 
 3.2.2   Law and society and law in context  
 
Travers notes that the Law and Society Association or Movement (LSA) was established 
after the Second World War through the initiative of sociologists with a vested interest in the 
study of law. The rationale for the movement was that ‘law is a massive vital presence. It is 
too important to be left to lawyers.’86 The founders believed that ‘the study of law and legal 
institutions in the social context could be constituted as a scholarly field distinguished by its 
commitment to interdisciplinary dialogue and multi-disciplinary research methods.’87 
 
Travers differentiates between the sociology of law and law and society: the latter does not 
limit itself theoretically or methodologically to sociology and tries to accommodate insights 
from all social science disciplines. The original empirical studies of the 1970s and1980s on 
conflict and dispute resolution are important for this study. Felstiner focused on alternative 
ways of solving conflicts and, together with Abel and Sarat, developed the idea of a disputes 
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pyramid and the formula of ‘naming, blaming, claiming’, which refers to different stages of 
conflict resolution.88    
 
Friedman describes the LSA as a scholarly enterprise that explains or describes legal 
phenomena in social terms or the relationship between legal and non-legal phenomena.89 It is 
also a general commitment to approaching law with a vision and with methods that are 
external to law but share a commitment to explaining legal phenomena within their social 
setting.90 A major thrust of the LSA is that legal systems are basically social objects and that 
law varies in time and location according to the conditions of the culture of the place. Again, 
the instrumentality of law is emphasised, together with its human or social context. 
According to Nelken, ‘the goal of relating “law” to “society” by examining social sources 
and effects of legal rules and ideas and the way law is shaped by and helps shape its historical 
setting is a central aspect of social theorizing.’91 
 
Its aim is not only to de-rigidify law but also to examine it in the context of society and social 
phenomena as ‘a loose, wriggling, changing subject matter, shot through and through with 
normative ideas. It is a science about something thoroughly unscientific.’92 The LSA 
acknowledges that the prime mover of legal change is social demands on its institutions. The 
legal system, given its exposed position, is forced to respond to demands. Thus, where the 
impact of law on society elicits demands for change, legal institutions must respond. 
Therefore, if LSA research ascertains miscarriages of justice, abuses of power or authority, or 
unlawful acts such as wrongful dismissals, it behoves the legal system to remedy these. 
 
The LSA uses the terms ‘law in action’ and ‘law in context’. Essentially, they all refer to the 
study of legal institutions, drawing the reference into the core of social, placing the law 
within the framework of social science life. Law in context points to the many ways that law 
and its norms and institutions are shaped by the culture, organisational ethos, norms and 
value systems of a society.93 In contextualising law, one seeks to address how and to what 
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extent law has provided a framework for or facilitated economic development, social change 
and political evolution, modified the contents of a society’s legal system, or provided 
evidence for a better understanding of that society.94  
 
As succinctly put by Parker and Gunningham, ‘[l]aw cannot be treated as a discrete set of 
principles without a context.’95 That said, it must be pointed out that the objective of the 
study is not to isolate law within a given social context and then proceed to observe it. From 
the sociological and social points of view, there are so many undercurrents that give 
direction, character and shape to law. The study acknowledges that, within the context of 
labour disputes, law plays a significant role through its instrumentality and the intermediary 
institutions it creates as agents. To this extent, this study is not about law per se but law in 
action within a social context and the effects thereof.  
 
It is precisely because of these realities as enunciated above that Fuller thinks law and society 
are too interconnected to be differentiated as ‘law and society’ instead of ‘law in society’.96 It 
is not clear whether this inclination is in pursuit of the ‘fit’ debate as alluded to by Nelken, 
which questions whether law ‘fits’ into social conditions or whether social conditions are 
determined by law.97 Suffice it to say that law must mirror the dynamics and nuances of 
societal development. For example, how does it assist in mediating workplace disputes 
through functionally appropriate institutions? 
 
Society and, by extension, social support is important for the legitimisation of law and its 
fusion with other institutions is the key to its usefulness. In effect, patterns of social change 
create the justification for law and help dictate its character. Such realities of social life 
include labour disputes.98 Selznick notes that even positive law with all its premises, 
institutions and sustaining culture ‘is framed by and implicated in a particular social and 
historical context.’99 Although this may be so, history demonstrates that positive (organic) 
law has been the instrument of much deprivation and repression. With the benefit of 
hindsight, law has not always been impacted upon by historical contexts, at least not in its 
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several attempts to rewrite history instead of addressing contemporary problems, such as 
those faced in southern Africa within the domain of employment relations. 
 
Therefore there is a need to understand the chosen context such as Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland. Such an understanding must cover the peculiarities, problems and existing 
conditions. The rationale is to make law more effective and responsive. This is the principle 
referred to as fidelity to context.100 The rationale is that an analysis of the institutions such as 
those created to deal with labour issues or the prevailing social environment should provide 
indicators for appropriate rules and procedures. This will facilitate the appreciation of the 
genuine needs so as to be able to respond to realistic circumstances without compromising 
the required standards of legality and morality.  
 
In sum, ‘law in context’ is not intended to take fidelity to context as an absolute. It should be 
seen as a process that needs to be subjected to and controlled within the confines of universal 
standards and ideals of freedom, fairness, rationality, justice, empowerment and growth, 
among others.101 The goal therefore is to realise relevant and enriching ideals within a given 
context. For the study, this would mean how to eliminate injustice and acrimony in the 
workplace and generate industrial peace and amity in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. 
 
3.3    Labour law: Past and present  
3.3.1   Introduction 
 
The previous section dealt with variants of legal disciplines and the inter-relationships that 
have come to underpin studies about the impact of labour law on societies. This section is not 
intended to be a restatement of labour law in its narrow traditional confines but in its many 
ramifications, because a preliminary investigation has shown that the concept is increasingly 
assuming an amorphous shape. The chapter is therefore intended as a discussion of the broad 
terrain of labour law from different perspectives, thereby covering a wide scope of debates on 
the subject. 
 
According to Arthurs, labour law has never had a precise meaning. On the one hand, it might 
be broadly defined as the norms, processes and institutions by which the state regulates or 
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mediates relations between employers and employees. Such a definition would extend the 
reach of labour law to include many legal regimes, such as taxation, intellectual property, 
international trade and social insurance, which shape labour markets and therefore work 
relations.102 He goes on to suggest that, while definitions of ‘labour law’ are likely to vary 
between countries, legal cultures and historical eras, any definition of labour law will contain 
the theme of relations between workers and employers. 
 
As this study shows in chapter 2, workplace relations and labour market regulation pre-date 
any consistent and concise assembly of material subsequently referred to as ‘labour law’. 
Furthermore, Arthurs adds that industrial disputes, trade union affairs, employment contracts, 
workplace safety, compensation for injuries and maximum hours of work had all become 
subjects of legislation, judicial pronouncements and legal texts by the end of the nineteenth 
century.103 He sees labour law in its generality as a derivative of all legal disciplines captured 
in the figure below. 
 
3.3.2     Sources of law and labour law application 
 
SOURCES OF LAW LABOUR LAW APPLICATION 
Special labour laws  
Collective labour legislation Relations between unions, employers and 
workers 
Employment standards legislation Floor of rights, negotiations over floor 
Occupational health and safety, 
workers’ compensation legislation 
Reduces industrial accidents and illnesses, 
provides compensation 
Social legislation Unemployment, illness, retirement, training 
Fundamental law  
Human rights legislation Discrimination, harassment 
Constitution; Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms 
Regulatory jurisdiction, equality, mobility, 
access to collective bargaining, strikes and 
picketing 
General law  
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Criminal law Picketing 
Tort law Picketing, strikes, boycotts, workplace injury 
Contract law Employment contract, internal union affairs 
Property law Picketing, union solicitation 
Trust law Pension and benefit funds 
Administrative law Judicial review of labour tribunals 
Specific statutory regimes  
Competition law Employer associations 
Corporate law Employee voice, management responsibilities 
Intellectual property law Non-competition, ownership of inventions 
Immigration law Migrant workers 
Taxation law Self-employment 
Trade law Goods excluded if child or convict labour 
International law  
UN charters of human and social 
rights 
Freedom of association and equality 
ILO conventions Directly bind or influence interpretation of 
domestic labour law 
NAALC, EU Social chapter Labour dimension of economic integration 
Non-state law  
Transnational law Codes of conduct 
Government procurement policies Minimum standards, employment equity 
Custom or usage Quotidian rules of workplace 
[Source: Arthurs ‘Labour Law as the Law of Economic Subordination and Resistance: A Thought Experiment’ 
Labour Law Research Network, Inaugural Conference, June 2013] 
 
Others may define labour law as including components such as ‘atypical, casual, temporary 
or precarious work arrangements’.104 There are also the ‘target’, transient employees who 
seek work to satisfy a specific need. Others are excluded completely from the protective and 
regulatory embrace of their labour law regimes. Therefore, the best functional approach is 
neither ‘complete universalism [n]or extreme selectivity’.105 In other words, labour law can 
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be captured when work-related rights and regulations apply only to ‘employees’ as defined 
but then other legal rights should be open to all claimants of whatever rights and largesse the 
state may provide.106 
 
For example, from 1992, the Labour Code Order of Lesotho conferred the status of employee 
on anyone working under a contract with an employer in any capacity, whether in a rural or 
urban area, including domestic servants.107 In Swaziland, the employment contract is defined 
as covering anyone engaged in a contract of service, apprenticeship or training. An employee 
is a person who works for pay or remuneration under a contract of service or under any other 
arrangement that involves control. This also means a sustained dependence on the employer 
for the provision of work. In this regard ‘control’ can imply the inclusion or not of such 
protection and benefits decreed by law or agreed upon outside the framework of the law.108 
This suggests a differentiated status classification between the one who commands and the 
one who obeys. 
 
As this study intends to show, the preambles, for example, offer lofty ideals but empirical 
evidence demonstrates an utter disregard for the statutory provisions. Domestic servants have 
only recently been brought within the ambit of the laws, while workers in agricultural 
enterprises do not include all categories of farm workers.  
 
Botswana also has an Employment Act which stipulates that an employee is one who entered 
into a contract of employment for the hire of his or her labour and specifically excludes 
certain groups of employees, subject to other legislative regimes.109 It also includes the 
proviso that the employee must be subject to control and direction as to what service to 
provide. In the context of labour law, therefore, Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland may be 
described as coming from a mixed socio-legal background that has produced a similarity of 
legal regimes. Constitutional provisions underpin fundamental rights and obligations. Codes 
of practice seek to humanise and fill the gaps arising from statutory provisions.  
 
In these countries, responsibility for labour dispute adjudication is allocated to the labour 
bureaucratic structures. Industrial Courts have been established, clothed in most instances 
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with exclusive jurisdiction over trade disputes and functioning as courts of law and equity.  
The Charter of Fundamental Social Rights in the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) was adopted in 2001 and signed by the Heads of Member States in 2003. It is hoped 
that, once domesticated, it will complete the existing labour law framework. These on-going 
interventions form a critical part of this study because there is evidence of increasing external 
influence, as a result of which the domestication of international minimum labour standards 
appears to be imminent, if not already occurring. 
 
In comparative terms, Cabrelli seems to summarise the essence of labour law as distilled in 
the works of the foremost proponents. He begins with Lord Wedderburn.110 In defining 
labour law, Wedderburn considers the following as components. First, there must be an 
employment relationship between an employee and employer. Within the environment of 
work, employees will be socialised into collective decision-making. They would then want 
the employer to endorse this as binding on all, hence the collective bargaining and agreement 
with statutory implications. In addition, protective and regulatory intervention exists to 
mediate the relationship. Freedom of association, recognition agreements, the inherent right 
to industrial action under given conditions and the employers’ prerogative to resort to lock-
outs also help to define the scope of labour law. 
 
Cabrelli proceeds to say that, according to Lord Millet, it is generally recognised today that 
‘work is one of the defining features of people’s lives’.111 Relying on several other sources, 
Cabrelli concludes that one possible way of describing a contract of employment in modern 
terms is as a relational contract. Further, since the common law is in a state of continuous 
judicial development so as to reflect the changing perceptions of the community, contracts of 
employment are no longer regarded as purely commercial contracts entered into between free 
and equal agents.112 Assuming these conclusions are valid, then the concept and scope of 
labour law needs to be revisited. 
 
3.4 Reconceptualising labour law 
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Conflicting tenets appear to characterise the field of labour law. These include granting 
individual autonomy to all those active ‘on the labour market’ to interact and freely make 
contracts, and ‘facilitating the roles of these actors and their actions by legal means, thus 
establishing order in their ways of interacting and contracting; and offering protection to 
workers, compensating by legal means for substantial inequalities in their bargaining position 
towards employers’.113 As noted elsewhere, ‘classical’ labour law was supposed to realise its 
aims by creating a relatively autonomous domain of law, deriving mainly from substantive 
regulation of the ‘normal’ contract of employment at the level of the nation state. These 
regulations would then be legitimised by the political need of protection of workers.114  
 
3.4.1   Substantive issues 
 
This section follows from the need to answer the concerns above and, by so doing, to 
substantiate or rebut certain assumptions about labour law. Primarily, labour legislation is 
deemed to intrude in the domain of the employment relationship by seeking to regulate its 
dynamics. In the contemporary context, therefore, the ‘concern with the correction of 
inequalities in bargaining power via the prophylactic of labour law or the social practice of 
collective bargaining has lost much of its force.’115 Some proponents have provided various 
justifications for a re-visit of the traditional notions of common law. Ultimately these, in 
practice, would affect the scope of both substantive law and other legal rules that are brought 
to bear on the environment of work and perhaps temper and mediate the current volatility of 
labour relations in the countries examined in this study. 
 
The employment contract is the bane of the employment relationship. Contemporary 
employment law uses it as a basis for determining who is an employee. However, this derives 
from the general principles of contract, underpinned by the notion of the mutuality of 
obligations. This also rests on an assumption of choice, control and risk: choice because there 
is an assumption of free will; control in terms of the judicial assumption of the employer’s 
prerogative; and risk because the transaction carries liabilities and protection.116 Empirically, 
these assumptions are wrong and should not continue to form the basis of workplace law. In 
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effect, these traditional notions that inform judicial decisions are not employed to benefit the 
worker, but rather help to perpetuate the myth of freedom of contract. 
 
Ipso facto, the concept of a free market premised on the commodification of the worker ought 
to be jettisoned as a defining attribute of the employment relationship. Since it is inherently 
integral to the worker, labour or the reproduction of the worker’s productive capacity cannot 
be commodified without the person.117 While accepting the need to work within a framework 
of doctrinal and contractual analysis of the juridical sphere of individual and personal work 
relations, the question posed by Freedland and Kountouris is whether the institutionalised 
employment contract serves the purpose of conferring status or a functional relationship.118 
 
If one may paraphrase Mitchells, the concern should arise from the empirical fact that there 
have been changes resulting in an increase in new forms of a-contractual, atypical and non-
standard forms of employment, a problem that the recasting of the theory of the labour 
market can solve. Davidov, on the other hand, is of the opinion that these do not warrant a 
new paradigmatic shift but an adaptation of labour law to meet these challenges.119 In the 
context of this study, it is not a re-conceptualisation that is called for, but a candid assessment 
of the inadequacies of labour law as currently understood and implemented. The ongoing 
institutionalisation of the inequality of bargaining power implies that current labour law has 
been unable to correct this. Doing this would have resulted in the regulation of labour market 
failures, the achievement of efficient labour markets and the realisation of social justice 
through the rejection of the commodification of labour.120  
 
That said, it must not be forgotten that– 
the most important shift in the discipline has been away from collective bargaining towards 
individualization, whether in the form of the contract of employment, human rights and anti-
discrimination law, or employment standards.... In official accounts of labour law, 
redistribution and protection have given way to competition and flexibility. Forms of work 
outside of the standard employment relationship have proliferated and the scope of collective 
bargaining has contracted in most developed economies. These empirical changes have resulted 
                                                          
117 Clarke ‘Individual and Collective Regulation of Labour Relations’ Centre for Comparative Labour Studies, 
University of Warwick-Beijing Labour Conference 2004. 
118 Freedland & Kountouris ‘Towards a Comparative Theory of the Contractual Construction of Personal Work 
Relations in Europe’ (2008) 37(1) Industrial Law Journal 49–74. 
119 Ibid 5. 
120 Cabrelli op cit 13. 
44 
 
in a conceptual and normative crisis in labour law, and a concomitant loss of prestige. Labour 
law's crisis both reflects and is part of a broader conceptual and normative shift within society 
and the academy.121 
 
There is the perception that labour law, particularly in terms of the judicial rules and 
standards review in areas such as rationality, reasonableness and proportionality, undermines 
employer prerogative and by so doing impedes business efficiency. Thus what is referred to 
as ‘labour law red tape’ must give way to deregulation so as to remove the ‘sclerotic’ effects 
of labour law on economic development and to allow the system to self-adjust where labour 
markets appear to fail.122 This moves the arguments to the arena of globalisation and trans-
territorial labour law. 
 
3.4.2   Globalisation and trans-territorialism in the context of labour law 
 
Globalisation and the attendant economic restructuring have led to the devaluation of 
traditional labour law. The by-product is the spawning of an internationalised ‘new’ economy 
involving ‘networked, boundary-less, even virtual organizations’ that employ floating 
professionals on project-specific terms.123 Further, globalisation has also led to an increase in 
precarious, dependent and socially marginalised work, where workers are employed as 
casuals or on specific contracts. As a result, they acquire few transferable and marketable 
skills, work unsociable hours in an environment bereft of collective association and unions, 
and where the legislative intervention of the state is considered as interference and intrusion 
so that the presence of the state becomes increasingly weakened.124 The increasing evidence 
of the absence of collective bargaining law and protective legislation leads to concerns about 
the efficacy of labour law. 
 
The precarious class emerges without occupational citizenship rights or any of the normal 
safety rules at work.125 Industrial citizenship rights and protection cover labour market 
conditions, employment, occupational safety, work and environment work competence, 
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income and collective representation.126 ‘The precariat is formed by global competition, 
inequality and re-commodification in a new global class structure as one of the seven classes. 
The seven classes include the ‘global elite, the salariat (civil servants and private high-paid 
employees), the proficians (technicians and professionals), the core workers (a withering 
working class), the precariat, the unemployed and the detached (modern ‘lumpen 
proletariat’).’127 Globalisation has affected even new theoretical positions and debates on 
labour and created doubts in the arena of international labour studies, thus creating an 
amalgam of unworkable paradigms. 
 
3.4.3    The way forward: Paradigmatic shifts or pragmatic adaptation 
 
In reaction to the labour problem arising with the advent of globalisation, it has been 
suggested that transnational labour regulation (TLR) could be the answer. Kolben defines 
TLR as ‘the field of law that concerns the regulation of work in the transnational sphere’.128 It 
is expansive in scope and constituted by a number of regulatory and academic fields that 
impact transnational work, including labour law. He states that, because of TLR’s 
heterogeneous roots of regulatory and political theory, it is often described as a spider’s web 
or a mosaic.129 Its major component is governance. He adds further that governance is a 
theoretical model applied to problems of global labour regulation but primarily referring to a 
body of regulatory and social science scholarship that describes the uncoupling and 
decentralising of regulatory authority and functions from the state and government to other 
regulatory layers, which are often subordinate.   
 
In essence, the main thrust of the TLR agenda appears to be to cast the state as incapable of 
regulating, and thus unable to monopolise, law and law-making. Teubner notes that this 
situation gives birth to legal pluralism or multi-layered law-making and a resultant reflexive 
legislative responsibility. In an adroit manner, the state is neutralised and trans-territorial 
corporations can now make their own rules.130 In a competitive world, this is a recipe for 
anarchy. Who then regulates the regulator, particularly where the justification is that 
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developing states have weak and deficient labour law systems, lack accountable governance, 
and literally require dismantling and restructuring to suit the proponents of globalisation?  
A clearer view emerges from Kolben’s exploratory and analytical thesis. The grand aim is the 
transformation of the regulatory state and the limitation of its capacity by devolving 
regulatory authority to multinational corporations (MNCs).131 He states that developing 
countries should not be analysed in the same way as developed ones are analysed. While 
there is over-juridification and unresponsive regulation in the West, in the developing 
countries the basic problems are the failure of the rule of law, under-developed regulatory 
regimes, and a lack of capacity to generate and enforce rules and norms. Furthermore, labour 
institutions are often under-resourced, corrupt and lethargic.132 A universal, common law for 
all states, premised on Watson-style translocation and transplantation in different contexts, 
would simply not work, given the differences.133  
 
Going back to Davidov, the concerns about workers’ rights as human rights, labour peace and 
stability have come to underpin and indeed qualify what is considered to be the emerging re-
conceptualisation of labour law.134 This is the context of what Mantouvalou describes as 
strategies of determination, being the ‘positivist’ approach, where labour rights are 
incorporated into international treaties and conventions or domesticated by way of ratification 
of a floor of fundamental rights, as in the SADC Charter on Fundamental Social Rights and 
the core conventions of the ILO.135 The other instrumental approach is determining ‘whether 
labour rights really are promoted within the framework of human rights.’136 
 
 3.4.4   The employment contract, the worker and employment relations law 
 
The employment contract, whether considered outside the confines of the concept of 
economic superiority and subordination or not, will always exhibit the linkage factor of 
resistance.137  
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The contract of service then becomes the basis for the antithetical relationship between a 
group that appropriates and utilises labour and a group that offers the service under 
conditions of subordination. However, subordination per se cannot describe the relationship, 
because in hierarchically structured organisations there is necessarily super-ordination and 
subordination. This locates the relationship within the ambit of an unequal exchange with the 
attendant unequal economic returns and thus economic dependence. This can be structurally 
contrived in situations where macro-level economic policy and political authority intervene. 
 
The labour contract is said to be the cornerstone on which labour law stands,138 but it would 
appear that although the contract marks the starting point of labour law, it is only a 
constituent part. Kahn-Freund had described the contract as a figment of the legal mind.  
Developments over the years have shown that it is both a historical inheritance and a 
consciously institutionalised core element of the employment relationship. In Kahn-Freund’s 
view, the main object of labour law is to be a countervailing force to counter the inequality of 
bargaining power that is necessarily inherent in the employment relationship.139 Again, 
contemporary observations of the law at work suggest that labour law has failed in this task 
because the employment contract is intrinsically related to production, not the equality nor 
indispensability of labour power. 
 
Labour power in this context means the capacity for labour, competencies or skills, 
knowledge and physical attributes. Labour law is deemed to have been built on two 
complementary pillars: the autonomy of collective bargaining and state intervention.140 In 
reality, while collective bargaining is a process, both internal organisational rules and 
legislation are facts.  Submission and subordination therefore occur in the course of 
actualisation of labour power. This process is also referred to as of the economics of 
production or the extension of capital. This process of economic production is then bolstered 
by the assumed privacy of the employment contract. 
 
In view of all these developments, Kahn-Freund’s work resulted in a move away from legal 
categorisation into contract, tort and statutory prescriptions as the basis for labour law. The 
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concept of labour law through the analysis of collective bargaining, trade unions and disputes 
within a regulatory framework was introduced. Labour law thus became affiliated to 
workplace relations, industrial relations and collective bargaining. What it failed to do was to 
reconstruct the work contract, contextualise it and allocate a specific definition to it outside 
both common law and economics.  
 
It is noteworthy that, given the historical context of labour law, a South African viewpoint is 
that while contemporary labour law scholars recognise that the role of collective bargaining is 
diminishing and new institutions will have to emerge, the broad family of labour law theorists 
and proponents agree that labour law’s normative function must be about addressing the 
disproportionate access to economic power between capital and labour.141 Broembsen notes 
that Hepple (who is also South African) reminded us that ‘the prime purpose of labour law is 
still to establish a countervailing power in the labour market which assures equality of 
position between employers and the collective organizations of workers.’142 Much as it is 
generally agreed that labour should not be commodified, definitions of labour law still 
identify the private market transaction in contract as the basis of the employment relationship 
and proceed to regard labour markets just like any other markets, irrespective of the human 
factor as opposed to inanimate products. In realising the present difficulty in attaining these 
lofty ideals,  Broembsen accepts that, by definition, labour law is inherently concerned with 
protecting human dignity. 
 
Broembsen then borrows from Standing’s distinction between work and labour, where he 
describes work as an activity that encompasses ‘creative, conceptual and analytic thinking 
and use of manual aptitudes’. Standing further says that work is ‘rounded activity combining 
creative, conceptual and analytical thinking and use of manual aptitudes’.143  
 
This primary human activity is reflective and contemplative because, according to Cato, in 
reference to man in action, ‘[n]ever is he more active than when he does nothing’.144 Standing 
described labour as ‘arduous – perhaps alienated work – and epistemologically it conveys a 
sense of pain – animal laborans. We may define labour as activity done under some duress, 
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and some form of control by others or by institutions or by technology, or more likely by a 
combination of all three.’145 
 
Put otherwise, work involves the individual in interaction with fellow persons and nature and 
is therefore an activity or a series of linked actions, using mental activity, physical activity or 
both to achieve a predetermined objective. ‘Labour’, on the other hand, derived from the 
Latin word laborem, means toil or arduous undertaking. In labour is implied onerous work, 
usually manual agricultural work. The word ‘labour’ in Greek is ponos or pain, while the 
French word travailleur means a person subject to torture with a nasty instrument, through 
constant use. Labour is thus activity pursued under constraints. 
 
Unmediated labour markets, where contract remains a dominant expression of supply and 
demand, therefore place labourers in a vulnerable position, with concomitant risks to their 
human dignity. Von Broembsen observes that, as a bulwark against capital’s proclivity to 
commodify labour, labour law’s ‘project’ has been to provide both a procedural framework 
for the bargaining process and substantive minimum protections for employees. It is clear that 
all the observations and conclusions of the foremost labour theorists point to a dysfunctional 
disjuncture that is traceable to both the juridical and judicial acknowledgement of the 
common-law free-market force of contract. 
 
It may be assumed that labour law’s rationale is based on labour’s unequal bargaining power. 
Also, the work environment may be faced with myriad challenges from the human 
interactional perspective. For this study, the position is that labour law has to be about labour 
and labourers, irrespective of other perceptions, otherwise it ceases to be of relevance. Work, 
as it is understood, is the application of labour power emanating from the worker. Work was 
not intended to be the process engineered to extract surplus value through greater productive 
effort. Embedded in the work relations are issues which have no defining legal concept. This 
does not mean they do not exist.  
 
The notion of a floor of rights defining workplace relationships exists. Given the 
discrepancies between municipal laws and ILO conventions, labour law should demonstrate a 
concern for how these basic rights are translated into statutory provisions, bearing in mind 
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Teubner’s warning.  He cautioned that legal institutions may not be easily transferable unless 
one prepares for a mutation that is the result of both the donor and the recipient adapting their 
contexts. As such, systemic transplants are not like the transfer of a part of one machine into 
another.146 This study considers the adoption of the ILO core conventions and the spirit that 
infuses them as an adequate substitute for any selective redefinition of the contract, which 
runs the risk of over-definition. 
 
Imposing subjective legal rules without sensitivity to need and relevance results in either 
resistance or instrumental compliance. It is not surprising if labour law that seeks to augment 
the powerful position of the employer becomes the cause of labour disputes. A key to 
dissipating labour disputes lies in equalising the contributory potential of all players, not 
perpetrating the notion of a contract for service between a master and a servant in the face of 
an avowed mutuality of service. 
 
In the context of Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland the observations above all have some 
validity, which this study intends to test. The study asserts that, by implication, the crisis of 
labour law is caused partly by its apparent inability to grasp the complex character of the 
social challenges that it confronts in order to solve them.147 Law, particularly labour law, 
requires an appreciation of the interdisciplinary nature of its composition. The issues 
involved deal more with social effects than abstract rules. To this extent, therefore, while the 
law makes greater social sense in given contexts, the philosophy informing it is equally 
important. To grasp this, one cannot ignore the roots of law and the lessons and directions 
such origins offer. In effect, labour law cannot exist without law.  
 
It is the contention of this study that the connection between history, law and social 
development, and the interrelatedness of the legal rules pertaining to the labour and 
employment relations of the countries being studied need to be identified. These have at 
certain stages in their social development experienced the same or similar forms of economic 
exchanges, including political and other forms of administration. To understand these 
phenomena is not a question of the uniqueness or exclusivity of legal expertise but an 
acknowledgement of the contribution of law.  
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Rules of law derive from facts of human nature and history.148 Rules derive from perceived 
public authority rather than social custom, which may derive from personal authority, whims 
or caprice. In an ordered society, there are laws and institutions for seeking redress and 
imposing penalties. Law, therefore, is a matter of fact for the conduct of social life and, by 
extension, labour law is for the conduct of work life. To reiterate, according to Teubner, 
subsystems within each society make legal rules precisely because the dominant state as the 
major source of regulatory law is unable to centrally implement its legal rules.149 Ultimately 
it creates institutions of administrative authority capable of sub-regulating. Such over-
bureaucratisation leads to what Teubner refers to as ‘juridification’.150  
 
Juridification is also perceived as the result of ‘motorised legislation’. By this, Smith means– 
 
the sheer volume of laws, their complexity and inter-connection and their constantly changing 
nature make the application and knowledge  of them, even by specialist lawyers, doubtful. 
Laws and subsidiary legislation cover kilometres of shelf space and the operation of law 
becomes ever costlier.151   
 
Thus, a labour or industrial relations system would normally experience regulatory 
intervention by the state and its institutions, and the influence of the constitution, codes, 
collective bargaining agreements, structured rules and regulations, custom and practices 
encapsulated in both the individual and collective labour law regimes.   
 
Practically, the proliferation of institutions or structures all aimed at dispute resolution results 
not only in petty centres of power but also in a replication of rules, procedures and the 
normalisation of ad hoc measures. The state, by intervening in labour relations both as an 
arbiter and employer, then becomes synonymous with juridification. If indeed each 
subsystem creates legal order, then the phenomenon of legal pluralism results.152 If these 
subsystems are complementary, Teubner asks the following question: at what point do 
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independent collective bargaining agreements or ‘group autonomy’153 or the autonomy of 
workers clash with the legal rules of the employer? 
 
The rules of law are not rules of morality even if their logic and authority emanates from 
collectively experienced norms and morals. For example, the concept of the vicarious 
responsibility of an employer for an employee’s actions is not rooted in moral equity but in 
the legal fact of the instrumentality of supervision and subordination arising under the 
common-law employment relationship. This institutional evolution within the sphere of the 
state produces internal differentiation with co-existence. These institutions operate within a 
given order of social power which in itself is dynamic. In effect, labour law and industrial 
relations are subject to the vagaries of the wider socio-economic and political variables.154   
 
Work relations could be better studied through examination and evaluation of the form, 
function and purpose of a given set of rules and how these are applied. As techniques for 
regulating social power, they are, however, not enough to explain the phenomena associated 
with labour: its psychological, political, economic, spiritual and cultural permutations. An 
understanding of the law would also include its interdisciplinary linkages with human 
resources management, trade union history, labour economics and the sociology of labour.155 
Labour law is not and should not be merely a collection of precepts and rules devoid of an 
environmental context reflecting different socio-economic objectives. 
 
In defining labour law, therefore, this study is mindful of other usages. The concept may 
encompass industrial safety, employment, and industrial relations law.156  Labour law should 
therefore be seen holistically as involving discipline, statutes (both regulatory and auxiliary), 
standards and collective bargaining. Its sources are the common law, social legislation, codes 
of practice, public law, administrative practices and government institutions, the state, 
constitutional provisions and the courts. In the search for a revitalisation of labour law, it 
should be remembered that, as opposed to the international labour standards of the ILO, any 
ultimate preference for a global labour law can only be premised on a particular, contextual 
understanding. 
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This understanding is that a concept of a global labour law emanates from a regime that is a 
product of the co-evolutionary internal differentiation of world law. It is the change in labour 
law by transforming institutions, not by changing substantive rules. Its driving force, 
constitutionalism in this context, implies corporate responsibility and how the codes of 
conduct of multi-national corporations are implemented. It is therefore the indirect 
globalisation of labour law.157 The role that labour plays in all these debates is the next 
concern. 
 
3.4.5        Labour or employment law? 
 
The first issue is whether law regulates production or the relationship between the owner of 
the reproducible labour power and the employer. Either way, employment relations or 
employment is a more apt description of such law or legal regime. Therefore, this discussion 
will, following Standing, use the words ‘labourer’ or ‘worker’ to signify the employee or 
worker, and the term ‘employment law’ in the place of labour law. For now, labour law may 
still be overshadowed by the common law, particularly in the courts of Botswana and 
Swaziland, where it enjoys an understandably pervasive continuity. Therefore, work-related 
judicial decisions still follow precedent and procedure, and the employer prerogative and 
archetypal models of the master–servant relationship also prevail. These claim the 
universality of a subjective determination of the doctrine of reciprocity.   
 
It is argued further that the mutuality of obligations also enables– 
 
the employee to trade-off subordination or acceptance of the employer’s right to give 
instructions and to organise the carrying out of the work, in return for certain protections; at a 
basic level, a regular wage which a self-employed person would not expect to receive, at a more 
extended level, the full set of income and job security rights which go with continuous service 
under the current provision of employment protection legislation.158  
 
                                                          
157 Rogowski op. cit. (2013) 1-267 
158 Ibid  208. 
54 
 
This argument is indicative of the current debates on the sanctity of the contract, the judicial 
tendency to uphold ‘non-mutuality’ clauses, and the purposive assault on collective 
agreements and unionisation among the multi-faceted problems of labour law.159 
 
Mitchell asserts that, functionally, labour law would mean the law of the individual worker, 
the job seeker, the unemployed and the marginalised.160 Should labour law be considered in 
terms of purpose, it would mean a social framework within which workers negotiate their 
rights and interest with employers through collective organisations.161 This entails collective 
bargaining structures, collective representative organisations, and implicitly the right to 
industrial action as a countervailing force to the employers’ power and unilateral right of 
termination. This accepts a necessary socialisation of the actors in the production process. 
 
In view of this, the labour law regimes in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland initially reflected 
only the preoccupation of those anxious to regulate the extraction of raw materials and the 
creation of labour reservoirs. Work has been defined as activity undertaken with our hands 
that gives objectivity to the world, or as effort aimed at redefining people in their relationship 
to nature.162 But work as full-time activity is new in relation to work as a necessary social 
function. Paid work or occupational work locates the person within one form of market or the 
other but also carries certain social perceptions of status. This is why an ex-officer or 
functionary would choose to be referred to as a retired general or permanent secretary as a 
claim to social status. According to Grint, ‘the language and discourse of work are symbolic 
representations through which meanings and social interests are constructed, mediated and 
deployed.’163 
 
Thus, when the state imposes the definitive term ‘contract’ on the employment relationship 
and confers the status of ‘economically active’ on those it perceives as contributing to fiscal 
and economic revenue, work assumes both political and economic connotations. Employment 
has therefore become the institution within which the social process of work occurs. As a 
result, it shapes identity as much as it produces goods and services.164 The proletarius in 
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Roman times was the servant of the state, a person without property, coming from the lowest 
class of the community, without capital, a serf or wage worker.165 
 
In such an environment, employment relations create a scenario in which the employer 
affects the employee in a manner contrary to the employee’s interests. Fox quotes Gouldner 
on the relationship between work relations and the need for law:   
 
‘A technologically advanced civilization reduces and standardizes the skills required for wanted 
performances: it simplifies and mechanizes many tasks. It is therefore not as dependant on the 
rhetoric of morality or the mobilization of moral sentiment to ensure desired performances. 
Thus, within the technologically advanced sectors of society, individuals are less likely to be 
required to possess moral qualities and to be treated as moral actors …. For men are becoming 
more interchangeable, more replaceable, and removable at lower costs …. 166In other words, 
men are less likely to experience themselves as potent and in control of their own destinies as 
bureaucracy, technocracy, and science become increasingly autonomous and powerful forces 
by which men feel entrapped. Men’s capacity and need to see themselves as moral actors are 
threatened. Many, therefore, will be disposed either to reassert their potency per se, 
aggressively or violently and without regard to the moral character of such affirmation, or to 
relinquish the entire assumption that they are moral actors and capable of moral action’.167 
 
To achieve this end, Marx proposed that the key to the organisation of work lies in the 
broader society in which it is embedded.168 The social structure itself is determined by 
prevailing relations of production reducible to the nature and control over property rights 
relative to the labour process and relations of production.169 For Marx, the critical locus of 
alienation comes to be situated in the workplace. The decisive form of alienation is not that of 
man but the worker’s alienation from objects that he or she produces and from the means of 
production with which he or she produces them. 
 
This alienation, Marx came to hold, was a result of property institutions essential to 
capitalism. These derive from the division of labour in which some capitalists own and direct 
the means of production and purchase the labour power of others, such as the proletariat, who 
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are subject to their domination. By reason of their ownership of the means of production, the 
capitalist can direct their use and also own the products they produce.170 This nexus is 
essentially antagonistic. Such a relational phenomenon cannot purport to underpin industrial 
democracy as it already functions as the prime mover for the prevailing, institutionalised 
inequalities.  
 
The worker, as the owner of labour power, is socialised into an organised production chain 
Therefore, the employee becomes a victim of the scientific process of the domination of 
nature. Such domination is not exercised by the labourer, but rather he or she is dominated in 
the capitalist process of dominating nature. This more often than not results in a form of 
division of labour that translates into the deskilling of the worker. This labour process also 
engenders an ideologically driven objective socialisation process for the attainment of 
specific goals.171 The presumption that the end justifies the means is fallacious, in that a 
worker who perceives him- or herself as exploited has nothing to celebrate in the spoils of 
economic inequality, hence the development of disputes. 
 
Labour disputes are thus the result of a relational permanence that is not easily resolved. 
From the foregoing, the study makes certain deductive assertions. The first is that reward 
systems that accompany the division of and reproduction of labour do not represent the true 
value of individualised labour in real terms. They are artificial impositions or the results of 
valorisation. This is a process that places more pressure on production capacity, dictating 
more quantitative socialisation and a preference for numbers. This may at times be at the 
expense of skills and specialisation and may also require technological re-skilling. 
 
This can be read as a reason for the modern-day clamour for the internationalisation of labour 
law and labour markets under the guise of globalisation.172 The net result is that with less 
skill comes lesser marketability of the worker, weak negotiating capacity, and vulnerability to 
employer machinations. Economic returns or rewards are naturally therefore a factor of 
labour disputes. The employment contract, being one of service, defines the economic 
relationship of domination and subordination based on an imbalance in bargaining power, 
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and therefore a perennial need for accumulation of power and leverage. Labour theory of 
value then attempts a more pragmatic definition of the relationship between labour as a 
function of the capitalist process of accumulation.173  
 
However, there is one very important difference between labour-power and other 
commodities, in that labour-power is embodied in human beings who can think, act and 
struggle to get the best price for what they are selling. Otherwise, its value is fixed in the 
same way as that of other commodities. The worker is capable of quantifying the amount of 
socially necessary labour spent on creating it and recreating it. The labour spent on creating a 
person’s labour power is that spent on producing the food, clothing, shelter and the other 
things needed to keep him or her in a fit state to work. Thus the value of an unskilled person’s 
labour-power can be measured in terms of the ability to keep him and his family alive. This is 
the source of the living wage. To increase access to higher economic returns while making 
profit for the employer calls for a different tactical approach. He can combat this inequality 
only by attaining associational rights as a member of a trade union. 
 
For this study, it is clear that social arrangements are utilised to ensure the stable continuation 
of the economic imbalance between the labourer and the master. The net result is the 
employer’s desire to maximise control, tempered only by a fear of worker revolt. The 
worker’s desire for equality of power or at least some respect from the employer is tempered 
by fear of interdiction and dismissal. It is thus logical to conclude here that employment 
relations deals with the realities of workplace antagonism, measures of containment and 
tactical concessions, rather than theoretical postulations and assumptions. This is addressed in 
the next section. 
 
3.5    The theory of labour disputes and conflicts 
 
In the previous section, an attempt was made not only to define labour in terms of work and 
the worker, but also to posit the worker as a victim in the socialisation necessary for the 
extraction of profit.  In this section the origins of disputes will be identified and they will be 
located within the context of employment relations. This section therefore attempts an 
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understanding of disputes both as a theoretical construct and as a reality. This task is 
approached from both a historical and contemporary perspective.  
 
The section seeks to examine the framework that  enables disagreements, grievances, friction, 
conflict and other forms of manifestation of dissatisfaction in the workplace to be holistically 
and collectively described as ‘labour disputes’. Finally, it is guided by the fact that theory is 
based on observations unless deductive, and in turn serves practice.174 A theory is expected to 
be internally coherent and plausible, capable of providing explanations for external events 
and possible predictions. To this extent, a selection of expositions are briefly discussed in this 
section to facilitate a deeper grasp of industrial disputes as social phenomena.  
 
This discussion begins with a quote: ‘Where people work together in an employing 
organization it would be expecting too much of human nature that disputes should not arise 
between employers and workers and for that matter between different groups of workers and 
within management.’175  Anstey quotes from the United Nations (UN) as follows: preventive 
diplomacy is- 
 
[a]ction to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from 
escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter.176 He quotes further that 
preventive diplomacy is also– 
 
[e]mployed to forestall policies that create social and political tension. These policies include 
human right violations such as denial of individual’s freedom of expression or right to a fair 
trial) or discrimination against people on grounds of ethnic, linguistic or religious identity or 
political belief … [It is] by definition low key, undramatic, invisible but it is cheaper than peace 
keeping or war.177  
 
Labour disputes are conflicts of views between employers and employees. Disputes cover a 
wide variety of situations and their commonest manifestation is the strike. Thus the strike, as 
a collective phenomenon, facilitates the expression of conflict.178 Conflict prevention 
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presumes the escalation of disputes as suggested by the UN and, in fact, trade disputes are the 
description for normal short-term workplace disagreements.179 Conflict as commonly used is 
synonymous with preventive diplomacy or conflict prevention. There is prevention connoting 
conflict containment, through dispute settlement and conflict resolution. Ordinary prevention 
is directed at removing potential triggers of conflict and promoting conditions in which 
collaborative and valued relationships control behaviours.180 It would appear then that 
disputes are necessarily internal, capable of being settled via alternative methods. Settlement 
is thus different from resolution, which often involves judicial decision-making. 
 
As observed earlier, labour relations and concomitant disputes and conflicts lack a theoretical 
platform. These episodes therefore become anecdotes along a narrative path as conflicts, 
unions and regulation become the definition instead of the characteristics within a 
framework. Shalev addresses this problem by pointing out the contemporary concerns with 
industrial relations theory. The first is whether a core theory is required within a self-
justifying stand-alone discipline. This is relevant because it would appear, according to Cox, 
that theorising is only about ‘problem solving in intent, positivist in epistemology and 
functionalist in method.’181 The second concern is whether industrial relations theory should 
be based on assumptions of consensus and stability or those of conflict and change. The third 
concern is about how to advance knowledge about industrial relations. To this end, Shalev 
refers to the manner in which legal rules or outcomes reflect the realities of the objective 
constraints on employee and employer relations in the environment of work. These may be 
economic, technical or political.182 
 
In agreeing with Shalev, this study notes that conflict and change are intrinsic to work 
relations and the external socio-economic dynamics cannot be divorced from workplace 
relations, primarily because the workplace is a microcosm of the larger society and, secondly, 
because socio-economic forces and societal demands impact on plant-level participatory 
arrangements.183 With due respect, Shalev, apparently in search of either a deductive or 
inductive theoretical base, now falls back on the old approach of measuring industrial 
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relations using factors such as the occurrence of strikes in different contexts. That being so, a 
more concise definition of conflict could be helpful. 
 
3.5.1   Historical dimension 
 
In keeping with the theme of chapter 2, it can be assumed that, with regard to Africa, the 
historical framework of labour disputes has been established. This is because the indicators so 
far suggest that strikes and legislation appear to form the major bases of good industrial 
relations. Like Japan, Europe experienced peasant rebellions as mainly sporadic outbursts of 
explosive class-experienced discontent. These were essentially conflicts over systems vying 
for dominance and the balancing of perceived inequalities. Though these conflicts were often 
brutally suppressed, the wisdom of negotiation finally became evident. Within these contexts, 
these rebellions were purely economic and essentially work-related rather than political. 
There were peasant revolts in France (1358), England (1381), Zurich (1489), and Germany 
(1520), the Kett’s Rebellion (in England in 1549), the Diggers and Levellers movements (in 
England in the seventeenth century) and the Irish tithe war (1831 to 1838).184 
 
Italy offers a testimony of how evolutionary trends shape employer–employee state 
relationships through a list of the causes of disputes over the period from 1969 to 1978. This 
study considers historical and contemporaneous discussions as essentially continuities of the 
same. Therefore, the following issues are assumed to represent causes of disputes generally, 
although with different contextual variables. These factors or causes are covered below. 
 
 The failure of state policy to keep a non-inflationary context under control; 
 A rapid growth in conflicts by 1969, associated with greater wage demands by 
workers of all ranks, coupled with a diffusion of bargaining and conflict in individual 
firms and a widening of union objectives; 
 A rapid increase in labour productivity, cuts in work time, increase in work intensity, 
pressure on labour formations and the failure of the National Economic Plan for 1966 
to 1970 (Programma Economico Nazionale) regarding social objectives such as 
income and employment differentials and social investment; 
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 The unsatisfied demand of workers for public goods and services and the failure of 
the state to provide the promised social safety net. In 1969, therefore, there was a 
strong demand from the working class for higher wages and better working 
conditions; 
 The growth of industrial concentration, the rise of the modern formalisation of work 
and work contracts against the informal sector, and the exclusion of some from the 
formal labour market; 
 The greater homogeneity of the workforce led to greater and more cohesive 
aggregation of complaints coupled with fundamental changes in worker formations 
and labour laws (e.g. the statuto dei lavoratori, which granted more basic rights to 
workers and unions, making it hard for employers to dismiss workers).185 
 
These developments led to disputes and subsequently to conflicts. The conflicts, the 
combative and defensive reactions and such demonstrations were manifestations of the fact 
that ‘social systems are the products of interaction between environmental conditions and 
strategic choices made by their stakeholder as they seek to protect and advance their 
interests.’186 An inspection of the histories of the developing countries shows a close 
similarity to Italy in its march towards full industrialisation. Ultimately, both sides see the 
futility of bellicosity and therefore arrive at a compromise to develop long-term policy 
founded on informed analysis, so that problems can be addressed before they mature into 
conflicts. In short, the lessons of the past led to the transformation of trade guilds into unions. 
Institutionalised liberalism formalised both corporate and collective employee autonomy, and 
statutorily entrenched this and the negotiation processes. The result, according to Anstey, was 
the demise of the struggle over which system to adopt. In its place came internal forms short-
term   dispute resolution.187 
 
It is worth noting that, since the end of the Second World War, industrial relations had 
resisted all forms of concise definition. There were attempts to define disputes and conflicts 
but it would seem that, too often, the symptoms were mistaken for the disease. One definition 
was the following:  
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Industrial conflict is a somewhat ambiguous term, since it includes every type of dispute 
between employer and worker; it covers the whole gamut of action that might be taken by 
employers and workers as a means of expressing their dissatisfaction with the other party to the 
employment contract or collective agreement.188 
 
The definition then goes on to state that ‘industrial conflict means the strike and lockout’ and 
is a part of the seamless web of industrial relations.189 The workplace is generally considered 
to be an environment for constant acrimonious confrontations. Several studies have 
considered the causes of disputes in the workplace and many have developed comprehensive 
lists of factors. Roberts states that contractual problems flow from a combination of employee 
uncertainty and a limited ability to think and communicate.190 They suggest that there are 
three basic factors that drive the development of disputes. One is a high degree of uncertainty 
arising from the complexity and dynamics of the terms and conditions of contract and labour 
legislation. The second factor is imperfect contracts that do not and cannot predict possible 
future problems. The third factor is the opportunistic behaviour of many parties who try to 
take advantage of one another in the competitive labour market to the disadvantage of the 
worker.191 
 
It appears that, to many observers, workplace relations are perceived as dispute-prone, 
litigious, adversarial and a creator of many unnecessary conflictual situations. It is suggested 
that this perception may in fact be based upon a claims culture that frequently results in 
lengthy negotiations in order to settle the claims.  
 
Below is a summary of Kumaraswamy’s examination of the common causes of claims and 
conflict in the course of construction projects. The constant rancour between employees and 
employers (contractors, consultants and clients) as to the causes of construction claims led 
him to differentiate between ‘root’ causes and ‘proximate’ causes. The ‘root’ causes are not 
immediately observable. They are the seeds of potential conflict sown at the commencement 
of the relationship, for example, unfair or unclear risk allocation. ‘Proximate’ causes are 
immediately apparent, for example, poor conditions of work, occupational risks and hazards, 
poor wages, or delayed wages.   
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These and other causes lead to claims or demands that originate from variable, unsatisfactory 
factors. These causative factors are explained below. 
 
3.5.2   Common root causes 
 
These include unfair risk allocation in the division of labour and tasks, unclear risk allocation, 
uncontrollable external events, an adversarial culture, an inappropriate contract type, a lack of 
competence, the deliberate deskilling of workers and resultant lack of professionalism, 
unrealistic expectations, poor communication, interpersonal clashes, vested interests and 
internal disputes. 
 
3.5.3   Common proximate causes 
 
These emanate from and replicate the root causes, which may be historical, economic, 
ideological and systemic. Being the seedbeds of disputes, they ultimately transform disputes 
into conflicts, protracted, sometimes exogenous or externalised, but often intractable.192  
What is clear for the foregoing is that there are myriad causes of disputes. Subsumed within 
this plethora are core labour problems. Removed from this seething mass, labour disputes   
assume their own problematic shape, size and dynamics. 
 
Authors such as Roberts define industrial conflict as follows; [i]ndustrial conflict is defined 
as every type of dispute between employer and worker; it covers the whole gamut of action 
that might be taken by employers and workers as a means of expressing their dissatisfaction 
with the other party.193 He goes on to say that ‘industrial conflict means the strike or lock-
out’.194 Neither of these define labour disputes but rather illustrate them. A strike is a 
manifestation of a dispute just as other forms of expression of dissatisfaction are. 
 
Labour disputes are generally grouped as disputes of right and disputes of interest. A dispute 
of rights deals with the interpretation and application of the provisions of any relevant Act, 
the terms and conditions of a contract and its existence or not and the resultant legal rights. It 
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also includes collective agreements, their actual existence or not, and the recognition of trade 
unions. On the other hand, a dispute of interest deals with any other matters that are work- 
related, such as wage increments.195 From the definitions in the Trade Disputes Act 
(Botswana) and the Lesotho Labour Code Order, it is evident that labour disputes can 
emanate from minor lapses in workplace administration.196 A grievance can therefore be a 
complaint, real or ill-founded, laid by an employee against the behaviour of anyone in 
management.197 Disciplinary issues are those complaints raised by management against 
employees.  
 
Grievances and disciplinary issues are intended to be managed through established codes and 
procedures. Integral to this is the process of negotiation, where two parties come together to 
effect consensual agreements through persuasion and constructive compromise.198  
Bargaining is where parties propose changes to the status quo and trade-off positions as 
necessary. In effect, a dispute calling for statutory intervention is one that could be an 
outgrowth of the degree of loss or acrimony in these transactional experiences. Complaints 
may be individual or collective. Individual complaints may be of a legal nature and generally 
concern the variation of terms and conditions, have no public profile, do not affect 
productivity, and therefore have little or no impact on social peace. However, because they 
give rise to different interpretations of enforceable standards of a jurisprudential nature, they 
could become a source of public concern and a cause of changes to public policy. 
 
3.5.4   Wheeler’s integrative theory 
 
                                                          
195 The Lesotho Labour Code Order defines a dispute of right as ‘a dispute concerning the application and 
interpretation of any provision of the Labour Code or any other labour law, collective agreement or contact of 
employment’. A dispute of interest is defined as ‘a trade dispute concerning a matter of mutual interest to 
employees but does not include a dispute of right’ (Lesotho Labour Code Amendment, Gazette No. 30 of 25 
April 2000. 
Under the Trade Disputes Act [Cap 48:02] of Botswana, the coverage is more detailed, and reads as follows: a 
dispute of right means ‘a dispute concerning an infringement of a right flowing from statutory law, collective 
agreements or individual employment contracts, or the conferment of a benefit to which the claimant is legally 
entitled’. A dispute of interest is a dispute ‘concerning the creation of new terms and conditions of employment 
or the variation of existing terms and conditions of employment’. 
196 Ibid.  
197 Genard & Judge Employment Relations (1997) 147. 
198 Kumaraswamy  supra 
65 
 
Wheeler’s interpretation takes a different approach. His integrative theory of industrial 
disputes hinges on five pillars.199 The first is that humanity exhibits some innate 
predispositions that do not derive only from economic rationality and reaction to 
environmental determinism,200 but also from internally driven needs as enunciated by Rostow 
in his hierarchy of needs. Secondly, there is the inclination towards material and social 
dominance. The second pillar is based on the assumption that disputes are grounded in 
material and social dominance.201 There are also humanity’s expectations and achievements, 
which are based on the gaps between the expectations and achievements of workers, and 
which are seen as a necessary condition for disputes. Where an employer is unsuccessful in 
closing such gaps, he or she produces a readiness for aggressive action via a frustration–
aggression path.  
 
This readiness for aggressive action may be traceable to frustration, threats and a perception 
of discriminatory activities that disadvantage the worker within his or her orbit of 
comparisons.202 Therefore, a decision to adopt the frustration–aggression path results from 
the inability to actualise intense material resources or dominance, the process for which is 
blocked, inducing courage and anger. Removal of expected returns may also point the way to 
threats. Rational calculations are then used to opt for aggression on a cost-benefit basis.203 
This fifth pillar is manifested through the strike and other forms of confrontation and protest. 
Generally, however, such action requires the existence of bands of loyalty, or affection 
exhibited within a given collective community. Solidarity and hope of success become 
essential requirements, coupled with the organisational ability of a leadership. 
 
Disputes may not explode into disruptive behaviour where their tactical and strategic value 
could be wasted. In a work situation, the use of the threat of collective industrial action 
becomes more effective than its actualisation, due to the possibility of such action backfiring 
on the workers themselves.204 In sum, the integrative theory postulates the certain 
environmental factors that are required for labour disputes as above. Wheeler’s postulations 
reflect reality and can be seen at play in the workplace. To this extent, they satisfy the quest 
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for coherence and plausibility while facilitating a better comprehension of the dynamics of 
the workplace. 
 
Kulcsar and Cain debate what they refer to as the ‘dispute industry’ at various theoretical 
levels. In their theory of universality, there is the assumption that disputes are generic to 
human society as societal relations play a role in the disputing process. This is akin to non-
equilibrium being the regenerative tool for the survival, growth and response of societal 
systems to internal and internal conditions. This notion also finds affinity in the idea that 
trouble triggers organisational change. The notion of disputes derives from fundamental 
tenets of legal ideology. Law is utilised to resolve disputes. The concept of disputes 
depoliticises conflicts.205 The contentious issue is whether law becomes a conscious social 
tool for dispute resolution or whether disputes, endemic as they are, can be resolved without 
recourse to the law. By extension, the presumption that legal institutions are the best ways of 
settling disputes becomes rebuttable. 
 
The individual, as a bearer of rights, expects the law to provide the means for redressing 
social conflict where the remedial capacity of the law is evident. Industrial conflict, as 
traditionally understood, refers to all types of disputes between the employer and worker and 
the manifestations thereof.206 Generally, disputes may arise from unsatisfied political 
demands for reforms, social services, and other societal expectations.207 It is equally 
important to note that the organic law as erected, can, of its own accord, become the course of 
labour disputes. 
 
3.6      The theory of ideological functionalism  
 
This theory postulates that members of society expect to experience justice. Therefore, 
conflict may be either functional or dysfunctional because society, being order-prone, views 
disputes as temporary disorder. Similarly, disputes could be utilised to trigger changes within 
the system or to paralyse it. However, this deals more with the functions of disputes rather 
than the root causes. It is appreciated that labour disputes can be triggered for non-industrial 
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purposes: Anstey alludes to this in respect of the political role of the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) in South Africa’s struggle against the apartheid state.208 
 
3.6.1    The theory of the qualitative identity  
 
With reference to the parties, this theory presupposes that, according to pluralist conflict 
theory, actors in a dispute may differ in power or skill levels but only in one dimension. 
Power, money and skills could be given to the party in need and the difference disappears. In 
effect, the difference between an employer and employee is mainly quantitative. In legal 
ideology, both are identical but not the same. A theorised microcosmic nature of the 
workplace would better explain the latent differences. For example, knowledge (ideology) 
and organisation (politics) may be reducible to a quantitative dimension (economy). The 
reality, however, is that social and organisational stratification within the workplace 
precludes the equality of the actors.209 Thus, the study argues, the inherent structural 
inequalities and their actual manifestations cause disputes. 
 
3.7   Transformational stages of disputes 
 
Some fundamental distinctions are useful at this point. A dispute is taken to mean a situation 
where a claim has been rejected, a claim being an assertion by one of the parties to a 
perceived right. This rejection may be in part or in whole or the claim may simply be ignored 
by the other party. Essentially it is objective in nature because an independent third party can 
recognise and observe the main characteristics and be able to state that a dispute exists. It 
may, however, not be as clear cut in a practical situation. According to Felstiner et al210 the 
important transformations of disputes are naming, blaming and claiming. An individual or a 
party may suffer an injurious experience and, for it to be a grievance, he or she must 
recognise and label it, hence the first transformation: ‘naming’. The second transformation 
occurs when this grievance is attributed to the fault of the other party: ‘blaming’. The next 
transformation occurs under the heading ‘claiming’, when the grievance is voiced to the party 
believed to be at fault. The final transformation occurs when the grievance is rejected, in 
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whole or in part, or is ignored by the other party. The key words to identify a dispute are 
therefore a claim and rejection.  
 
The major stages in Felstiner’s model are thus naming, which is recognising an experience as 
injurious and labelling the problem, and blaming or attributing the cause of the problem to 
another person. It also involves claiming, that is, informing the person believed to be at fault 
with the substance of the complaint and the declaration of a dispute, which occurs when the 
other person either rejects the claim, in whole or in part, or ignores the claim. In addition to 
these observable processes, Felstiner et al make specific observations on the characteristics of 
the transformations that occur during the process.  
 
3.7.1    Contextualising labour dispute resolution 
 
The concept of disputes has been important to legal anthropology since Gulliver’s seminal 
work.211 According to Moore,212 specifically, the modern concept of disputes is rooted in 
anthropological studies of law, social control and conflict theory. Kulcsar and Cain had 
earlier postulated that because society, by definition, is ordered, disputes are moments of 
social disorder and therefore transient.213 The problem, at this juncture, is that of recurrence 
of the transient social disorder. For immediate purposes, the discourse is narrowed to 
definitive issues relating to the labour process through the employment contract and how the 
process generates disputes. 
 
The area of labour dispute resolution is arguably well explored, except when one talks of the 
complex political and legal phenomenon of disputes, the centrality of the state and the 
comparative stature of International Labour Standards (ILS) in the schema in southern Africa. 
Most southern African countries have established statutory structures such as Industrial 
Courts, tribunals, commissions and boards. The most preferred methods of resolving disputes 
are collectively referred to as alternative dispute resolution (ADR), which covers any means 
of settling disputes outside the courtroom and the formal processes of statutory arbitration. 
Some are voluntary, while others are mandatory. They include, among others, negotiation, 
consultation, conciliation, mediation and adjudication. 
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This indicates that one critical aspect of understanding the cause of disputes and the current 
modus operandi for their resolution is to examine and evaluate the form, function and 
purpose of the rules created to regulate social power. These forms of regulation and 
procedures give rise to conflicts. However, as Crouch214 has explained, instrumental 
compliance and relations only reflect market relations. They do not reflect political power 
relations in terms of legitimacy and authority. In effect, simmering anger may be papered 
over by compliance, but the socio-political allegiances of the same workers should not be 
taken for granted. Along the spectrum of power relations, one resilient and intransigent 
element underpinning labour disputes is the often dehumanising commodification of labour. 
 
3.7.2   Conclusion 
 
Labour law has a necessary historical dimension as exemplified in the doctrine of precedent. 
Law is a historical process of evolutionary development where common law and equity 
judges have incrementally developed principles and where, from time to time, legislative 
intervention has sent that development off on a different course. But even where the 
legislature has intervened to prescribe or codify the law, the courts will construe and apply 
the legislation against the background of the judge-made law. The reconciliation of conflicts 
by lawful process is ‘a cultural achievement of universal significance’.215   
 
The great works of labour history illuminate contemporary controversy. They provide a 
hinterland of ideas that helps to put the day-to-day battles into perspective. Labour history 
provides the contemporary practitioner with the colourful, complex and ambivalent story of 
the central concept of industrial relations. There is thus nothing peculiar about this 
exploratory exposition of the evolution of labour relations the world over, precisely because 
the yearnings of workers are universal, the machinations of employers are essentially the 
same, the hegemonic inclinations of the political state are a commonality, and efforts at 
managing workplace discontent and disputes are still ongoing.  
 
3.8     Regulation in the context of employment relations 
3.8.1   Defining regulation 
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People hold strong views about regulation, but do they know what ‘regulation’ means? Both 
regime and regulation theorists come up with different suppositions, yet the meaning of the 
term ‘to regulate’ is difficult to unravel. Mill observed that ‘we do not [always] understand 
the grounds of our opinion. But when we turn to . . . morals, religion, politics, social 
relations, and the business of life, three-fourths of the arguments for every disputed opinion 
consist in dispelling the appearances which favour some opinion different from it.’216 
 
During the past century, substantial resources were invested in the politics and scholarship of 
regulation. Nonetheless, the term ‘regulation’ appears to escape a clear definition. Although 
regulation has been one of the most controversial topics in law and politics, it has also been 
one of the most misunderstood concepts in modern legal thinking. According to Francis, the 
function of regulation in the context of a political state is to set limits on private conduct. It is 
state intervention in private spheres of activity to realise public purposes.217 This implies a 
public interest and legal perspective that assumes that the state, acting in the public interest, 
establishes a legal framework to realise a specific set of regulatory objectives.218 In line with 
this, while formal institutions are agents of the form and nature, it is the ethos of the state that 
explains the political calculations that inform regulation.219  
 
Legislation, as a form of regulation, deals with law that, in any case, is supposed to be a 
captive of social forces such as the labour market. Perhaps this is why socio-legal studies 
proponents only concern themselves with the function of law in society.220 Considering that 
deregulation is the removal of formal controls to allow common-law controls to operate, 
legislation could then be interpreted as intervention to restrict the inroads of the common law. 
These may be ascertainable from sources such as the Hansard, judicial rulings and by the 
ideological orientation within the existing political economy.   
 
The evasive nature of the term ‘regulation’ is largely a product of confusion between two 
unrelated matters: the abstract concept of regulation and opinions about the desirable scope of 
regulatory powers or desirable regulatory policies. People intuitively understand the word 
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‘regulation’ to mean government intervention in liberty and choices, through legal rules that 
define the legally available options and through legal rules that manipulate incentives. But, 
too often, ideologies and pre-existing beliefs dictate perceptions as to what intervention 
means and whether intervention is needed. This pattern results in inconsistent preferences for 
regulation and obscures the understanding of the term. 
 
3.8.2         Labour law and regulation 
 
This section attempts to draw a distinction between the contextual use of ‘regulation’ in 
labour law and its generic application. The definition of regulation as intervention in the 
private domain is quite old. Of course, there is some truth in most perceptions of regulation. 
Regulation may be used to require or proscribe conduct, it may come in the form of 
administrative rules, it may serve interest groups, and it may generate waste. Regulation 
occurs in several spheres of labour law, such as the labour market and international standards. 
However, it tends to assume a different connotation when used to qualify governmental 
activity with particular reference to trade disputes and labour formations. 
 
Traditional labour law encompasses employment law, collective relations law, and social 
security law. Employment laws govern the individual employment contract and the terms and 
conditions thereof. Collective or industrial relations laws regulate the bargaining, adoption, 
and enforcement of collective agreements and the by-products of the dynamics of the 
socialisation process at work, such as the organisation of trade unions, and industrial action 
by workers and employers. Social security laws govern the social response to needs and 
conditions that have a significant impact on quality of life, such as old age, disability, death, 
sickness, and unemployment. 
 
Labour law is underpinned by theories of institutional choice, the efficiency theory, the 
political power theory, and the legal theory. Labour law concerns itself more with the 
political power theory, where institutions are shaped by those in power to benefit themselves 
at the expense of those not in power, and limiting the extent of redistribution. Under the legal 
theory, a country’s approach to regulation is shaped by its legal tradition, history and 
philosophy and, by implication, how these affect workers. The term ‘regulation’ can be dealt 
with at two levels: one is the abstract concept of regulation and the other is the opinions about 
the desirable scope of regulatory powers or desirable regulatory policies. Generally, 
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regulation is understood to mean an authoritative (government) intervention resulting in the 
limitation of basic freedoms. This is done through legislation that defines the legally available 
options and reward systems.  
 
Intervention by legislation per se may not be restrictive. Regulation, therefore, can produce 
myriad definitions, mostly subjective, and also varied consequences. With regard to labour 
law, the automatic understanding of regulation has been state intervention in the private arena 
or a legal rule that implements such intervention. The implementing rule is a binding legal 
norm created by a state organ that intends to shape the conduct of individuals, labour and 
other social formations. The state organ, the regulator, may comprise the political elite, 
including the legislature, the executive and the administrative bureaucracy that wields the 
legal power. These are not the restrictions or rules or regulations or even delegated legislation 
and laws that serve interest groups. This is regulation that is essentially statutory in nature. 
Demonstrating how regulation relates to and impacts upon labour law and employment 
relations generally is the challenge with which we are faced. 
 
3.8.3       Transnational private labour regulation (TPLR) 
 
It appears that either a collective frustration with the state has emerged or a collective 
perception of the state as a failed centralised institution incapable of harnessing and 
regulating all sectors of society has emerged. This perceived governance deficit has led to the 
conclusion that a transformation of the regulatory state and the limits of its capacity are 
needed. This limitation should also include law so that other actors can effectively regulate 
certain spheres of economic and social activity. One of the proponents is said to have 
proclaimed that the move to governance ‘represents a much broader shift in regulatory 
theory, reflecting a move form centralised command and control regulation to a more 
dynamic, reflexive and flexible regime’221 [where] ‘the exercise of normative authority is 
pluralised.’222 
 
It is acceptable that principles are intended to promote the internal self-regulation of other 
social activities at different levels. However, this movement advocates that multi-national 
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corporations (MNCs) should be legislators, regulators and enforcers of norm which can be 
assisted by other social organisations which play the role of watchdogs. It appears that this 
movement is a scheme to effectively neutralise, marginalise and ultimately render the state 
irrelevant so as to dominate labour legislation reforms. Given the potential for dismantling 
institutions of labour studies, Kolben wishes for an examination of its derivative theories. 
 
3.8.4    Systems theory 
 
The systems theory is grounded in the law and society movement, which underscores 
systemic autonomy. Led by Teubner,223 it postulates that the legal system exhibits an 
incapacity to communicate224 with the  differentiated social systems in their plurality and 
ultimately makes laws that are either irrelevant or that have an disintegrating effect on that 
social area of life, or that have a disintegrating impact on regulatory law itself. Since state law 
is insufficient to resolve conflicts within these systems, but has the potential to destroy valued 
patterns of life in that society, then the state forfeits its monopoly. In its place would be a 
plurality of legal orders, functioning independently of the state.225 Their law-making, 
however, must be informed by reflexivity or governance or accountability. Teubner appears 
to have had a significant influence on the theoretical foundations of the movement, but it is 
not clear if his primary purpose was also the eventual demise of the state. 
 
3.8.5    Responsive regulation 
 
This theory presupposes that although policy goals and the attendant rules and regulations are 
made by others, the addressees of these laws, power and authority should be left to decide 
how to meet the objectives of those legal rules. In other words, regulators must be responsive 
to the innate desire of those who are expected to comply to deliberate and engage with the 
regulators in debates about the rules. This aspect is commendable as participatory decision-
making, even if symbolic, makes legitimisation and compliance easier. 
 
3.8.6     New governance   
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New governance is a loose term referring to a broad body of research that has been said to 
mark a move away from the familiar mode of command and control and fixed rule regulation 
towards multi-level, collaborative, multi-tier, adaptive problem-solving. Its key attributes, in 
addition to those mentioned above, include broad framework agreements, flexible norms, 
revisable standards, benchmarking, indicators, peer review and accountability. This is in 
marked contrast to the rigidity of doctrinal substantive legislation with its plodding 
amendment procedures and protracted judicial processes. 
 
3.8.7        Labour market regulation project 
 
Located at the Centre for Employment and Labour Relations Law (CELRL) at Melbourne 
University, Australia, and headed by Mitchell, the first objective of this project was to 
develop labour law as a discipline, with particular regard being paid to developing an 
understanding of the role of law in regulating all aspects of the labour market. The concept of 
broadening the frontiers of labour law into all spheres of the local market was first broached 
in 1984 by Davies and Freedland.226 This was in reaction to creeping globalisation, 
unemployment, downsizing and the relocation of industries to more cost-effective 
environments. 
 
Then the project observed that labour law was contextual rather than conceptually orientated, 
and ought to seen in action at the level of social interaction not as a collection of doctrinal 
precepts. So when Mitchell became involved, the perspective adopted had been one of 
making labour law more relevant by widening the range of work and including factors 
contributing to the work environment. More importantly, the project sought to recognise the 
problem as encapsulated in Standing’s work on working group categorisations and the 
implications of industrial citizenship.227 Mitchell and Gahan proffered that labour law must 
remain interdisciplinary in focus, orientated towards legal regulation, capable of interrogating 
the operation and effects of the law in the field, but recognising the variables at work in the 
labour relations permutation. In that way, labour law is not parochial in perception, but 
perceptible as existing within the broad field of regulation. As they said: 
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[L]abour law must also embrace the study of regulation which emanates from other sources – 
public and private – which impact upon labour markets. Such regulation would include, for 
example, government policy documents, private arrangements such as the Labour/ACTU 
Accord, government administrative schemes and bureaucratic systems within enterprises, 
whether or not they have the force of law.228  
 
According to Frazer, the project helped to establish labour law firmly within the ambit of 
regulation, fortified by a reliance on an interdisciplinary understanding of regulation. 
 
3.8.8        Global labour market regulation  
 
This movement is more of a concerted decision by MNCs rather than a pure academic 
postulation, because the issues addressed herein have already been meticulously debated 
elsewhere. In essence, the import is that states should relinquish individual holds on 
intervention in the labour market and employment relations. This responsibility would then 
be taken over by a consortium of the actors in the new world economic order, rationalising all 
labour market regulations under the philosophy of globalisation. 
 
In prefacing his critique, Kolben states that– 
 
contemporary regulatory and political science theory has described and argued for a transfer of 
authority away from the state to non-state actors, normative plurality and decentralization from 
command and control regulatory methodologies towards more disaggregated and experimental 
methodologies. An important meta-critique that emerges from these theories, however, is that 
most of its scholarship investigates and discusses regulatory phenomenon that takes place in 
developed countries.229 
 
For Kolben, what this implies is that the developed economies want to impose their choice of 
labour market neo-liberalism on countries struggling to come to terms with poverty, a lack of 
resources, poor governance and corruption. These countries need assistance and shoring up, 
rather than disintegration. The key goal in labour law as a regulatory mechanism is rather the 
fortification of the state and its agencies and their capacity to cope with the challenges and 
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dynamics of a rolling labour market, not its contrived demise. On the whole, this study leaves 
one with the impression that globalised labour market regulation is the ultimate expression of 
globalisation in its essence. 
 
3.9      Conclusion 
 
This chapter has helped to justify the character and scope of the study. With regard to 
employment relations, it has confirmed the belief of the study in the solidity of the ideas of 
the founders of the discipline. As a result, revisionist critiques have all retraced their steps to 
the founders, seeking to restate their conceptual premises, affirming their empirical   
conclusions, and accepting the societal contexts within which these conclusions were drawn. 
Secondly, the chapter has shown that the study was initially based on much unexplored 
terrain and untested assumptions. Thirdly, it has shown the importance of understanding the 
theoretical foundations of the study. Although the themes and concepts might appear rather 
varied, a closer examination shows a shared affinity, an interdependence and linkage that 
confirms the perception of employment relations and work-related disputes as inherently 
interdisciplinary. Chapter 4 outlines the key areas that form the basis of this study. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The State in the Context of Employment Relations 
 
4.1   Introduction  
 
In chapter 3, a survey of the spectrum of ideas that inform the subject matter of the study was 
undertaken. The concepts discussed therein have helped to ascertain that labour disputes and 
their solution cannot be achieved with one stroke of the legislative pen. This is because, much 
as the subject itself commands an interdisciplinary approach, labour issues are essentially 
social, embedded in the socio-economic fabric of any society. Thus, while it is appropriate to 
examine these, such examination also creates the need to investigate the notion of the state 
further, as the state appears to be the dominant factor in the dynamics of employment 
relations. 
 
Chapter 4 is therefore primarily an attempt to examine the state in all its spheres because of 
its dominant position in labour relations. In this context, labour relations is intended to apply 
to the environment in which conflicts arise, whether due to certain inherent contradictions in 
the forms, processes and methods of socialisation or the articulation of relations in the 
workplace. The state for this purpose is not the nation-state. The ‘nation-state’ is thought of 
as a political entity having sovereign authority. This authority is expressed through judicial 
institutions such as the courts, the legislature and executive agencies. These administer and 
regulate social processes within the said nation-state. Thus the functional state, embedded in 
this geographically discrete entity, is seen as a compendium of the political, juridical and 
economic institutions and structures employed in managing public affairs.230 
 
4.2    Defining the state 
 
The state has been defined as ‘that summation of privileges and dominating positions which 
are brought into being by extra-economic power …. I mean by Society, the totality of 
concepts of all purely natural relations and institutions between man and man.’231 To 
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paraphrase, the state uses political means, force or coercion to ‘plunder and exploit society’ 
and uses economic means of co-operation. For this reason, the state is an enemy of society.232   
 
There is a distinct difference between the nation-state, the state and government. The nation-
state has political, juridical and economic space, according to Arthurs.233 It is usually 
regarded as a political entity with authority to govern its affairs. Such authority is expressed 
through created juridical institutions such as the courts, the legislature and the executive or 
bureaucratic adjuncts as agencies with discretionary rule-making powers. These bodies 
regulate and administer the socio-economic order and affairs within the boundaries of a 
country such as Botswana. The characteristics of such a nation-state may include the degree 
to which principles of the rule of law and the separation of powers exist and are enforceable. 
It also includes the political and social status accorded to citizens, either through structured 
economic differentiation or social stratification and, finally, the degree of intervention in the 
private space of the individual.234 
 
On the other hand, the ‘state’ is defined, in contradistinction from society, as a constitutional 
aggregation, a power situated above society, a territorial concentration that has always been 
in the hands of a few who control the myriad functions in the life of societies.235 More 
critically for this study, the state as used in this context represents an abstract theoretical 
construct that is therefore not concrete. The state is only an analytical tool and not an entity. 
The analytical approach to the state is therefore methodological individualism. This approach 
states that only individuals exist in reality, so the family, church, state and other forms of 
societal congregation result only from institutional frameworks.236  
 
It has been suggested that both the juridical and political spaces are aligned but create room 
for exceptions, such as supranational institutions whose normative influence outweighs that 
of the nation-state. These include the ILO, supranational juridical regimes such as the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(UNCITRAL), and also sub-regional juridical bodies such as SADC and the African Union 
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(AU) with their Protocols.237 The potential result of the existence of these institutions is that, 
coupled with diffused indigenous legal orders, there is thus considered evidence of the 
‘hollowing out of the state’.238 In this regard, given the fact that the nation-state is being 
engulfed by exogenous but higher juridical, moral and doctrinal institutions, it could actually 
be losing its grip on jurisdictional and sovereign power.  
 
From this perspective, one visualises the institutional machinery known as the state which is 
embedded and shored up by its accessibility to agents of command and control. This is 
irrespective of the fact that its capacity for governance, legitimacy and relevance are 
questioned because it exhibits a distasteful exhibition of graft and corruption.239 The value of 
the state is now assessed in terms of the political economy of the nation-state and its assumed 
role as the custodian of economic life. Thus the perceived dysfunctionality of the machinery 
of state has become one of its threats.240 
 
4.3     Other dimensions of the state  
 
Governance theory implies that responsibilities and boundaries become less evident and the 
traditional nation-state no longer functions as the prime mover for addressing social and 
economic issues, and governing becomes tracing and monitoring those mechanisms that do 
not depend on the authority and sanctions of the government.241 ‘[A]t its core [governance] 
describes a process in which regulatory authority and legitimacy have become de-centred 
from the state and from government.’242 It is therefore now conceptualised as having become 
diffused, dispersed and dislocated among multiple actors, whether private, international or 
domestic.  
 
Governance is thus expansively defined as– 
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‘All processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and restrain the collective 
activities of a group …. Governance need not necessarily be conducted exclusively by 
government and the international organizations to which they delegate authority. Private firms, 
associations of firms, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and associations of NGOs all 
engage in it, often in association with governmental bodies, to create governance, sometimes 
without government authority.’243  
 
Government is then also considered as consisting of ‘specific personnel and policies located 
at a particular time in history. But no state can be adequately summarised by the actions of 
anyone or several of its governments.’244  
 
In the context of Botswana, one may define the state as the political leadership comprising 
the President, the Speaker, the deputy, members of parliament, ministers, assistant ministers, 
councillors, and members of the ntlo ya dikgosi (House of Chiefs). The House has recently 
been increased to 35 persons, all of whom are salaried public officers as provided for by the 
Chieftainship Act,245 and who are subject to the political authority of the Minister of Local 
Government. In a sense, this is the continuation of the colonial strategy of dependence. 
Included in this group would be the remote but active members of the business community, 
such as the owners of ranches, farms, hotels, and hospitality and other service enterprises. 
Added to these would be the coterie of co-opted academics, senior civil servants and those 
with access to political power and patronage and then the higher echelons of the public 
bureaucracy. Such a state is also said to consist of the judiciary, the police service and the 
armed forces.   
 
In Swaziland, the state could be described as comprising the King in Council.246 The King 
has established a parallel system based on edicts by decrees, with a semi-feudal tinkhundla 
system based on chiefly power. The parliamentary system or libadla is bicameral. The King 
appoints 20 members of the Senate and the other 10 come from the House of Assembly. The 
House of Assembly has 55 elected members, and the King appoints 10 members. According 
to Decree No 2, the King-in-Council may, whenever it is deemed in the public interest, order 
the detention of any person for a period not exceeding 60 days in respect of any one order. 
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Consecutive orders may be issued as necessary and no court shall have the power to hear any 
case in this regard. In essence, therefore, all the functionaries who, together with the King 
and his chiefs ensure the hegemony of royalty, constitute the state in Swaziland.  
 
In the case of Lesotho, the state comprises the King as ceremonial head, the principal chiefs, 
the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, the defence force, the police and the national 
security service.247 In Botswana, the clearest convergence of interests among the elites is 
private capital accumulation manifested in cattle farming. This choice is the result of both the 
nature of the terrain and a deliberate colonial policy of nurturing a specific form of capital 
accumulation based on a distinct ‘class of cattle accumulators’, including the ‘new 
intelligentsia’.248   
 
In his analysis, Tsie traced the functional collaboration of the elites and civil servants in their 
mutual need to control the resources related to cattle accumulation and the erection of stable 
structures that would ensure access to the labour power of the dominated segments of the 
society.249 An example is the collaborative, symbiotic role of the institution of the traditional 
elite. This could be because of superficial historical generalisations about socio-economic 
processes that distort the historical linkages between groups in hierarchically structured 
societies where chiefly authority is cultural rather than political.  
 
In sum, there is an invisible but direct, definitive, functional relationship between the 
traditional elite and the state, which facilitates their co-optation through the instrumentality of 
legislation such as the Chieftainship Act in Botswana.250 Within this process, therefore, the 
political leadership have been able to indulge in the creation of a generally powerful 
bureaucracy capable of formulating and effecting development policy. As Tsie 
acknowledged, the net result was and has always been a state-engineered and centrally 
dominated administrative process that ascertains firm control of the allocation of 
developmental resources.251  
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The nature of the state normalises a stable, cohesive stratification of society. The consequent 
trade-offs, such as overlapping directorships, subsidies and even accommodation of 
bureaucratic excesses, have operated to confirm the indispensability of the bureaucracy in 
tandem with the proliferation of its organic interests. Given the current climate of 
maladministration, the public bureaucracy might yet justify past observations that it suffers 
from ‘gross mismanagement and dishonesty’.252  
 
4.4 Juridification 
 
Juridification is a term increasingly occurring in the widest range of contexts. Its use is, 
however, probably nowhere more justified than where the structure and the objectives of 
labour regulations are being discussed. It could be said that labour law constitutes the classic 
paradigm for juridification. In terms of both the background and the evolution of the 
juridification process, the context of the origin and the development of labour law provides a 
practically suitable environment in which it can be best appreciated.253    
 
Bates stated that– 
 
Government intervention … creates opportunities for conferring privileged access to commodities that 
have been rendered scarce in comparison to the demand for them. Privileged access is used by the 
elites … for direct personal gain or to create a political following. The [obvious] political attractions 
... help to explain why, when given a choice between market and non-market means of achieving the 
same end, African Governments often choose intervention measures.254   
 
According to Teubner, two major problems arise from a penchant for legislating. First, in a 
complex, functionally differentiated society, this may cause the law to become decentred 
through a process of cognitive limitation of normative legitimacy. Cognitive limitation refers 
to the recognition by the state that it has come to a dead-end of objective regulatory law. At 
this point society becomes too complex for effective control by state-centrist intervention 
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alone.255  This results in excessive, multi-layered rule-making or legal pluralism or, simply, 
juridification.256  
 
A direct consequence is the spontaneous multiplicity of bureaucratic structures with 
administrative rule-making and quasi-adjudication authority like the labour-related structures. 
This development might be through delegated discretionary authority or through the usurping 
of such authority. At times it may also result in extra-judicial rule-making, in addition to the 
judiciary’s constitutionally guaranteed mandate to settle disputes and interpret the law.257 
 
Working within the ambit of state delegated institutional authority, these structures, hitherto 
referred to as the public bureaucracy, are able to nudge the institution of state in a 
predetermined direction through informed feedback. In other words, the political machinery 
of state, through its bureaucratic organs, is able to regulate and administer society in a 
particular manner using the selective allocation of resources as part of its strategy of sanction 
and reward.258  
 
4.5    The interventionist state 
 
The study reiterates that post-colonial societies demonstrate either a strong reaction against 
all things colonial or, in the main, rely on what has been assimilated in terms of 
administration, governance, control and command. Their bureaucratic adjuncts become 
closed societies. For this reason, it makes sense to constantly retrace the steps to the past in 
trying to understand the present for the future. Within a historical context, political thinkers 
from Madison259 to de Tocqueville260 recognised that associations promised the liberty of 
expression for individual citizens while posing a threat to political stability. This is so 
because they could turn into hotbeds or ‘violent factions’. Yet, for Rousseau, associations 
were undesirable even if they did not turn to violence.261 As ‘societies within society’, they 
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affected the interests of their members and therefore prohibited the free expression of the 
general will.  
 
The state is also described as all government institutions that have a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force. Therefore, in terms of employment relations, the state is normally 
taken to mean the elected government of the day, together with all other agencies that carry 
out the will of government and implement its policies and legislation. The state then could be 
seen as the ‘elected government of the day, together with all other agencies that carry out its 
will and implement its policies and legislation’ 262 One of the prime tasks of government then 
is to manage the economy so that it is prosperous. This means it has to try to achieve key 
economic policy objectives, each one of which can easily conflict with the others.263  
 
Within this broad framework, the state appropriates to itself other functions. It proceeds to 
typically hold and exercise sovereign legislative power as well as a virtual monopoly of the 
means of violence. Thus it controls both the power of the sword as well as the power of the 
purse. Additionally, it exercises the power to tax, as well as the power to spend with a 
corresponding claim to legislative sovereignty. It distinguishes itself from other systems of 
rule by its claim to be above the law. This is in the very specific sense of being the supreme 
source of law itself, and responsible for its administration and enforcement. 
 
This is a far more radical ‘principle’ than the traditional rule that the king or ruler is not 
bound by his own commands, meaning that the king's laws cannot be invoked against the 
king himself. Further, there is the presumption of immunity from sanctions for transgressing 
the law. It does not say anything about the state having no legal right to bind anyone by its 
mere commands, when these are not founded on justice but designed to maintain or restore 
adherence to law. In effect, the law is what the state decrees, together with a subjective and 
selective determination of justice. It is hereby contended that justice derives more from social 
norms, values and expectations rather than the dogmatic precepts that the state might impose. 
 
Regarding the state’s regulatory and interventionist role, labour legislation has moved from 
the notion of conferring rights on workers to one of regulating the business environment. This 
is done by balancing management autonomy and worker protection. The regulatory 
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mechanism leaves a scope for common-law principles and judicial decisions, although both 
are inadequate. Regulation can therefore be described as state intervention in private spheres 
of activity to realise public purposes.264 As a result, there is the public perception that the 
state establishes a specific legal framework for achieving specific regulatory objectives. One 
of these is labour legislation, which can be seen as not being a reaction to any specific 
demands from the society that it seeks to dominate, regulate and administer. This is done 
through the medium of its institutionalised agencies. 
 
 4.6       The institutionalisation of the state 
4.6.1     Conceptualising institutions  
 
The institutionalisation process becomes the key to a general understanding of the state and 
its adjuncts in action. According to Crouch, an institution is constituted as– 
 
patterns of human action and relationships that persist and reproduce themselves over time, 
independently of the identity of the biological individuals performing within them. Sociologists 
have long understood such a concept, but much of this earlier history has been ignored by 
recent political scientists and others who have come autonomously to the idea of the institution 
n as they sought to convey the idea of behaviour being shaped and routinized, fitting into 
patterns, which are not necessarily those that would be freely chosen by a rational actor needing 
to decide what to do.265  
 
Institutions are created to limit transaction costs by engineering rules that condition conduct 
and also by creating rewards and sanctions systems so as to offer incentives that render the 
implementation of agreements easier. Institutional change is what explains the history of 
every society. It happens incrementally and can be positive, negative or regressive, depending 
on the environmental costs and incentives. However, all institutions do undergo change. 
Institutional change is defined as change in an entire class or organisation. Institutional 
change, at its deepest level, refers to changes in the ideas that define and govern structures.  
 
As these ideas change, rules and practices shift as well. Even in the allegedly stable 
industrialised countries, the institutions of labour relations are gradually transformed from 
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market-constituting institutions to market-dependent variables. Change is not the only 
movement of the core–periphery boundary. It is also deployed to subjugate collective 
bargaining and workplace co-determination. In consequence, firm-level economic 
calculations may subvert the intentions of the prevailing labour law. 
 
Institutions do not only disintegrate; they also become passive and ineffective with time or as 
a result of concerted onslaught. Institutional atrophy with regard to practical labour law 
results from the effects of flexibility in the labour law regulatory framework. An example is 
the ineffectiveness of institutionalised labour standards in a hostile environment. Labour 
market flexibility, which is essentially an approach to public policy that places almost 
exclusive reliance on the competitive and simulated market mechanisms, has also, in its own 
way, significantly impacted on the dynamics of labour law and relations.  
 
In effect, legal concepts such as labour law, when formulated, create institutions through the 
functionally complex process of identifying patterns of socialised conduct and, by analysing 
them within an ideological context, produce a normative institution such as applies to the 
state, regulation or the employment contract. Private organisations engage in jurisdiction 
shopping to find the most sympathetic regulatory environment, which then dictates the 
location of labour markets and entrepreneurship. 
 
At times, political institutions that determine values and ideology are mistakenly identified as 
the state rather than as its mechanisms.266 The state exists to harness, guide and stabilise the 
contradictions in society as the political leader of that coalition of peak groups. As said, it 
decides who gets what, when and how. Through legislation and policy, the institutional state 
has evolved into a centrist creature, capable of determining, via mobilisation, acculturation, 
conditioning and other means, the socio-economic direction of the country. Precisely because 
of its roots, it also becomes reluctant to change and responds, in a bureaucratised, deliberative 
manner, to social demands. Both formal and legal structures are therefore created and vested 
with certain attributes to assist in defining individual choices, thereby reducing uncertainty 
and minimising the cost of consensual transactions.  
 
                                                          
266 Mattei op cit. 522 
87 
 
Government and governance are therefore the institutions and processes deployed by the 
state. There arises then a perceived need to adjudicate all disputes and impose coercive 
authority to ensure order, using regulation. Regulation is therefore the setting of limits by the 
state for private conduct, using its formal institutions as above as agents of form and nature of 
the regime. A regime implies forms, processes and values systems conducted and determined 
by the state. In terms of regime theory, then, the premise of regulation is the political 
decisions of the state within a given context of utilitarian values and features it feels have 
been used effectively before and so can be used again to organise public life.267 The 
contradiction is that time and environment determine change, not adherence to the past and 
its ideology and methods. 
 
The structural foundations of the African state therefore emanate from its colonial legacy, 
through a period of concentration of state power. This evolutionary path enables the 
elaboration of the state through the amplification of structures. This amplification results in 
expanded bureaucratisation and excessive rule-making and administration. Invariably, this 
leads to the refinement of the coercive apparatus, the refinement and reconfiguration of rule-
making processes and structures, the selective and subjective interpretation of rules, and a 
redefinition of the parameters of political activity.268 The state in action therefore manifests a 
degree of decision-making authority through specific structures. The state, as ‘that 
summation of privileges and dominating positions which are brought into being by extra-
economic power becomes inured to methods of sustaining the status quo.’269 
 
That being the case, the state becomes important for this study because, as explained, it 
intervenes in all spheres of social activity, creates structures, and allocates authority and 
functions to them. In effect, the effectiveness of state structures or institutions is a function of 
the state’s capacity to successfully mediate in inter-group and interpersonal relations and, in 
this context, with regard to workplace dynamics.  
 
The state exists to harness, guide and stabilise the contradictions in society as the political 
leader of that coalition of peak groups that have seen the need to collaborate to retain 
privileges. As the primus inter pares of the constellation, the state lays claim ideologically to 
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interests it perceives as public.270 The need for the state to intervene, to lead, while politically 
neutralising and isolating other interest groups, flows from the logic of its developmental 
path. Ultimately the modern state, having evolved a national order, ceases to rely on 
traditional ties of kinship and loyalty for stability, as seen in the enactment of laws that 
demean traditional authority by turning chiefs into paid functionaries. It now co-opts 
deviants, rewards loyalty or punishes deviance.  
 
The historical connection between the colonial and post-colonial states would suggest certain 
continuities essential to the sustaining of the state, even if the forms and approaches differ. In 
effect, the study agrees with Gramsci that- 
 
The historical unity of the ruling class is realised in the state….But it would be wrong to think that 
this unity is simply juridical and political…the fundamental historical unity, concretely results from 
the organic relations between state or political society and civil society.271 
 
This study concludes at this juncture that, to a large extent, the period before 1990 suggests 
that the post-colonial state in southern Africa would demonstrate a concern and apprehension 
of labour as an organised entity. This anxiety would appear to have been transmitted via the 
colonial state machinery, which had sought to put in place pre-emptive legislative and 
administrative mechanisms. These inherited modalities of control and containment helped to 
create a state-centred legal order largely intended to erect and sustain a superstructure of 
regulated stability. This is variously described as ‘authoritarian corporatism’272 or the 
containment of conflict and maintenance of peace through bargained corporatism.273 Statism 
therefore has historical antecedents. This historical linkage can have its problems when 
change is needed. One main cause could be path dependency. 
 
Government and governance are therefore the institutions and processes deployed by the 
state. There arises then a perceived need to adjudicate all disputes and impose coercive 
authority to ensure order, using regulation. Regulation is therefore the setting of limits by the 
state for private conduct, using its formal institutions as agents of the regime. A regime 
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implies forms, processes and value systems conducted and determined by the state. In terms 
of regime theory then, the premise of regulation is the political decisions of the state within a 
given context.  
 
In effect, an examination of current trends in employment relations in the countries of study 
is important. In essence, examining the reform process of labour relations provides insight 
into how political and economic institutions are born, sustained and changed in reaction to 
the dynamics of forces at play in societies.274 In this regard, any attempt to tame labour 
movements by the state signals the collapse of pluralism and voluntarism. The regulation of 
industrial relations in this regard may take various forms. The constitutive function in the 
state in the construction of institutions is one of them. 
 
It is postulated therefore that the state can and should facilitate the creation and sustenance of 
structures and mechanisms for deliberative democracy. Theorists have suggested that 
modalities for deliberative democracy could enable society to meet the challenges of 
legitimacy. This implies effective and efficient governance and proper citizen acculturation, 
as well as capacity acquisition and empowerment. The benefits include the co-determination 
of matters relating to employment relations. This will also include the formulation, 
implementation, and monitoring of municipal labour practices and domesticated international 
standards.275 
 
From the foregoing, in pioneering and energising such institutional and structural processes, 
the state could be erecting a platform for social discourse about labour law, labour market 
regulation and labour’s industrial rights as embodied in international standards. The state 
would have then evolved from a class-conscious coalition of the elite into a desirable engine 
of social responsibility, accountability, justice, welfare and social relevance.276  
 
4.7      Conclusion 
 
The chapter examined the nature of the political and legal state in action, the ramifications of 
labour disputes, and the interdisciplinary issues it commands and thereby harnesses for its 
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exposition. Thus the inevitable nexus between labour disputes, relations and law becomes 
distinct. The most important contributions of the chapter however are not the polemics. The 
first contribution is the realisation of the dominant role of the state as the custodian and 
enforcer of legal rules. Secondly, the chapter highlights the complexity faced in any 
examination of labour dispute resolution in any arena and the caution that must be exercised 
in any attempt to objectively study the subject matter irrespective of the environmental 
context. Thirdly, the study reveals a state that is circumscribed by transactional costs and the 
prices that must be paid to nourish the coalition and sustain its predominance. Finally, there is 
the need to come to terms with the fact that the state cannot be wished away or rendered 
irrelevant in employment relations. The option left for labour is to widen its social base and 
linkages with other players so as to neutralise the political, economic, legal and historical 
supremacy of the state. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
State Agencies and Institutional Intervention in Employment 
Relations 
 
5.1     Introduction    
 
This chapter has two main objectives: a discussion of the theoretical foundations of industrial 
relations as the context within which labour law operates and the identification of the specific 
structures created by the concerned states to administer and oversee the sustenance of good 
industrial relations practice. By implication it also examines their key function of labour 
dispute resolution. To do this, the chapter explores the conceptual and thematic basis on 
which the instrumentality of the structures so created can be observed. In effect, the chapter 
demonstrates the need for a proper comprehension of the theoretical generalisations about 
industrial relations. This provides a platform or context for the discussion and subsequent 
assessment of the effectiveness of these structures. 
 
In chapter 4, the study located the state at the core of the relations generated within the work 
environment and the forces that affect such relations. This is because such forces are 
instrumental in any changes in the quality of workplace relationships. It has become apparent 
that the state occupies an intrinsic place in the complicated web of production relations. This 
is irrespective of whether it functions as a major employer, rule-maker, enforcer or arbiter. 
The state has an inherent stake in the tenor of employment relations, because whatever roles 
the state chooses or is pragmatically compelled to play, it invariably assumes or is made to 
assume responsibility for how these roles impact on the society at large. 
 
This centrality makes any role the state chooses to play an important constituent and thus a 
focus of attention. This is particularly so where labour disputes are concerned. This also 
includes those structures that the state creates and institutionalises for the discharge of 
assigned roles. This is also because the functionaries so assigned may excel in their capacity 
to perform such roles or they may abuse the powers conferred on them. In effect, they could 
be presiding over dysfunctional entities. That being so and for contextual clarity, these 
specific organs need to be identified. First, however, they must be properly located within the 
domain of industrial or employment relations. 
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5.2        Understanding employment and industrial relations  
 
Given the scope of labour law’s coverage, a discussion of both theoretical principles and the 
practice of industrial relations cannot be fettered by the claims of law as its founding and 
nurturing domain. It should be expected that the dynamics of workplace relations cannot be 
circumscribed by legalities alone. Neither can the instrumentality of law be used as the sole 
medium of interpreting industrial relations. Precisely because of this, industrial relations is 
acknowledged as interdisciplinary, covering sociology, labour economics, political science, 
labour law and industrial psychology, among others.   
 
This, as a result, provides divergent analytical tools. Secondly, due to the complexity of the 
subject, theoretical specifications are carved for different institutions, actors and issues. These 
are also tailor-made for the respective explanation of phenomena like trade unions, collective 
bargaining, conflict and industrial citizenship. The result is that it is impossible to integrate 
them. At the same time, it is also not advisable to compartmentalise these living and 
malleable phenomena. This is why ‘theoretical pluralism prevails and finds its justification in 
different analytical foci and objectives. The spectrum of theories applied in industrial 
relations consists of grand theories, as well as middle range theories and ad hoc 
approaches.’277 
 
In this context, industrial, labour and employment relations are used interchangeably, as is the 
case with disputes and conflicts. There is no intention to revisit debates about such a 
justification as they do not ignore the centrality of labour disputes. Labour disputes are 
located in the environment of work where work is systematically organised, necessitating a 
form of socialisation process that is neither always comfortable nor desirable. The internal 
peculiarities of the workplace characterise it as a microcosm of society. This study adopts the 
position that the difficulty in dealing with independent theories for industrial relations should 
be seen as reflective of the variables in group socialisation. Therefore, various factors are 
called into play, because workers come to work with different orientations, differing drives 
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and potentially irreconcilable impulses. Converging these attributes in close daily proximity 
can lead to unpredictable consequences. 
 
The study therefore posits that labour relations and disputes defy a consistent, coherent 
theoretical platform. Therefore, conflicts become anecdotes along a narrative path. It is along 
this path that factors such as disputes, unionisation, and regulation become the definition 
instead of the characteristics. Shalev addresses this problem by pointing out the contemporary 
concerns with industrial relations theory.278 The first is whether a core theory is required 
within a self-justifying stand-alone discipline. He concurs with Cox that, theorising is only 
about ‘problem solving in intent, positivist in epistemology and functionalist in method’.279  
 
The second concern is whether industrial relations theory should be based on assumptions of 
consensus and stability or those of conflict and change. The third concern is about how to 
advance the knowledge about industrial relations. To this end, Shalev returns to Dunlop, who 
is supposed to have opted to measure industrial relations from the perspective of the manner 
in which legal rules or outcomes reflect the realities of the objective constraints on employee 
and employer relations.280 The issue then becomes one of whether a theoretical paradigm 
must necessarily oppose prior theorising, even when such a theory is empirically valid.  
 
In the context of this study, all proponents of theoretical positions together weave the fabric 
of industrial relations as currently understood. As an illustration of the discussion above, the 
study locates a definition that is patently unsatisfactory. The definition proposes that the 
focus of industrial relations is ‘all forms of economic activity in which an employee works 
under the authority of an employer and receives wages for his or her labour.’281 However, 
assuming the employment relationship, such as there may be, is a simple direct exchange of 
service for remuneration, the problem will now be how such an agreement can become a 
relational one in terms of workplace socialisation.  
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Kaufman observes that ‘to a large degree, most scholars regard trade unions, collective 
bargaining and labour-management relations and the national labour policy and labour law 
within which they are embedded, as the core subjects of the field.’282 He also quotes 
Rogowski as describing industrial relations to ‘have developed from a conflict system into a 
societal sub-system which defines itself with respect to fulfilling a function in society at 
large, namely, to manage collective violence which can occur in the relations which can 
occur between industrial interest groups.’283  
 
As demonstrated above, industrial relations appears to elude a precise definition. This, 
according to Yesufu, is because–  
 
the parties to industrial relations present an infinite permutation of attitudes on these matters. It 
is hard to achieve a consensus on the formulation of the problems which have to be faced. 
Agreement about how to resolve them often thus seems to be beyond reach …. The subject 
moves quickly, which is why an academic analysis which maintains a proper regard for 
practical considerations is important. The aim is to give a firm basis for understanding the 
underlying problems and principles.284  
 
Put another way, there is no denial that the state rules through arrogating legislative authority 
to itself.   
 
One result, therefore, is the constant references to the doyens such as Simmons, Dunlop, 
Marx and Durkheim, among others, revisiting their postulations and truncating their written 
propositions.285 Ideally, all academic explorations must be aimed at fortifying the social, 
moral and ethical components of any human interrelationships. This then can justify a 
problem-solving approach with regard to the impact of institutionalised structures. These 
academic expositions should also not forget the need for reforms in labour policies and laws 
and in particular the need to ensure protective mechanisms for workers in developing 
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countries, who are exposed to the machinations aimed at the re-commodification of labour. It 
should be acknowledged that such developments suggest that ‘social systems are the products 
of interaction between environmental conditions and strategic choices made by stakeholders 
as they seek to protect and advance their interests.’286    
  
In this context, the complexity of industrial relations can be summed up in the imbalance 
between the implementation of an organisational plan and the maximisation of efficiency on 
the one hand, and the maximisation of income and leisure on the other.287 Whoever assumes 
responsibility for the resolution of workplace problems must be well grounded in the 
principles and practice of good industrial relations. In the context of this study, therefore, it is 
one thing to create varieties of structures that are invariably under-resourced. The actors in 
industrial relations constitute the key elements and ingredients of industrial relations. These 
key actors consist of the state, employers and their associations, employees and their unions, 
and they operate within an environment comprising more than policies regarding wages and 
incomes. 
 
To understand industrial relations therefore is to understand the nature of these elements, 
their perceived and real roles, and the degrees to which their orientations accentuate any 
conflicting interests. It is important to indicate that ‘industrial relations’ is relevant only in the 
context of the modern market and industrialising economies. Therefore, it must be seen as the 
whole web of human interactions at work. This interaction is in turn predicated upon the 
contract of employment and how it is actualised.  
 
This chapter seeks to identify and examine the structural elements designed and implemented 
in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland to oversee the sustaining of effective industrial 
relations. Their objective and subjective interpretation of relations is another matter. 
 
5.2.1      Employment relations as interpersonal relations 
 
This study asserts that the fragmentation of the work process further deepens the domination 
of the worker by the employer. This results in perpetual dependency on the employer. 
Exposure to the realities of work cannot depend on an externalised advocacy for greater 
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humanism within the African context. The humanisation of work relations is not a privilege 
but a fundamental, moral and philosophical premise for democratisation. Without 
humanisation, confrontation may occur.288 The worker is intrinsically connected to 
employment or industrial relations. This role comes with severe handicaps which reflect the 
socio-economic realties of the true nature of production relations. This study indicates that 
constant disagreements and the absence of good faith in negotiations constitute grounds for 
distrust. Mistrust can stoke the fires of aggressive confrontation and industrial action. The 
implication is that labour disputes are not spontaneous and should therefore not be treated as 
such by the structures with authority to intervene and mediate. 
 
As Salamon says: 
 
‘Very often, the lack of any proper theoretical conception of the nature of work in modern 
society, or of the interests that determine the design of work and organisation, or of the forces 
in society at large that determine the development of appropriate and realistic expectations 
invalidate exercises particularly those based on theoretical, management-biased empiricism.’289 
 
This observation is a correct reflection of the current realities on the ground in Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland, given the fact that much of the confusion of workers does not 
originate from the workers but from those who impose their will by domination. Domination 
includes the capacity to reward, but through the creation or generation of that reward by its 
recipient.  
 
This supposed reward is remuneration in the contract of employment. Recognition for work 
done may therefore increase in relation to productivity because of the input–output nexus. 
Such a recognition–reward factor can only elicit obedience but not a legitimisation of the 
relations of domination. Thus the alienation of the worker results in tactical and instrumental 
compliance, which in reality is a function of market relations.290 Employment relations have 
therefore come to assume a situation in which the employer impacts on the employee, 
contrary to the employee’s interests. This carries connotations of political as well as 
economic power. These are some of the underlying issues in the nature of the employment 
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contract, including the continuity of such dominance.291 How workers have reacted to these 
varieties of domination is dealt with below. 
  
5.2.2      Trade unions and labour relations 
 
Trade unions desire a decent living standard for their members and not affluence. It is this 
exhibition of aspiration that translates itself into the myriad roles that labour movements are 
expected to play. However, what these roles are depends on whose interests are being 
advocated. Several roles have been ascribed to unions in general. In providing employees 
with a voice, unions may have an impact on society at both economic and political levels. To 
this extent, employee turnover becomes a barometer of ‘good’ management.  It is also an 
indictment of the bad employer and, depending on the employees’ intentions, a reward for a 
good employer. In providing a voice, unions determine the nature of the marriage between 
actual and desired conditions. 
 
By demanding rules for the pre-emption of unilaterally determined labour policy by 
management, unions help to standardise wage rates and minimise inequalities within the 
labour force at large. This has the potential to redistribute income in a manner consistent with 
the objectives of social justice. Unions also facilitate communication between workers and 
employers. They operate as a source of worker power that influences management power in 
ensuring ‘due process’ through collective agreements. Whenever labour is able to organise 
itself into monopolies, it substantially increases its bargaining power. But, in practice, this 
potential has rarely been achieved, due to fierce resistance by employers and their allies. 
 
Finally, unions have been alleged by some employers and state functionaries as exhibiting a 
propensity for political power and greed. But the argument here is that structurally 
differentiated states do not allow such things to happen. In fact, unions are a function of 
social cohesion. In the absence of legitimacy, fluid and volatile social conditions may invest 
unions with informal authority. There have been instances of union leaders riding on the crest 
of popular dissatisfaction to assume political authority. Realistically, however, the history of 
unions generally shows that leaders have never been able to manipulate workers into the 
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revolutionary assumption of state power without a corresponding atrophy of state institutions, 
a general malaise and a political vacuum in need of fulfilment.  
 
Therefore, the potential power of unions to destabilise the status quo may lie in the 
subjectively determined access to co-owned resources by the state. At any rate, union leaders 
are often promoted out of their unions and those who are better educated have been co-opted 
and awarded management positions in hitherto politically neutral public service unions. 
Therefore, the grasp of the complexities of state administration eludes most unions. Their 
major preoccupation has been with short-term economic returns on the sale of their labour 
power. In fact, most unions do not exhibit a capacity for political leadership.  
 
5.2.3   The state and industrial relations 
 
In most African countries, the state has come to epitomise the aggregation of all resources of 
civil society. As the law maker, it possesses a monopoly over the means of coercion in 
ensuring compliance with the law. The state is also an arbiter and an employer. The state 
pretends to be neutral but in reality it cannot be. This can be seen in instances where the state 
attitude towards unions is hostile and combative, as has been the case in Botswana, Lesotho 
and particularly Swaziland.292 It supposedly endeavours to mitigate the conflicts between 
employer and employee in a tripartite agreement, even when such conflicts are often 
triggered by the state’s labour policies. In this regard, the state is seen as a legitimate holder 
of public authority. In fact, its capacity as an employer is paramount. Therefore, it operates in 
a similar manner to any private capitalist who may bargain with worker formations. 
 
The test of effective state intervention is its ability to put economic policies in motion within 
an environment of political stability and freedom without resorting to violence. Its confidence 
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and sense of democratic direction can only be seen in its attitude towards the creation of 
meaningful facilities for diffusing tension. Where this occurs, the state is considered passive 
but not weak. Whether the state is passive and neutral can be determined by its relationship 
with the macro-economy.293 In return, the position adopted by the state determines the tenor 
of the relations with workers, particularly those directly employed by it, as was demonstrated 
recently in Botswana.  
 
This study observes that the state, whether passive or active, reserves the right to decide 
which organisations should exist and what rights, status and liabilities they can attract. For 
example, the state can regard unions as legal persons or juristic entities, but deprive them of 
real, substantive countervailing capacity through its power to define the nature and scope of 
their rights. The degree of restriction may also indicate the extent to which the state is 
prepared to go to consolidate its alliance with the interests of the dominant classes and groups 
in society. Thus the degree of legal constriction of the weaker elements in the workforce is 
not only indicative of how the state is biased but also equally indicative of the degree of 
confidence in the ability of the coalition to neutralise whatever countervailing force there is.  
 
Pragmatically, therefore, unions, in seeking legal entity, also seek social and economic 
participatory rights. Workers try to develop enough momentum to utilise economic and 
ideological pressures for greater returns for economic efforts. This momentum, however, is 
often elusive and thus transformed into inertia due to the more dominant activities of the 
state. Such activities are informed by the political culture of the corporatist, political state.  
Basically, this is the amalgamation of the economic, political and ideological facets of 
domination with the existing economic relations of domination. In simple terms, it is a 
modality for arresting the independence and empowerment of workers at the expense of 
dominant interests by ensuring that unions are subordinated to the state and to the dominant 
economic interests. 
 
According to Crouch, depending on the level of economic growth and development, a 
successful strategy of domination must be more formalistic and active. He believes that 
corporatism in this context should be seen as strongly insistent on the maintenance of order. 
Being organicist, hierarchically structured and anti-liberal, it insists on the involvement of 
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subordinates with authority and on the maintenance of order, while being strongly 
monopolistic or monist in terms of political power and economic dominance.294  
  
Therefore, by describing strikes as ‘illegal and unnecessary’ the state may not only be 
confirming its preoccupation with stability and safety.  
 
5.2.4   Wages policy and industrial relations 
 
A wage is an offer of the means of subsistence and a worker goes to work for survival. In 
Marxist terms, this implies both necessary and surplus labour. Necessary labour is that which 
determines his or her wage while the surplus is that which capital appropriates and realises as 
profit. Thus, a wage is equivalent only to a portion of a day’s labour to which a worker is 
entitled only after applying labour power over a period that includes the surplus labour time. 
Incomes policy occupies an indispensably crucial position in the industrial relations nexus.  
 
Von Beyeme considers incomes policy as the result of the bankruptcy of the theories 
explaining the distribution of income. In addition, he attributes this to the oversight of the 
‘magic rectangle’: full employment, monetary stability, balance of payments equilibrium, and 
adequate economic growth. The oversight was in glossing over the political dimensions of 
economic growth which free wage and price formation could not accommodate. Hence the 
need to harmonise all these factors in a wage policy.295  
 
However, in attempting to harmonise, the state intervenes with restrictive measures in the 
process of income distribution. This is because ‘it is increasingly clear that prices and 
incomes cannot be influenced only through monetary measures or steering of demand.’296   
The study contends that historical and contemporary differences may exist but the 
universality of certain peculiarities and reactions lend validity to the commonality of the key 
variables in industrial relations, such as the democratisation of industry. Industrial relations 
has come to assume an increasingly definitive connotation, not only of humanisation but, 
more significantly, participation and democratisation. Industrial democracy, according to the 
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Webbs,297 consists of three tenets or doctrines as follows: the doctrine of vested interest, the 
doctrine of supply and demand, and the doctrine of the living wage.  
 
A living wage should at least ensure that the worker can survive by his or her trade and the 
sale thereof. This is supposed to liberate both labour mobility and competition. A ‘living 
wage’ is therefore an arbitrary determination of labour value, bearing in mind the economic, 
political and ideological objectives of the dominant interests. Its adequacy and fairness are 
equally arbitrary, subjective and questionable. In serving the ends of the state, an appeal to 
nationalistic sentiments may be employed. As Sir Seretse Khama said in 1971, ‘it may be 
plausible that, as the workforce increases, the majority of new workers would have to go to 
the land.’298 He went on to say that such workers inevitably migrate back to the areas of 
industry and would do so more actively if wages for skilled and semi-skilled workers were 
allowed to increase. In addition, while production in the countryside would decline, urban 
population growth would affect the creation of more jobs. Therefore, while people must be 
rewarded for their skills, they cannot be allowed to hold the majority to ransom. 
 
Such sentimental appeals are descriptive of a situation where the normal laws of demand and 
supply are found normatively unsuitable for the political objectives of the state. 
Pragmatically, increases in purchasing power encourage consumption without savings, 
particularly as rising costs tend to outstrip these superficial increments.  
 
5.2.5   Collective bargaining and labour relations   
 
Collective bargaining should be seen primarily as an effort to acknowledge and comprehend 
the fears, needs, desires and anxieties of the parties. It also aims to develop the ability to 
inquire, negotiate and adjust jointly. However, in Botswana, the state exhibits contempt for 
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collective bargaining. While the state seeks to emphasise the advisability of collective 
bargaining and the principle that mutual problems should be mutually tackled and solved, it 
also seeks to devise mechanisms for future security and stability. Often, this is done by 
imposing wage ceilings instead of negotiation.299 In effect, though the state seeks a collective 
and comprehensive agreement, it applies a short-term solution while laying down modalities 
for a longer-term perspective. 
 
However, because the structures created are permanent, they become procedural, established, 
orderly, predictable and therefore corporatist in nature and practice. In effect, it could be said 
that the negotiation of a general agreement as to terms and conditions of employment is to 
labour relations approximately what the wedding is to domestic relations.300 Thus the heart of 
collective bargaining is the continuous display of the capacity for co-operative adjustment. 
This is often in the face of the dynamic, human and risk-prone requirements of production. 
Therefore, strictly speaking, the collective agreement is not a contract. Rather, it is a cluster 
of undertakings and commitments within the broad framework of the contractual nature of 
production relations.  
 
In this section, the study weaves together the ideas of the doyens of industrial relations and 
current theorists, enabling a better understanding of the crafting of a working definition of 
industrial relations. While it is clear that an effective definition must include the roles of the 
state, employers and employees, it is equally clear that industrial relations is such that a 
holistic definition is political, economic and organisational in scope. What is clear from the 
foregoing is that labour or industrial relations systems develop in response to situational 
dictates. While industrial relations practice is ostensibly intended to reduce, contain or 
prevent labour disputes, it actually engenders and nurtures them, depending on available 
factors.  
 
5.2.6     The role of labour law 
 
There is a perceived need for labour law to transcend the narrow boundaries of employment 
per se. This is because it deals not only with the manner in which work is organised in 
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today’s world but also addresses the world of work of the future. This study argues that the 
issue becomes one of a distinction between what the law is, what it does or should do, and 
how it has functioned in terms of workplace disputes. It also acknowledges that labour law 
serves to preserve industrial peace by acting to confine and contain the manifestations of 
conflict that are endemic to the entire system of industrial relations. 
   
The true function of labour law, according to Davis, is the ‘preservation of the social and 
economic structures prevailing in society at any given moment for restraining the frictional 
relationship between employers and employees.’301 This perception explains Kahn-Freund’s 
theory of the relationship between law and industrial relations and ‘negative’ law as 
epitomising the collective laissez-faire of the past.302 The study accepts that modern labour 
law is an admixture of terms and principles, concepts and rules of common law and statutes. 
It also accepts that legal rules do not redefine the employment relationship.303 They function 
by influencing the legal content and effect of the relationship. Therefore, in examining labour 
law in the context of employment relations, it is necessary to look at both the statutory 
framework and the principles of contract, property and obligations and the political direction 
of the state.304   
 
Whoever is charged with creating an atmosphere for viable industrial relations should 
consider the following. Accidents, fatal and otherwise, occupational diseases coupled with 
poor or non-existent social security, welfare and compensation mechanisms create worker 
insecurity and workplace volatility. Unemployment and labour market stagnation impact on 
aspirations and exacerbate social tension. The arbitrary deployment and relocation of labour, 
migrant contracts, casualization and individualisation of employment terms and conditions 
result in social dislocation. They also result in the fragmentation and dislocation of group and 
family loyalties which in turn affect existing normative standards, migrant labour practices 
and restrictions.  
 
The study concludes that, in view of the foregoing, labour law as a field of study in the 
modern context is too fluid and dynamic to be compartmentalised for ease of discussion or 
reference. It defies statutory restrictions and frowns upon philosophical and jurisprudential 
                                                          
301 Davies The Functions of Labour Law (1980) 217. 
302 Davies & Freedland Labour Legislation and Public Policy: A Contemporary History (1993)1-728. 
303 Freedman The Modern Law of Employment (1963)1-243 
304 Ibid. 
104 
 
obfuscation coupled with judicial imprecision and confusion. Going beyond the law and, by 
implication, more important than the law, is the need for voluntary Codes of Good Practice, a 
wider and constant open debate about the common social good, and the principle of 
proportionality.  
 
Those who commercialise and perpetuate industrial feud would then have to contend with the 
wider public. Economic, social and political demands, coupled with public opinion and the 
law all affect industrial relations and by extension the tensions within the relational space. 
However, except as a last resort, law must be seen and allowed to function only as a 
subordinate rather than the dominant factor in industrial relations.305 
 
5.3    Statutory and institutional interventions in workplace relations 
 
5.3.1       Overview of the administrative structures 
 
The labour law frameworks in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have resulted in the 
creation of multiple structures with commonalities suggestive of the sources of their origin. 
That being the case, transplantation without proper awareness as to whether the nurturing 
environment is capable of sustaining growth and fruition may result in a wasted effort. In 
addition, marginal results or at best incremental spurts of efficiency undermine the cost-
effectiveness of any enterprise. 
 
However, these assumptions need to be tested by a more rigorous examination of each 
country. In the interim, this introductory section examines the following state agencies: the 
Department of Labour, the Commissioner of Labour, the Industrial Court, the Labour Court, 
the Labour  Appeal Court, the Industrial Court of Appeal, the Labour Advisory Board, the 
Minimum Wages Advisory Board, the Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration Commission, 
the Panel of Mediators and Arbitrators, the Director of Dispute Prevention and Resolution, 
the National Advisory Committee on Labour, and the Industrial Relations Council. 
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What informs this examination is the fact that much state intervention in labour relations is 
through the agency of these organs, which have already been identified as components of the 
powerful public bureaucracy. 
  
It is debatable whether institutional interventions, judicial decisions and other politico-
administrative oversight mechanisms have had resounding success in mitigating the effects of 
labour disputes. An answer in the negative does not imply failure, but a need to identify the 
constraints. The following section juxtaposes the structures in the three countries in order to 
identify further functional, procedural and even nomenclature-related similarities. 
Subsequently the study will examine the ground realities and impact using these specific 
structures. However, it has to be recognised that, unlike state agencies, enterprises are 
economic entities driven by the profit motive. Their structures and organisational ethos are 
therefore informed by these short-term specific objectives. 
 
Bearing this in mind, their internal structures, corporate sub-culture and interactions and the 
modalities thereof are informed by this capital-driven concern. Therefore, state intervention 
in whatever form is more often than not considered intrusive rather than constructively 
interventionist. The state is guided more by political concerns regarding order, stability and 
the status quo. In essence, the question still remains as to why the state sees a need for an 
ever-increasing role in industrial relations, a role that results in replication of state-funded 
structures maintained at the expense of critical social services. Some state structures are 
examined briefly below. 
 
5.3.1.1 The Commissioner of Labour 
 
This office is created by current labour legislation in Botswana and Swaziland. However, the 
Commissioner of Labour (COL) in Botswana has a wider area of responsibility and therefore 
inherent authority. He may empanel arbitrators or mediators, over whom he presides as 
chairperson. There are no intermediary institutions like the Tripartite Commission on 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (TCCMA) in Swaziland, which must precede access 
to the courts. The Director of Dispute Prevention and Resolution (DDPR) in Lesotho is 
charged with similar functions. He is a public servant, as in Botswana and Swaziland. This 
institution is thus replicated in two countries, while the Director in Lesotho has a different 
title.  
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5.3.1.2 The Industrial Court 
 
Both the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) of Swaziland and the Trade Disputes Act (DTA) of 
Botswana provide for an Industrial Court composed of judges appointed in the same manner 
as those of the High Court. The functions of the courts are essentially the same in both 
countries as the courts in both instances are expected to be courts of law and equity. They 
also have independent Registrars. The jurisdiction suggests an emphasis on matters arising 
from trade disputes and those needing resolution in furtherance of good industrial relations. 
Decisions are subject to appeal to the Court of Appeal in Swaziland, where an Industrial 
Court of Appeal exists. In Botswana, appeals lie before the High Court. This provision should 
be replicated in Botswana as it is the trend. South Africa also has a Labour Appeal Court. It 
engenders specialisation away from the over-arching demands on the normal justice system. 
Essentially the courts may regulate their own procedures and proceedings, unlike in Lesotho. 
 
The purpose of these courts is mainly to interpret and oversee the implementation of labour 
law so as to ensure good, effective industrial relations. Achieving this aim requires a 
harnessing and harmonising of the roles of all the other actors who may be both centrally and 
marginally connected to labour law and relations. Since the judicial framework, the 
philosophy and the expectations are common, the Industrial Court system becomes an 
attractive instrument, provided this instrumentality can be used to enhance social justice.  
 
5.3.1.3 The Labour Courts 
 
Lesotho has a Labour Court system up to appellate level. Swaziland and Botswana do not, 
but rather have Industrial Courts that perform the same functions. These courts are also courts 
of law and equity and are intended to perform adjudicatory and review functions in the search 
for effective industrial relations. 
 
5.3.1.4 The Labour Advisory Board 
 
Labour Advisory Boards (LABs) exist in Botswana and Swaziland, while the National 
Advisory Committee on Labour (NACL) is found only in Lesotho. The two structures appear 
to be performing the same or similar functions, albeit with different reporting and oversight 
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mechanisms. The Labour Code of Lesotho provides for a National Advisory Council of 
Labour (NACL). Both the IRA of Swaziland and the Employment Act (EA) of Botswana 
provide for a Labour Advisory Board. While the duties of the LABs are now essentially the 
same, Botswana was, until the amendments in May 2004, rather vague about the 
composition, powers and functions of the Boards, which are covered in detail in the 
Swaziland IRA and the Labour Code Order in Lesotho.  
 
The IRA of Swaziland places the following duties upon the Board: the incorporation of ILO 
Conventions and the preparation of reports and memoranda submitted according to the 
requirements of articles 19 and 22 of the ILO Constitution. However, the Board is composed 
of 18 members, with six senior government officials, and six representatives each of 
employers and employees, or their alternates, with the Commissioner or his Deputy as 
Chairperson. In effect, this may translate into votes of 12 against 6, leading to questions of 
disproportionality and imbalance and legitimacy, if and when worker representatives are 
outvoted, not forgetting the intimidating potential of this majority of the better-educated and 
vocal state and employer representation. 
 
5.3.1.5  Tripartite Commission on Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (TCCMA) 
 
Though there is a variation in nomenclature, these variants of the ADR approach are referred 
to in Swaziland and Botswana respectively, and are charged with alternative dispute 
resolution prior to the referral of disputes to the Industrial Court. Both are established subject 
to the consultation of the Labour Advisory Board, which makes recommendations, and 
membership consists of those recommended to the Minister. 
 
The Commission in Swaziland receives trade dispute reports directly and is standing rather 
than ad hoc for this purpose. In Botswana, the Commissioner of Labour receives the reports 
and determines who is suitable to mediate or arbitrate, as the case may be, from a pool of full-
time and part-time appointees. The Commissioner may intervene where he apprehends a 
dispute and delegate the resolution of the dispute to a panel member or a board chaired by 
him. The two Acts provide detailed procedures for effecting alternative dispute resolution 
which, in their letter and intent, do not differ, and indicate a preference for compulsory 
statutory dispute resolution. 
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5.3.1.6  Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration Commission (CMAC), Panel of 
Mediators and Arbitrators, Industrial Relations Council 
 
The Industrial Relations Council in Lesotho is a tripartite body established to oversee dispute 
prevention and resolution. It is intended to lend legitimacy to the system and to ensure that 
the social partners, as beneficiaries of the system, have an important influence in seeing that 
the system works effectively. It is composed of three representatives each from employers, 
employees, the government and the Permanent Secretary of the responsible ministry. The 
Industrial Relations Council is a Lesotho brand. Its scope and functions are similar to the 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration Commission of Swaziland, which does not have the 
IRC’s powers. In Botswana, the COL combines all these roles under his portfolio as a 
Departmental Supervisor. 
 
5.3.1.7   Joint Negotiation Councils (JNCs), Joint Industrial Councils (JICs) 
 
In Swaziland, a JNC may be formed by an employer, employers’ organisations, or one or 
more registered trade unions. The purpose of a JNC is to negotiate on behalf of employees 
and employers within an industry where it considers itself sufficiently representative. Once 
the employers’ organisation or trade union has satisfied the requirements, a notice is gazetted 
for the purpose of establishing a JNC. The same applies to the JIC under the Botswana Trade 
Disputes Act and the Bargaining Council under the Public Service Act.306 The difference, 
however, is that where the COL under the TDA refuses registration of a grievance, the only 
recourse is to the Minister. In Swaziland, any aggrieved person may refer the matter to the 
Industrial Court or the TCCMA. As a JIC is important negotiating machinery from which 
collective agreements emanate and disputes of rights evolve, it is critical for the court to 
determine objectively the grounds for the non-establishment of a JIC rather than leave this to 
the political discretion of the Minister. The provisions of the IRA and the TDA regarding 
disputes procedures, unlawful industrial action and the enforcement of collective labour 
agreements are not substantially different. Thus, content and format are identical and 
reconcilable. They could also replicate the problems caused either by acts of omission or 
commission in the drafting. 
 
                                                          
306 [Cap 26:01] Act 30 of 2008. 
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Organs such as an Essential Services Commission in Swaziland and a detailed, crafted role 
for Mediators and Arbitrators in Botswana are aimed at the same goals. The list of essential 
services is the same by industry or service.  For reasons given earlier, a body comprising 
equal numbers of representatives from the government, employers and employees is ideal for 
overseeing the broad range of issues concerning essential services. Currently, the absence of 
an essential services commission in Botswana has led to serious departures from statutory 
procedures. 
 
5.3.1.8  Minimum Wages Advisory Board (MWAB) 
 
A key factor in industrial relations is wages and their determination, since many worker 
pursuits are focused around socio-economic issues, such as a living wage. Thus such a body 
plays an important role, particularly in the fixing of statutory minimum wages. Such bodies 
are charged with the annual review of wages policies and orders. In Swaziland, the COL is 
charged with the fixing of wages in consultation with representatives of both employers and 
employees. From the viewpoint of the state, wage leadership is an essential tool in labour 
retention, even if the process is arbitrary. Assuming the process in Swaziland is collaborative 
and bona fide, it could constitute a practical way of reducing labour disputes. The Industrial 
Court is charged with resolving questions regarding wages. In Botswana, there is a standing 
Minimum Wages Advisory Board. A listed statutory category for which the Minister shall fix 
minimum wages is provided. There is also a Wages Advisory Board comprising equal 
numbers of representative from employers, the trade union Federation, government and the 
public.  
 
5.4    Conclusion 
 
This study has demonstrated that, in Africa, the state is not yet in retreat. The dominance of 
the state is a pragmatic choice perpetuated by the coalition, particularly the political 
leadership. The state has, generally, continued with the colonial legal framework, tinkering 
only marginally and incrementally in response to both internal and external influences.  
 
In essence, the key institutions in labour dispute resolution, while structured differently and 
designated equally so, functionally converge in terms of aims and goals. There is still a need 
to look at their evolutionary path, historical antecedents and the impact of foreign influences 
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on their creation, relevance and sustainability. One could then determine the pressures 
brought to bear as a factor in the search for results in these legal systems.  
 
All three countries have provisions for workplace councils as engines for collective 
bargaining and worker formations and their roles in collective agreements. However, 
statutory compulsory registration of agreement and compliance with procedural and 
substantive issues do not appear to have diminished disputes of right or interest. This is 
probably because they do not always reflect a realistic appraisal of bargaining positions. 
Registration compels compliance and sanctions within a regulatory framework, but not 
necessarily internalisation and legitimisation. This is particularly so where a bureaucratic and 
elitist union leadership discards the value of grassroots mandate for financially lucrative 
arrangements with employers. 
 
At the moment it would appear that, as the three countries have indicated, there is a greater 
reliance on alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms. It is on record that the Labour 
Departments are poorly equipped. There is a remote possibility that the state might opt for the 
privatisation of labour dispute resolution unless the overall goal is not justice and equity, but 
an indirect way of keeping workers in check. In any case, there is an urgent need for specific 
training for both legal and paralegal public officers. The structures and institutions for ADR 
envisaged need to be developed and sustained not only to reflect the duality of the duties of 
justice and equity, but also to prevent overloading the more ponderous and laborious court 
system. It is expected that internal workplace dispute resolution will be re-visited.  
 
Such internally driven arrangements will allow in-house fire-fighting, husbandry and house-
keeping to become prerequisites for internal intervention, apprehension by a statutory officer 
notwithstanding. It must also be ascertained whether alleged over-regulation and over-
administration affect the desire of the parties to find solutions to their problems internally. 
Another vexatious issue for examination is that, more often than not, judicial decisions do not 
appear to be shaping the teleological social policy dimension of labour law and policy. 
Furthermore, except in a few instances, the specialised courts seem to emulate the rigidities 
and traditions of legal positivism and doctrinal litigation.307 
 
                                                          
307 Swaziland Government v The Swazi Federation of Trade Unions (SFTU) and The Swaziland Federation of 
Labour (SFL) Case No IC 349/02, Case No IC 347/02 of 8/01/03. 
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At another level, it is presumed that a worker needs more than a vague sense of contentment. 
According to recent trends, a new worker is emerging who needs to constantly feel that he or 
she is participating responsibly, whether alone or in a group, in an enterprise the overall 
objects of which he or she can understand. The corollary is that ‘a new form of state emerges, 
concerned with the expanded, rather than the primitive accumulation of capital, with 
extraction of relative surplus value from production.’308 It is in this context of perceived 
marginalisation that the employee conceptualises wage determination. Industrial action or 
inaction is often the result of how wages policies are perceived and evaluated relative to the 
calculated economic returns to the worker. 
 
This is why it becomes paramount to examine parameters such as ‘employee’, fair and unfair 
dismissal, freedom of association, the right to organise and collectively bargain, and the 
notion of ‘essential services’, among others. A logical outcome that some dismiss is the issue 
of industrial action or strikes. Tangentially, strikes are seen as a vent for frustration. For 
example, the terminologies applicable to war, boxing damages, wins, losses and casualties 
indicate such orientation. Employees generally resort to other devices to even out the score 
with management. But psychologically, these outlets only portray their frustration at being 
unable to intellectually articulate their perceived exploitation by the employer. It takes a lot 
more than legislation, rules and regulations to understand the workplace. This also applies to 
disputes. 
 
The chapters that follow examine disputes in the specific contexts of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland. The study has identified some aspects of the employment relationship that mostly 
trigger disputes, which are: 
 fair and unfair dismissals; 
 the freedom to form and join unions of one’s choice; 
 the right to organise and collectively bargain, union recognition, the strike (lawful and 
unlawful) as a bargaining tool; 
 the statutory and judicial dimensions of ‘essential services’ in relation to ministerial 
powers and statutory instruments. 
 
                                                          
308 Burawoy, The Politics of Production: Factory Regimes under Capitalism and Socialism (1985) 253 
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These elements of the employment relationship need examination from the doctrinal 
perspective, the normative exhortations of the ILO, and the narrow substantive legislation. 
This survey ought to provide adequate insight into the workings of public institutions. This 
study will also cover the judiciary and, more importantly, how the institutional make-up and 
ideological orientation of these bureaucrats might have rendered them impervious to the 
subtle nuances of shop floor relations. The study suggests that such patterned insensitivity 
could have crystallised over time. A proper investigation might explain why such 
institutionalised conduct, though less costly, is an equally less efficient way of dealing with 
labour disputes.  
 
Further, the functionaries of the state appear inclined to address the symptoms rather than the 
actual causes of labour disputes. At the risk of pre-empting the outcome of the survey, it is 
quite apparent that the state engineers inter-union and employer–employee friction. The state 
encourages the dissipation of the collective energy of workers and then intervenes. The quasi-
judicial intervention by its agents and functionaries who are already imbued with anti-union 
sentiments further muddies the waters.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
The Botswana Perspective 
 
6.1   Introduction 
 
Chapter 5 dealt extensively with the state as the dominant actor in employment relations. It 
became obvious that the state is guilty of stoking the fires of labour disputes, because the 
state creates the framework within which the relevant laws are manipulated to regulate the 
workers in Botswana. Post-colonial developments appear to have followed the same direction 
as in the past, in what one might describe as path-dependency. In effect, therefore, many of 
the observations, deductions and conclusions with regard to Botswana are not likely to be 
completely at variance with the situations in Lesotho and Swaziland. For this reason, an 
intensive and comprehensive analysis of the Botswana situation is deemed necessary, because 
this will ensure that the other two countries need not be treated as extensively with regard to 
detail and scope. 
 
Chapter 6 proceeds on the basis of the core areas identified in chapter 5 as being prone to 
disputes. These include the concept of the status of ‘employee’. The arrival of the worker 
begins the employment relationship, resulting in fair and unfair disciplinary dismissals and 
the freedom to associate and organise. In addition, the study undertakes a blend of theoretical 
and empirical discussion of the problematic issue of essential services, given that the state 
periodically tinkers with the categorisation of essential services. The chapter explores these 
themes objectively and analytically. 
 
6.2   The notion of a contract of service 
 
This section begins with the entry point of employment relations. Botswana has not been 
untouched by developments in the empirical development of labour law. The modern concept 
of the contract of employment has its roots in the traditional Roman law concept of locatio 
conductio operarum, or the letting and hiring of services. This definition, which initially 
applied to only the unskilled and menial worker, now has a bearing on various facets of work 
life in Botswana. In essence, moving away from the Roman and English common-law roots, 
the modern definition of the contract of employment has certain contextual implications. For 
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example, in the local context, it has acquired an increasingly legislative definition. This is 
ostensibly intended to address the perceived shortcomings of both the Roman-Dutch and 
English common-law approaches. The employment contract as legally defined is supposed to 
be a consensual agreement in which the servant or employee (locator operarum) avails the 
employer or master of his or her person to be used in the performance of services as may be 
assigned by the employer. This definition is loose and designed to advantage the employer, 
regardless of how others might define it. In this context, the employee offers his or her 
productive capacity for hire under imposed conditions, over a specified period of time in 
return for remuneration.309 
 
This definition is encapsulated in the Employment Act310 of Botswana, which provides the 
prescriptive environment underpinning employment relations. The scope of the Act suggests 
that, within the framework of formal employment, there is ample statutory protection for all 
parties even if implementation and enforcement may be lacking  This Act defines an 
employee as a person who enters into a contract of employment for the hire of his or her 
labour. A casual employee is defined as an employee whose contract exists for a period of not 
more than 12 months and whose working time is limited to three days or 22½ hours per 
week.311  
 
Each of these categories of employee is supposed to be eligible for basic pay based on a rate 
of payment. This includes payment in kind. Payment is made by the employer for work done 
or services performed during hourly, weekly, fortnightly or monthly periods excluding all 
other remuneration. Within the context of the Act therefore, employees are statutorily 
covered and their services may not be terminated without just cause. According to 
Dingake,312 it is a criminal offence for both parties to contravene the provisions of the 
Employment Act.313 This was the position taken by the court in Kgosiemang Mogopi v Nata 
Timber Industries (Pty) Ltd. 314In casu, it was decided that- 
                                                          
309 Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner 1979 (1) SA 51 at 56–57. See also Finams v Derek Grace 
IC 26/96. 
310 [Cap 47:01]. 
311 Part 1 of Cap 47:01. 
312 Dingake Individual Labour Law in Botswana (2008) 19. 
313 Section 37 of [Cap 47:01]. 
314 IC 194/96 
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[w]hilst the Court accepts the general principle that anyone may renounce a law made for his special 
benefit, such renunciation is not permissible where matters of public policy or public interest are 
involved.315 
 
However, labour legislation has demonstrably continued to be skewed towards the notion of 
contractual obligations and the prerogative of the employer to structure the work relations as 
he or she deems fit. Therefore this notion is not grounded in a conscious desire for equity 
even though there is no equality between the parties. Even in the event of state intervention, 
the premise is generally the supposed private contract between two consenting adults.  
 
An ‘employee’ as defined excludes members of the Botswana Defence Force, the Botswana 
Prisons Service, the Botswana Police Service and the Local Police. Currently, the definition 
includes civil servants and those in local authorities deemed as having agreed to (a) place the 
whole of their time at the disposal of the government; and (b) waive the right to additional 
remuneration for any work performed in an official capacity as required by a competent 
authority.316 It is obvious that the performance of this labour to satisfy the contract must 
attract a degree of effective control, either in the course of performance or spanning the life 
of the contract, as the case may be. 
 
 A servant therefore becomes a person subject to the control of his employer ‘as to the 
manner in which he shall do his work’.317 Such control includes hiring and firing. This 
statutory provision does not provide the servant with reciprocal control over the employer as 
to the manner in which he or she shall provide the work. While the Employment Act imposes 
a duty on the employer to provide work in terms of the contract, it does not confer on the 
employee the right to demand that he or she be given work.318   
 
Thus the employee is not afforded legal capacity to sue for damages for breach of contract 
and the wasting of time, deprivation of his or her earning capacity, and other related issues. 
The employer is only obliged to pay wages covering the period. In effect, the employee can 
only ‘control’ the employer to the extent of demanding payment. The principle of reciprocity 
                                                          
315 Ibid  
316 Section 37 of [Cap 47:01], read with ss 1–2 of part 1 of the Preliminary Trade Unions and Employers 
Organizations Act [Cap 48:01]. 
317 Ready Mixed Concrete (South East) Ltd v Minister of Pensions and National Insurance [1968] 1 AER 433 
per Mackenna J. 
318 Section 16. 
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whereby the employee can seek compensation for time wasted if the employer leaves him or 
her idle has never featured as prominently as the power vested in the employer. 
 
Several methods have been utilised to determine the status of an employee. In Francis Dola v 
Cecilia John,319 the ‘multiple test’ determination of who is a servant was adopted. This test 
covers (a) the recruitment and selection of the employee; (b) powers of discipline; and (c) 
control over wage determination. The capacity to undertake these vis-a-vis the employee 
implies a super-ordinate position whose inherent characteristic is the element of control. The 
determination of a servant’s status has also been implied, if one accepts the full meaning of 
the multiple test in Botswana which will extend the provisions of the Employment Act.   
 
In the true meaning of employment, the terms of the Constitution and also the Public Service 
Act, the Director of Public Service Management is an employee delegated and designated as 
an appointing authority. He determines, among other things, the conditions of appointment 
and terms of service, recruitment, administration, the structure and assessment of salaries, 
discipline and staff welfare. He exercises these functions over subordinate public officers. 
Such differentiation, while asserting the control function, also results in the relegation of 
lower level officers to the status of mere public servants. There is no all-purpose definition of 
what constitutes an employee. However, some of the indicators include the form of the 
contract, the method of payment, the intention of the parties, and the supply of all materials to 
enable the employee to deliver the service.320 
 
The status of employee may also be determined by the ‘policy approach’. This covers the 
following areas: (a) taxation of income as an employee; (b) eligibility for compensation under 
cover of the employer’s duty to provide security against injuries incurred ‘out of and in the 
course of’ employment; (c) capacity to enjoy statutory rights as an employee, such as resort 
to the Public Service Commission or a Labour Officer in the event of unfair dismissal; and 
(d) the enjoyment of returns by way of wages rather than fees or profit This approach is well 
demonstrated by Young & Woods Ltd v West.321 In this case, a worker was persuaded to opt 
for payment as a self-employed person rather than as an employee. In a contested dismissal, 
he was allowed to seek redress as an employee. 
                                                          
319 [1963] INMLR 58 Kaduna High Court, Nigeria, 1974. 
320 Sigwele v Botswana Life Insurance (2000) 2 BLR 331 (IC). 
321Young &Woods v West [1980] 1 R. Law .Review. 201 CA.  
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On the other hand, the ‘non-policy approach’ emphasises the factual situation. Using the 
same Young case as example, the question arises as to whether the respondent, Mr West, a 
skilled sheet metal worker, was factually self-employed, or whether the status of a contractual 
relationship was formally agreed upon and seen to be so. Further, whether the return on the 
application of labour power was remuneration, service fees or a commission attracting 
appropriate tax. Other questions that will arise logically will include how the hours and terms 
of work were decided, and by whom; whether one of the parties has the right to discipline and 
supervise the other regarding when and how work should be undertaken; and whether the 
performer supplied his or her own resources and capital in terms of tools, transport and even 
extra personnel. 
 
This factual determination was applied in Morren v Swinton and Pendlebury Borough 
Council.322 The resident site engineer was appointed and paid by the Council but was 
seconded to and given instructions by a consulting firm. The issue was whether he was 
entitled to superannuation as a local government employee. The court held that, although the 
firm was not subject to direct control, it was an agent of the Council and therefore the 
engineer was a servant of the Council. The legal status of a worker can also be determined 
with reference to his role within the organisational structure. Thus it was ruled in Stevenson 
and Others v McDonald & Evans323 that a servant must be ‘part and parcel of the 
organization’. The test here is thus the degree of integration and involvement in the 
employer’s enterprise. 
 
Normally, a general employer of regular services is deemed to owe duties of a personal 
nature only to a servant, although such a servant may, occasionally, be under a special 
employer. Therefore, although the owner of a machine hires it out to another with the 
services of his operator, his primary responsibility for the operator is not waived. Where A 
works at location Y without pay on the instructions of B, primary liability remains with B 
since B retains control over A. In Rotimi v Adegunle and Another,324 it was held that the 
appellant, who was injured in a hired vehicle driven by the respondent’s driver, was correct in 
suing the vehicle owner on the basis of vicarious liability. In effect, where compensation of a 
                                                          
322 [1965] 2 AER 349. 
323 [1952] TLR 101. 
324 Alhaji M.O. Rotimi v Adegunle and Another [1959] 4 FSC 19 Nigeria. 
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third party is traceable to another, the person who creates the conditions for the compensation 
becomes a servant. In conclusion, the status of a worker is not only important but crucial.   
 
The status of a worker affects his or her returns on labour and compensation in the event of 
injury and also his or her entitlement to separation awards. The Employment Act of 
Botswana makes no provision for the unfettered prerogative of unilateral change in the terms 
and conditions of contract. Impliedly, while such perceptions may inform the quality of work 
place relations between employer and employee, its very nature can trigger disputes. The 
Trade Disputes Act of Botswana defines disputes of ‘right’ as those arising from an illegal 
infringement of rights flowing from statutory law. This covers collective agreements, 
individual employment contracts, or the conferment of benefits to which the claimant is 
legally entitled.325 The negative rights attendant on these include dismissals, suspension, 
retrenchment, re-engagement, recognition or otherwise of a workers’ organisation seeking to 
represent employees or whether a statutory dispute does exist as a matter of fact and law.326 
The Trade Disputes Act also classifies disputes as those of ‘interest’ implying grievances 
over the creation of new terms and conditions of employment or the variation of existing 
terms and conditions of employment. 
 
The common thread running through this nexus is trade disputes. These are defined as an 
alleged dispute, a dispute between unions, or a grievance.327 For example, in Moyo v 
Kgolagano College,328 the Industrial Court observed that, while employment conditions may 
change to sustain the organisation and are thus subject to unilateral amendment as part of the 
employer prerogative, these conditions must be seen to be necessary, fair and reasonable. 
Thus, if a contract provides for a notice period of three months or three months’ salary in lieu 
of notice, the purported renewal of such a contract replacing the notice period by the 
employer with one month’s notice or one month’s salary in lieu of notice, while retaining the 
employee’s obligation to give three months’ notice or payment of three months’ salary is not 
only unfair and unreasonable, but also unlawful in terms of s 19(a) of the Employment 
Act.329 
 
                                                          
325 .Trade Disputes Act [Cap 48:02] Part 1 –Preliminary (s 2)  
326 Ibid. 
327 Part 1 preliminary [Cap 47:01] No 6 of 2008. 
328 IC 33/95. 
329 IC 33/95. 
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The Botswana Railways Amalgamated Workers’ Union and Botswana Railways is a case in 
point.330 In this instance, the union alleged discrimination by the management in the creation 
of two separate bands of station master after a rationalisation and restructuring exercise in 
1996. Some station masters were graded at band 8. A complaint by the Chief Traffic Officer 
resulted in some from band 6 being moved to band 8. The rest were left on band 6. The 
complainant station masters did not question the integrity of the rationalisation and 
restructuring consequent to a job evaluation but wanted all station masters to be on the same 
band. The court ruled that their dissatisfaction was not the result of a denied right but of a 
perceived entitlement, although band levels were based on station size and levels of 
responsibility at the respective stations. In effect, the position adopted by the management 
was fair, valid and lawful within the ambit of their prerogative to determine organisational 
structure. 
 
In chapter 2 of this study, it became clear that the concept of employment emerged from the 
era of serfdom, through wage earners to current employees under the notion of a contract of 
employment or a contract of service. This differs from the individual contractor (locator 
conductio operis) hired for specific service delivery in return for a specific fee as pre-
determined. In essence the Employment Act is a state-imposed regulatory mechanism. It 
provides for the appointment of a Commissioner of Labour and Labour Officers. It also 
provides for a Minimum Wages Advisory Board and a Labour Advisory Board. It also deals 
with provisions related to recruitment, the prohibition of forced labour, the protection of 
wages, rest periods, hours of work, holidays, the employment of young persons and children, 
and other conditions of work.  
 
6.2.1   Termination of the contract of employment 
 
The purpose of dismissal is not to allow employers to dodge their responsibilities. This is 
why the Employment Act makes certain provisions with regard to unspecified periods of time 
(subject to notice). The first is the termination of contracts of employment without reference 
to time. Secondly, the payment of daily wages in daily-rated or casual working situations can 
signify the termination of such daily engagements. Termination can occur even if notice is 
given in a situation where work period exceeds a day, but is less than 21 hours a week. 
                                                          
330 Unreported. 
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Thirdly, in the event of periods exceeding a day but less than a week, notice shall be a day. 
Fourthly, in the event of wages payable for periods of work less than a week, the notice shall 
be equivalent to the period worked. Fifthly, if an employee has worked for not less than a 
week but continuously for two or more but less than five years, the length of notice shall be 
two weeks. Lastly, if the period exceeds five years but is less than ten years, notice shall be 
one month or six weeks if over ten years.331 It should be noted that equitable arrangements 
that do not jeopardise the employee situation are deemed lawful. 
 
However, under s 19, where there is no reference to time, either party may give notice 
according to the terms, or pay the other party a sum equal to basic pay accruing over the 
minimum lawful period of the notice. The employee, without waiting for the notice periods to 
lapse, may also pay the equivalent basic pay covered by the notice period to the employer 
concerned. The position with regard to the termination of contracts during the probation 
period is quite clear. Probation period itself is pegged at three months for unskilled 
employees and twelve months for skilled employees. Though it attracts 14 days’ notice, 
neither party is required to give any reason therefore.332 In real terms, as a period of 
adaptation, orientation and evaluation, it makes moral and occupational sense for the 
employee under probation to be informed as to the grounds for his unsuitability.  
 
In s 23 of the Employment Act prohibits dismissals on certain grounds. These include an 
employee’s membership of a registered trade union or participation in any activities 
connected with a registered trade union outside working hours or, with the consent of the 
employer, within working hours.333 This also covers the situation where the employee seeks 
office as an employees’ representative, or where the employee makes a complaint in good 
faith or participates in proceedings against the employer involving an alleged violation of 
law. Finally, this also covers a situation where the employee suffers prejudice on grounds of 
                                                          
331 Section 18. 
332 Section 20. See the Industrial Court case of Mosedame v Institute of Development Management. IC/ [29/97] 
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333 Motshegwa was an employee of the Council. At same time, he was the Secretary General of his union, the 
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disciplinary hearing, on the grounds of insubordination and absence without official leave. Neither the 
Department of Labour nor the Minister has so far questioned the conduct of the Council. See Botswana Gazette 
Wednesday ( 10-16 June).11 (unreported)  
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his her race, tribe, ethnicity, social origin, marital status, sexual orientation, political opinion, 
sex, colour or creed.334 
 
In addition to the foregoing, the employer may dismiss on disciplinary grounds without 
notice if the employee is guilty of ‘serious misconduct’.335 This is interpreted to mean wilful 
disobedience, wilful misrepresentation of qualifications or skills, habitual, wilful neglect of 
duties, theft, misappropriation, wilful dishonesty, acts of violence, and harassment of 
colleagues. In addition, the employee may be liable to disciplinary dismissal on grounds of 
wilful damage to property negligently or by default regarding both movables and fixtures, 
wilful disclosure of trade secrets or confidential information, the inability to carry out normal 
duties due to the intake of alcohol or habit-forming drugs, and wilful refusal to obey safety 
rules and regulations. The list also includes work performance below the average standard 
despite two written warnings, offering or receiving bribes, and persistent absence from work 
without justifiable cause.336 
 
It should be noted that each of these grounds can trigger a whole chain of events in the 
workplace. Apart from being part of the range of basic floor expectations, they are also the 
seed-bed of labour disputes. Precisely because of this, the Employment Act provides for what 
is generally referred to as ‘constructive dismissal’ parameters. These include employment on 
work ‘markedly different’337 in nature from the work one was originally engaged to do, and 
confined employment necessitating a ‘change of residence for which no provision was made 
in the contract of employment’.338 In addition, there is the issue of transfer to lower grade 
work, poor treatment by the employer or his or her representative, and exposure of the 
employee and his or her dependants to danger, violence or disease that was not contemplated 
as an inherent part of the contract. 
 
The other dimension is when a dismissal is summary and fair or both procedurally and 
substantively fair. By definition, a summary dismissal is that which occurs when an employee 
breaches a material term of the contract. It presupposes both an anticipatory breach and 
repudiation (breach in anticipando). In reaction, there is the corresponding declaration by the 
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employer that it is no longer bound by the terms of the agreement.339 Fair dismissal then 
becomes substantive if it affects the material integrity of the terms and conditions of the 
contract. In effect, such dismissal must be perceived to be a consequence of the irretrievable 
breakdown of trust or a proper working relationship. A case in point is that of Motshegwa 
and the Francistown City Council.340 The dismissal was contrary to s 23 dealing with 
automatically unlawful and unfair dismissals, specifically s 23(a).  
 
Procedurally fair dismissals are expected to follow laid-down procedures including general 
warnings, informal warnings, written warnings, final written warnings, denial of privileges, 
suspension, demotion, and the establishing of a disciplinary panel. In the case of the latter, 
the employee must be notified of the nature of offence, the date and venue for the hearing, 
and must be given time to prepare. In effect, dismissal, viewed as a last resort before when 
the relationship has irretrievably broken down. This results in separation from the payroll of 
the employing entity.341 In National Development Bank v Thothe,342 the Appeal Court held 
that the dismissal of the applicant was substantively unfair because he had not been given 
notice and had not been given the opportunity to defend himself, having been dismissed by a 
body corporate established by statute. In the absence of any supervening legislation at that 
time, the guiding document was the employment contract in terms of the Employment Act 
which laid down procedures to be followed in cases of disciplinary dismissal. The employee 
must be given notice of the relevant misconduct and afforded a fair hearing.343 The purported 
termination of employment was therefore wrongful, invalid and unlawful. This suggests that 
there is a rebuttable presumption that the law lays down procedures for trade disputes that 
may culminate in dismissal. 
 
For example, if the law stipulates that the Commissioner of Labour (COL) shall investigate a 
trade dispute brought before him before referring the dispute to the Industrial Court under a 
section 7 Certificate of Referral, this presumes active personal involvement by the COL or a 
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designated representative. The inability to comply by the COL would render such a 
Certificate invalid, rendering the court unable to proceed according to its jurisdictional 
mandate. In such a situation, matters regarding dismissal may not be placed before the 
Industrial Court.344 
 
Similarly, the Industrial Court took the position that condonation of poor performance 
amounted to a waiver of the need for remedial intervention. Further, refusal to give notice 
amounted to procedurally unfair dismissal in terms of s 25 regarding retrenchments and s 
26(4)(i) regarding serious misconduct terminations under an employment contract. In the 
Mokaya v Moteo Condotte, a surveyor, challenged his dismissal as unlawful in the High 
Court and demanded payment of six months’ wages. He had been employed for 24 months. 
After 17 months, he was given one month’s notice of termination without any prior 
information of breach.  
 
First, the District Labour officer determined the dismissal to be unfair but was unable to 
resolve the matter, which was then referred to the Commissioner of Labour (COL). The COL 
issued a section 7 certificate in terms of s 7 of the Trade Disputes Act.345 The court decided 
that if redundancy had indeed occurred, two new surveyors should not have been hired 
immediately to replace Mr Mokaya alone. The purported dismissal was both substantively 
and procedurally unfair.346 
 
There is a general perception that the levels of organised work and the calibre of workers 
required renders this maze of sophisticated  rules and  regulations inimical, if not irrelevant, 
to  harmonious industrial relations. For example, S&B Construction v Stobbs347 underscores 
this paucity of awareness about the nuances of the law. An employer sued a deserting 
employee for half of his monthly salary in lieu of notice. But s 18 of the Employment Act 
confers a right on the employee to terminate the contract without notice by making payment. 
There is no reciprocal right of the employer to demand payment. Further, an employer can 
sue a deserting worker only for damages, not for a refund of salary. Issues such as these could 
be avoided if workers were educated about the relevant legislation, by both employers and 
shop stewards of the unions.  
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347 BLR [1979-80] 3 HC. 
124 
 
6.3   Freedom of association and organisation 
 
This section demonstrates that associations of workers and employers are not simply an 
episode in the life of an organisation but a social phenomenon. This is based on certain 
jurisprudential postulations that have legislation and labour policy at their centre. Chapter 2 
has illustrated a historical connectivity between the pre-colonial and post-colonial 
environment of organised industrial processes and the necessary socialisation of a given 
workforce. The dichotomy between the individual and the collective with regard to freedom 
of association is played out in the Webster case regarding whether it also implies freedom to 
dissociate.  In Young, James and Webster v UK the dissenting judges considered the right to 
associate as concerning ‘the individual as an active participant in social activities’ while at 
the same time it is ‘a collective right in so far as it can only be exercised by a plurality  
individuals’. The right to dissociate ‘aims at protecting the individual against being grouped 
together with other individuals with whom he does not agree or for purposes which he does 
not approve’.348 
 
It is noted that such protection of the individual does not translate into positive freedom of 
association. Hepple and Leader therefore challenge this juridical argument as fallacious. 
Their reasons are that, firstly, as a paid worker, one ceases to have that liberty in terms of 
who to work with, in which unit or on which shift. Secondly, the freedom not to associate is 
not a celebration of the death of the ‘closed shop’ membership recruitment approach. Most 
importantly, this negative freedom seeks to remove the possessors of the freedom of 
association from the point at which the freedom is enjoyed.349 One cannot realise freedom of 
association practically as an individual alone. Assuming an individual consciously excludes 
him- or herself from union membership, such an anti-group individual will still expect to 
benefit from the concessions that others win through bargaining as a collective.  
 
There appears to be a convergence between the principles enunciated by different 
international institutions regarding the desirability of domesticating international precepts, 
norms, practices and conventions. These are seen as subordinates to domestic rule-making. 
This study contends that, if indeed ‘freedom of association’ provides the nexus between civil, 
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political, economic, social and cultural aspects of human rights, then this should include the 
unfettered right to join a trade union of one’s own choosing.350  
 
Assuming this is so, the issue then would translate into a confrontation with the state 
regarding its discretionary authority   to exclude or restrict segments of society from the full 
actualisation of these rights. Regardless of that, conventional wisdom has shown that there 
cannot be forced subscription from any employee simply because he or she benefits or might 
benefit from a collective agreement or the consequences of a concerted, collective stoppage 
of work as a bargaining tool.  
 
6.3.1     Historical linkages 
 
There is a historical linkage to this modern interpretation that must accompany a modern 
examination of current labour law regimes. The trade union collective came into existence in 
Britain in 1868 and obtained legal status by 1871. However, the effects of the 1875 
immunities did not augur well for the control of union activity. Taff Vale therefore provided a 
new juridical redefinition of union freedoms. In Taff Vale Railway Co v Amalgamated Society 
of Railway Servants Ltd351 liability was imposed on unions. In effect, since unions now had 
both juristic personalities and locus standi, they could be sued in tort in their registered name 
for officers’ torts. A Royal Commission recommended in 1905 that unions should be legal 
entities whose benefit funds should be separated from assets against which suits could be 
executed. The following year, under the Trade Disputes Act (1906), immunity was granted 
from civil liability for acts in furtherance of a trade dispute, thus conferring the right to picket 
or strike.  
 
In Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants v Osborne,352 the government sought to curtail 
the politicisation of unions through the sponsoring of political parties. The Trade Union Act 
(1913) legitimised all forms of lawful activity, including political affiliation. In this regard, 
therefore, the role of the International Labour Organisation became crucial for several 
reasons. In the preamble of the 1946 Constitution of the ILO, it was stated that conditions of 
labour exist involving ‘such injustice, hardship and privation to large numbers of people as to 
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produce unrest so great that the peace and harmony of the world are imperilled’.353 Records 
indicate that the resolutions of the 1944 Philadelphia Conference were the first to elicit a 
response from the colonial government in Bechuanaland. This was the reiteration of the 
Forced Labour (Indirect Compulsion) Recommendation.354   
 
In fact, what Convention 65 advocated was the mere progressive abolition of criminal 
penalties in dependent colonies. Article 2 of the Convention, recognised and tacitly condoned 
the criminalisation of breaches of health and safety regulations. It identified some areas of 
penal sanction which it decried. These included: any refusal or failure to commence or 
perform service as stipulated, neglect of duty, lack of diligence, and absence without 
permission or valid reason. Certain breaches were considered as attracting civil action, for 
example, offences against public order; labour discipline such as drunkenness, insults, 
assault, disorderly conduct, violent language; possession and use of company property 
without permission; and acts of commission and omission involving material loss to the 
employer.  
 
In Botswana’s legal evolution, the worst offender was the Native Labour Proclamation (Cap 
64). Section 40 imposed severe penalties for all breaches of contract. This is not to say that 
other laws were not equally guilty. To this extent, the Southern Rhodesian government 
reaction is illustrative: 
 
The African generally has little sense of responsibility and even less of the sanctity of contract. 
The civil sanction is quite ineffective in that he owns little property.  Moreover, the cost of civil 
proceedings, which would in most cases be irrecoverable, would prevent employers from 
instituting action.355  
 
The Resident Commissioner also concluded that ‘no useful purpose would be served. It is 
doubtful whether they would be read; and it is even more doubtful whether they would be 
understood.’356 
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In 1952, any immediate or early abolition of criminal penalties in the prevailing 
circumstances was considered as not only likely to upset labour stability but also capable of 
increasing lawlessness.357 The academic question for now therefore is whether by the 1992 
amendments, workplaces and the intervening state had transformed sufficiently to have 
positively impacted on labour legislation. The answer may be found in the following 
quotation. During the committee stage of the Trade Union Bill on 12 May 1969, it was 
emphatically stated that ‘we owe nobody an apology; we are going to legislate in a manner 
which we think it is in the best interest of Botswana and in the best interest of the trade 
unions.’358 This was stated prior to comments that trade unions were being manipulated by 
some ‘ill-advised political fanatics’ who wish to use the unions as ‘a trial of power against the 
government’.359      
 
One can see how such sentiments were reminiscent of colonial legislative developments. In 
other words, in ascertaining whether these signs of intransigence still persist, one is 
compelled to answer in the affirmative. This is based on the dominant perception of labour 
legislation as having been transformed from a legislative function into executive rule-making 
given the assertion of the rule-making prerogative by the state. For example, the definition of 
breaches is no different from the pre-independence framework. The remarkable departure is 
the criminalisation of breaches of contracts covered by essential service clauses under the 
Trade Disputes Act.360 The ILO had also recommended the standardisation of wages for 
labour. This was roundly ignored by the state. In its quest for wage leadership, reservations 
were made about the general applicability of ILO Conventions in discrete, individual African 
situations.   
 
In addition, differentiation between the coloniser and the colonised on one hand and social 
stratification between the traditional elite and commoners, it was argued, must be retained ‘to 
safeguard African customs’.361 Naturally, feudal practices such as perpetual indentures falling 
under herding, sharecropping, the employment of minors, and property rights have since 
colonial times, been included in the annual capping of minimum wage policies, except for 
hired hands in agricultural enterprises. It is therefore not surprising that, by 1960, the report 
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on labour legislation in Bechuanaland concluded that jobs performed by traditional 
regiments, were contraventions of ILO Conventions.362 These public works were compulsory, 
unpaid and subject to penalties. With regard to ILO demands for With regard to ILO demands 
for vocational training and labour inspection, the office of the High Commissioner indicated 
that technical or industrial training was not ‘in the interests of the population’.363 In any case, 
industrial and commercial establishments did not need ILO instructions to operate.364 The 
most serious indictment of labour practice and regulation in Botswana occurred in 1978. 
 
This was after an ILO mission on labour legislation drafted an Employment Act, the Trade 
Disputes Act and the Compensation Act. In 1960 Catchpole had redrafted the Law of Master 
and Servant which he copied from Act 15 of 1815 of the Cape of Good Hope. This then 
became the received law of Bechuanaland. Catchpole later crafted out of this amalgam 
together with the Native Labour Proclamation. In the process, he also amended the Wages 
Board Proclamation 52 of 1949. Between 1960 and 1979, the only thing resembling an 
inspectorate of labour was the powers delegated to the Mining Commissioner under the 
Mines and Minerals Proclamation (s 77 of Cap 96).  
 
Paragraph 12 of the Catchpole report considered it adequate in scope since it enabled the 
determination of whether ‘any nuisance exists’ without defining ‘nuisance’. In fact, the first 
25 Labour Officers were appointed only in 1966 on a part-time basis. Essentially, what the 
ILO mission did between 1978 and 1979 was to redraft existing regulations in conformity 
with ILO standards. To this extent, the intransigence of the government was understandable 
and could have been acceptable on the grounds of anything but political expediency.   
 
6.4    The Constitution and fundamental rights 
 
Section 13(1) of the Constitution of Botswana guarantees the protection of freedom of 
assembly and association and, by extension, the right to organise and collectively bargain. To 
this extent, it provides, inter alia, that except with his or her own consent, ostensibly 
voluntarily given, no one shall be hindered in the enjoyment of these freedoms. Superficially, 
this provision captures the spirit of all the international instruments hitherto cited. To that 
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extent therefore, there is nothing iniquitous about it. Section 13(1) of the Constitution could 
be said to meet the expectations of art 9 of ILO Convention 87, but it is not in agreement with 
the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights.365 Similarly, it is in conflict 
with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966. 
 
The provision in the Constitution guarantees the right to assemble freely and associate with 
others, and to form or to belong to trade unions or other associations for the protection of 
interests. Yet it also implies these rights can be curtailed or withdrawn. The restrictions in 
this context are those regarding assembly and association. Section 13(2) of the Constitution 
stipulates that anything contained or effected under the authority of any law and statutes shall 
be considered as duly enacted. Such laws are to be considered as not inconsistent with or in 
contravention of the Constitution if their purpose includes defence, safety, public order, 
health or morality, as defined. 
 
Section 13(2) also condones and legitimises restrictions (without form or content) upon 
public officers and others.366 It is apparent that, in Botswana, these restrictions exist 
specifically in relation to the formation and joining of trade unions. For such purposes, any 
conduct may be subjectively defined as threatening law, order, security and health. A prison 
officer in Botswana may not be a member of a trade union and may also not be a member of 
associations not established exclusively for members of the prison service alone.367 With 
regard to the police service, the restrictions expressly refer to anybody or any association that 
wishes to control or influence the terms and conditions of work within the service.368  
 
These and others regulations apply equally to members of the Botswana Defence Force. 
Within these contexts, it has been assumed that acceding to the terms and conditions of 
employment imply voluntary consent to have one’s constitutional rights restricted. The 
freedom of contract implies the freedom to put a noose around one’s own neck. The question 
with regard to the Constitution is whether any statutory body should be visited with the 
consequence of being hamstrung by a prejudicial exclusion from the enjoyment of the 
freedom of association and assembly. 
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In South Africa, while the South African National Defence Force, the National Intelligence 
Agency and the South African Secret Service are excluded from the scope of the Labour 
Relations Act (LRA) and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA), members of the 
SANDF have been given the right to form and join trade unions. This was the position of the 
Constitutional Court in SA National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Another.369 
Naturally, soldiers in the SANDF are not permitted to strike, but they have the right to 
associate, although not as a union in the conventional sense, and to collectively fight for their 
common welfare.  
 
The Botswana legislature has taken almost four decades after independence to include all 
public sector workers, tribal administration staff and teachers under the ambit of ‘employee’ 
to enable them to form and join unions. Hitherto, this large but extremely fragmented 
category of workers had, according to the Constitution, been excluded from forming and 
joining trade unions of their choice. The relaxation of the restrictions under the 2005 
amendments to the TUAEOA could be interpreted as either the latent intention of the 
Constitution or that the Constitution had anticipated such developments for the future that has 
come.370 Given that the Constitution affirms its parental responsibility for derivative statutory 
enactments, it also therefore must assume vicarious liability for any excesses of these 
individual laws, both substantively and in application. 
 
The amendments that have liberated certain sectors of employees from non-unionisation, 
albeit in keeping with emerging international trends, calls into question what informed the 
provisions of the Constitution at its promulgation. This is particularly so when one also 
considers the provisions of the Act dealing with restrictions on registration, membership 
thresholds, eligibility for office and other matters. This should also take into account the 
apparently stifling legislative environment of the past from which the country was supposed 
to have emerged at independence. 
 
6.4.1 The formation and registration of trade unions 
 
Since its formation, the ILO has been instrumental in attempting to direct countries towards 
approximation to international labour standards. For example, the powers of the registrar of 
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trade unions to refuse registration to similar bodies (s 13(1)(d)) was a denial of the right of 
association and a contravention of art 2 of Convention 87 which stipulated that domestic 
legislation should not be seen as impairing freedom of choice. The definition of trade union 
under the received 1941 Gold Coast Ordinance 13 remains largely the same. In fact, nothing 
radically different has occurred between 1941 and 2004 as far as amendments are concerned.  
In the recent past, the establishment of a vetting board chaired by the registrar was seen as 
diluting the power of government through the registrar. It was believed that the discretionary 
control of unions was important because most were badly in need of guidance. Sentiments 
were expressed to the effect that a multiplicity of organisations would hamper economic 
development. The prevailing opinion was that trade unionism in Botswana appears to have 
suffered from political and ideological ties. Today, there is strategic fragmentation and 
multiplicity of unions.371 
 
6.4.2       Eligibility as an officer 
 
A designated officer must be an employee member of a union and not a union employee. This 
clause contravenes the freedom to choose officers since the termination of their employment 
could endanger union activity. It is proposed that anyone familiar with the trade union ought 
to be eligible as an officer, which is different from a paid employee of the union. Section 
10(3) of the 1992 Amendment Act reaffirmed the requirement of citizenship under the 1984 
Act and retained the right of the registrar to cancel applications for registration and also de-
register unions when the need arises. The current Trade Unions and Employers Organizations 
Act prohibits union employees from elective positions since they cannot be members.372 An 
elected officer must be a union member. For now, unions can operate only on a part-time 
basis and ipso jure, at the employer’s or manager’s discretion. The legislative interpretation 
of this perception of labour by government is the same today. 
 
6.4.3     Recognition and affiliation 
 
The prohibition of international affiliation was viewed by the ILO in 1978 as contrary to the 
free and voluntary association of groups and against art 5 of Convention 87. In 1969, the 
Attorney-General explained the limited scope of the Trade Union Act thus: ‘One of the 
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reasons why there are so many controls and restrictions in this Act about trade unions is the 
fact that trade unions are given  power to do various  things that ordinary bodies are not 
permitted to do.’373 The debates on affiliation thus laid the groundwork for today’s legislation 
considering it is the same government with largely the same legislators. 
 
Perhaps one could say that government has, over the years, appeared inclined to see 
international affiliation as an inroad into political stability. In 1992, the Trade Unions and 
Employers Organization Act was amended. It stipulated that it would no longer be necessary 
for unions to seek ministerial approval before they could accept foreign assistance in the form 
funds, donations and loans. However, they are prohibited from accepting financial assistance 
for air, road, sea passages or scholarships.374     
 
6.4.4   Finance and auditing 
 
The ILO observed that the rigid control of union finance has been on the statute books since 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Proclamation 16 of 1942.  
Utilisation of funds, it said, should be for anything lawful (as legislated in Britain since 1913) 
and not only for matters on an approved list. The Minister’s powers under the 1979 Act were 
incompatible with freedom of association. The ‘open-house’ nature of records amounted to 
grave interference. The Convention on Freedom of Association is generally coupled with the 
Right to Organize and Collectively Bargain Convention.375  
 
The Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention376 deals with the right to organise in the 
public service. Its provisions expand on Convention 98 which, unlike Convention 87, does 
not cover public servants engaged in the administration of the state. The United Nations 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that ‘everyone has the right to form and join 
trade unions for the protection of his interests’. It also recognises that ‘no one may be 
compelled to belong to any association’.377 By extension, no one should be compelled not to 
join any association of his or her choice. In reality, to join or not to join a union is a 
pragmatic dictate. In effect, the right to form and to join a union or not may be a conferred 
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constitutional right. The question of which union one wants to associate with and the reasons 
therefor are issues of statutory conferment, which, by implication, can be withdrawn in terms 
of that law. 
 
It has been suggested that the presumption of equality between the employer and employee 
tends to ignore other social and economic considerations. These make this equality and the 
implied freedom not only fictitious and hollow but also morally reprehensible. To him, the 
so-called bargaining power of the individual worker is insignificant, particularly in the event 
of greater supply than demand for labour. The implied freedom to hire and under what 
conditions to hire is reserved for the employer.378 The countervailing power of the employee 
can only be found or actualised in his or her capacity to associate with others in a similar 
socio-economic situation at the workplace. 
 
In addition, as Roper observes, the employer assumes responsibility for the programme of 
work. Inherent in this is the prerogative and authority and therefore the implied subordination 
of the worker. Such a relation explains the need for built-in guarantees against abuse, such as 
through the vehicle of unionisation. It explains why, when a repressive law is removed, 
unions exhibit a greater willingness to seek co-operation with the employer.379 According to 
Kahn-Freund, society is not an agglomeration of co-ordinated equals. All societies, 
particularly the industrial, are structured on the unequal distribution of power. Labour law has 
shown that its purpose is regulating, supporting and restraining the power of those individuals 
or corporate bodies who exercise power. The concern is its empirical effect.   
 
6.4.5    Liability, intimidation and picketing 
 
Normally, coercive action, or the threat of it, is not a dispute unless it is in furtherance of 
matters related to the terms of employment. In this, there is very close similarity between the 
provisions of Botswana and Britain. A union demand must precede a dispute. Such dispute 
and consequent action must be connected with, concerning or about employment terms. 
While officers are not liable for ‘actions in contemplation of a furtherance of trade dispute’, 
they are liable for an inducement to breach of contract and, in addition, acting in a manner 
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that is likely to ‘lead to a breach of the peace’.380 This is a loaded phrase capable of multiple 
interpretations and abuse. Officers are also liable for interfering by unlawful means such as 
intimidation, annoyance and violence within a contractual relationship.381 Where applicable, 
such acts attract criminal liability.  
 
The interest of this study lies in when such an action in contemplation or furtherance of a 
trade dispute constitutes the cause of that dispute. This covers the proportionality of the 
action taken or proposed and the result, and whether such an act is reasonably and honestly 
believed to be in furtherance of a strike objective. Further, there is a need to determine when 
such contemplated action is proportional to the dispute triggering it. It would seem then that 
officers of unions could open themselves to actionable suits in the event that they are not 
cognisant of the scope of the laws. For example, intimidation includes the threat of a breach 
of contract implied in the threat to strike. Therefore, a union official could be liable if he 
threatens a strike to secure the dismissal or reinstatement of a worker.  
 
The acts of physical threat and abuse and restraint of scab workers during the 
NACLGPMWU strike in 1991 fall within this category of intimidation.382 Whereas certain 
acts may not attract liability in terms of the TUEOA, these may fall under the scope of the 
Penal Code with regard to riots, unlawful assembly, breach of the peace or sedition.383 In 
Tynan v Balmer,384 the arrest and conviction of a union leader in charge of a picketing group 
was upheld. The ratio decidendi was that the obstruction of traffic was detrimental to the 
statutory objectives of picketing and at variance with the objective of peacefully persuading 
or communicating. Such a premeditated act was viewed as simple common nuisance.  
 
Except under a declaration of emergency, the determination of illegal picketing and 
intimidation brings into question the conduct of peace officers who, in fact, are the coercive 
machinery of the state. Whereas in some societies peace officers are just that, in others they 
embody the coercive clout of the state and manifest such disposition in the face of peaceful 
picketing which is far removed from acts of civil unrest. In Piddington v Bates,385 it was held 
that the law enforcement agents have the duty to prevent a breach of the peace. Where there 
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383 Part 11 division 1, Penal Code [08:01]. 
384 [1967] 1 QB 91. 
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are reasonable grounds for apprehending a breach of the peace, such an officer may arrest 
those obstructing the performance of such duty to ensure the peace. Caution in the exercise of 
this discretion is paramount. The performance of such duty must be in good faith, impartial 
and effected without undue force or provocation. 
 
6.5 Contextualising ‘essential’ service 
 
This discourse forms the conceptual basis of the issues that need resolution regarding the 
degree of authority to derogate from fundamental rights such as the right to freedom of 
association. Having been provided for by the Constitution of Botswana, fundamental rights 
should have been reflected in the relevant statutes of Botswana. The concept of ‘essential 
services’ is addressed within the overall context of ILO Conventions 87 and 98. Convention 
87 states that public authorities shall refrain from any interference that would restrict the right 
or impede the lawful exercise of the freedom of association.386 As the Convention stipulates, 
‘the law of the land shall not be such as to impair guarantees provided by the Convention.’387 
 
Problematically, the Convention also recognises the primacy of domestic legislation as 
contained in laws, awards, custom and agreements over which the Convention may claim but 
cannot assert an oversight in order to safeguard the guarantees in the Convention.388 
Convention 98 accepts the right of the state to restrict the police and armed forces with regard 
to forming and joining trade unions of their choice. These apparently contradictory 
statements raise important issues which are explained below.  
 
The first is the value of the moral and persuasive authority of ILO Conventions and 
standards. Secondly, these Conventions must be integrated into domestic legislation via 
assimilation or transplantation or selective incorporation.389 Thirdly, as part of international 
law, these Conventions as ratified do not appear to carry the enforcement or coercive 
authority in relation to municipal legislation. Comparatively, therefore, their role requires 
unambiguous clarification whether from a single or ‘monist’ or parallel or ‘dualist’ legal 
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387 Art 8(2), Part 1, Convention 87 on Freedom of Association. 
388 Art 9(2), Part 1, Convention 87 on Freedom of Association. 
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regime.390 A case in point is the GCHQ case. Here, the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) rejected a complaint by members of the General Communications Headquarters in 
the UK that restrictions on their union membership had breached art 11 of the European 
Convention. The court said the measures were not arbitrary and thus did not violate any rights 
simply because restrictions on grounds of state security or public safety were permissible.391 
 
This is similar to the philosophy informing essential services determination. Both the Human 
Rights Act and the pronouncements of the courts in the UK would suggest an unwillingness 
to question whether there is a primary duty owed by the employee to their contractual 
obligations rather than to a post-contractual creature such as a trade union. With regard to 
essential services in Botswana, the relevant schedule of the Trade Disputes Act identifies the 
following as ‘essential services’: air traffic control, the Botswana Vaccine Laboratory, 
electricity, fire, and water services, transport and telecommunications services as deemed 
necessary, operational services of the railways, health services, and the Bank of Botswana.  
Compared to the ILO understanding of core essential services, some of those in the schedule 
immediately appear superfluous.392 
 
6.6    Labour dispute resolution in Botswana 
 
As stated earlier, the operating statute is the Trade Disputes Act. The rationale for this 
legislation is the settlement of trade disputes generally, the settlement of trade disputes in 
essential services, and the control and regulation of industrial action. The focus is a 
contextualised examination of ongoing changes within dynamic systems and is intended as an 
analytical observation rather than as a critique, an examination of evolving processes rather 
than an affirmation of any particular legal system. The central concern is how the state in the 
selected countries has been grappling with the creation of effective, internationally 
comparable mechanisms for labour dispute resolution and the dominant underlying 
constraints.  
 
Labour dispute resolution suggests first that within the environment of work and work-related 
human interaction, disagreements are bound to occur. These may be at the level of 
                                                          
390 Botswana Land Boards and Local Authorities Union v The Director of Public Service Management Civil 
Appeal No.CACLB-043-11 /IC Case No. IC UR 13-11 
391 Council of Civil Service Unions v UK (1988) 10 EHRR 269. 
392 Ss 2 and 49.  Trade Disputes Act [Cap 48:02] 
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interpersonal problems. Disputes may also cover matters seriously affecting the integrity of 
the contractual relationship. Trade disputes deal with, among other things, a dispute between 
unions, a grievance or any dispute over the interpretation and application of any law relating 
to employment, the terms and conditions including physical conditions of employment, 
entitlements arising out of or within a collective agreement, dismissals and other forms of 
termination, or the recognition or not of bodies seeking to represent employees in the 
determination of issues pertaining to work.393 The legal environment of dispute resolution is 
therefore necessarily entwined with the regulation of conduct within the wider society and 
industrial relations values. Labour law as the enabling environment is therefore defined as 
deriving from common law, social legislation, codes of practice, public law, administrative 
structures and the courts. 
 
The inability to prevent, contain, manage or successfully resolve labour disputes could thus 
be traceable to the persistent refusal to embrace relevant international labour standards. This 
is in spite of the fact that these standards are a referent point for most grievances that trigger 
explosive trade disputes. Put differently, international labour standards, where adopted, 
should significantly minimise workplace conflict. Where certain countries have undertaken 
significant reforms towards alignment with these standards, they should, by implication, 
experience the beneficent effects of such reforms. If they do not, then the universal 
applicability and efficacy of these transplanted standards become questionable. The receiving 
environments may themselves then be perceived as not sufficiently conducive to certain 
expected changes on the ground.   
 
Along the spectrum of power relations, one resilient and intransigent element underpinning 
labour disputes is the often dehumanising commodification of labour.394 State-driven 
industrial relations can be seen as a process of structuring the labour force in general into a 
stable atmosphere, and this derives from the logic of capitalist development.395 In sanctioning 
compulsory dispute resolution, the state assumes a defensive posture on behalf of the public 
in labour relations. By curtailing strikes and other disruptive manifestations of dispute, the 
                                                          
393 Section 2(1) of the Trade Disputes Act (Botswana); s 4 of the Industrial Relations Act; s 3 of the Labour 
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394 Beatty Labour is Not a Commodity: Studies in Contract Law Reiter & Swan (eds) (1980) 300. 
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state contains conflict and maintains civil peace.396 More importantly, by legislating over all 
spheres of employment relations, the state steers labour relations in in its preferred direction, 
using the law as an agent to regulate the parameters of workplace relations.397 
 
6.6.1    The administrative and quasi-judicial role of the Commissioner of Labour 
 
The Commissioner is empowered to intervene as and when needed to pre-empt harm to 
people and property.398 In terms of s 6(3) he or she also has authority to mediate or cause 
mediation to be effected, to help parties reach a settlement by their own efforts, and to 
incorporate such settlement in the terms of a collective agreement. He or she may delegate 
functions to a labour officer and is assisted by labour officers defined as public officers. The 
Commissioner is empowered by s 6(5) to delegate functions such as the effective realisation 
of training and advice, designing in-house procedures, the recognition of unions, designing 
collective agreements, codes and procedures, and assigning mediators. 
 
The procedure for referrals is that the recipients of the grievance are the Commissioner and 
labour officers. Disputes regarding the termination of contracts of employment must be 
referred 30 days after their termination date. The other party is then served. The 
Commissioner or his delegate must formalise disputes about oral terminations or grievances 
on behalf of illiterates. He or she may assign referred disputes to a mediator from the panel in 
terms of section 4. The Commissioner or labour officer then arranges a venue, a time, and a 
date of first contact, and informs parties in writing. The direct referral for arbitration occurs 
where a collective agreement or the Trade Disputes Act so stipulates. These issues are 
addressed in section 7. 
 
The mediator’s role is addressed in s 8(1). He or she must undertake the following: the 
mediation of disputes, the extension of time subject to an oral agreement or in terms of a 
collective agreement. In the event of his inability to mediate successfully the Commissioner 
of Labour may refer the matter for compulsory arbitration where necessary or directly to the 
Industrial Court. The Mediator together with the parties determines the modalities and 
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procedure for mediation within the parameters of s 7. The jurisdiction of the mediator 
includes the permitting of a justifiable condonation and the dismissal of a referred dispute 
where the complainant absents himself at a mediation meeting without justification. The 
Mediator also has authority to: give a default reward if the respondent fails to attend a 
mediation meeting, reverse (justifiably) any dismissal of a referral or default award, 
recommend a settlement, make an advisory award if so requested or if it will promote 
settlement, and effect a final determination in the event of a correct referral or date of referral.  
 
Provision is made for appeals against the decisions of the mediator to the Industrial Court 
regarding the jurisdiction of the mediator, the refusal of condonation, the reversal of 
decisions to dismiss referrals, or the reversal of default awards. All proceedings and 
averments shall be confidential and a mediator may not appear in any legal proceedings as a 
witness. In the event of a failure to mediate, a certificate of failure is issued under s 8(11). 
This may be issued by the mediator before the allocated period expires if there are no 
prospects of settlement, which shall enable either party to proceed to the Industrial Court. The 
mediator shall continue to exercise his or her functions until a dispute is settled, by showing 
active interest and contributing in any way, including the methods provided for in s 51.399  
 
The Minister, in consultation with the Labour Advisory Board, may publish Codes of Good 
Practice, policies, guidelines, model agreements, statistics of mediation, arbitration and 
adjudication results, and case databases and annual reports. An Industrial Relations Code of 
Practice is designed by the Labour department in collaboration with the Employers’ 
Federation (now called Business Botswana) which is to be consulted for assistance. A 
mediator in a dispute of interest shall, where a strike is looming as a result of failure by the 
parties to agree, reach an agreement on the rules to regulate an intended strike or lockout and 
any conduct in furtherance of same. This shall cover, among others, provision of minimum 
services, the use of replacement labour and picketing. 
 
6.6.2   Functions of the arbitrator 
 
Arbitration is defined in s 2 as dispute resolution involving one or more neutral third parties, 
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agreed to by disputing parties. The arbitrator’s decision is binding on such parties. Referral 
matters are settled by means of a mutually agreed method or by redirection by the Industrial 
Court to the Commissioner. In that event, the Commissioner is to proceed according to a 
currently non-existent s 4.In terms of s 9(3) to (7), the arbitrator’s functions include the 
following: to mediate before arbitration if prospects exist regardless of earlier mediation, to 
attempt mediation before arbitration in all cases whether chosen by parties or not, to conduct 
business as deemed fit with minimum legal formalities but substantive integrity and to allow 
evidence, witnesses, cross-examination, and addressing of concluding arguments by parties.  
 
The decisions of an arbitrator shall have the same effect as an award by the Industrial Court 
or the High Court and shall be enforceable as such. Referral of disputes to the Industrial 
Court may be undertaken by either the Commissioner or a labour officer of a dispute 
mediated upon for determination. The Minister is empowered to do the same if it involves 
essential services, is likely to jeopardise the essentials of life and property and public safety, 
or involves members of management.400 According to s 39 of the Trade Disputes Act, lawful 
industrial action is permitted only in the area of disputes of interest. Any party to a dispute of 
interest has the right to strike or lockout provided there has been an initial referral to the 
Commissioner of Labour, the dispute remains unresolved after 30 days (to be extended by 
another 30), there is a 48-hour notice period in the prescribed form to the Commissioner and 
affected parties, or it complies with any rules of conduct agreed to either in the Code or the 
mediator’s guidelines. Under s 18(1), the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court excludes 
disputes of interest.  
 
Objectively, the strict pre-conditions for lawful industrial action include, under s 40(3), the 
obligation on the employer not to hire scab workers where parties have agreed to the 
provision of minimum service. Where no such agreement exists, 14 days after the strike or 
lockout commences, this obligation shall lapse. Where a strike fully complies with said 
provisions, no striker shall be liable either in delict or for breach of contract. No dismissal for 
this purpose, other than other justifiable grounds, shall be lawful. To this extent, s 42 
provides that no civil proceedings shall proceed in such circumstances except for any act in 
contemplation or furtherance of a strike that constitutes defamation or an offence. 
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 6.6.3      Industrial action procedure 
 
The trade dispute must first be reported to the Commissioner, who must proceed in 
compliance with the provisions of s 7 and in particular s 7(3). In the event of a failure to 
resolve by the Commissioner after 21 days, the union or workers may proceed with industrial 
action. Where a union in terms of Cap 48:01 is the exclusive negotiating body for the 
aggrieved employees, only its members may be entitled to vote in secret ballot if so directed 
by the Minister. Secret ballots must be supervised by labour officers as authorised in writing 
by the Commissioner. All centres so affected shall, on the same day and at the same time, 
hold such secret ballot nationally. Where there has been full compliance with the 
aforementioned conditions, any subsequent industrial action shall be lawful. Participants are 
therefore free from liability. Organisers, shop stewards are free from prosecution. In terms of 
s 47, an employer who locks out shall be free from any civil proceedings. 
 
6.7   The role of the Industrial Court in Botswana 
 
The Industrial Court system came into existence in 2004, though there had been decisions 
regarding labour disputes before its advent. It is established by the Trade Disputes Act (TDA) 
as a court of law and equity and mandated to settle trade disputes and secure and maintain 
good industrial relations in Botswana. All appeals against it shall be tabled before the Court 
of Appeal. It may permit certain matters to be addressed directly to the Court of Appeal in 
terms of a certificate of urgency through a motion of notice supported with an affidavit as to 
the facts for which relief is sought.  
 
6.7.1   Powers and functions 
 
The court is vested with exclusive jurisdiction in every matter properly before it, and its 
functions include: 
(a) hearing and determining all trade disputes except disputes of interest 
(b) interdicting unlawful strike actions; 
(c) hearing appeals and reviews from mediators and arbitrators; 
(d) directing the Commissioner to refer a dispute before the court to arbitration; 
(e) directing the Commissioner to assign mediators where a matter requires proper 
mediation; 
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(f) referring any matter to any expert and receiving such determination as evidence; 
(g) generally directing affairs, providing directions and determining any and all disputes 
where practicable; and 
(h) ascertaining matters of law for ruling on and determining whether an issue is one of 
fact or of law. 
 
The Industrial Court, created by the Trade Disputes Act, is vested with all the powers and 
rights set out in the Act as a court of law and equity. The court, or any division of the court, 
shall have exclusive jurisdiction in every matter properly before it under the Act. There shall 
be an appeal to the Court of Appeal against decisions of the Industrial Court as the latter 
court has concurrent jurisdiction with the High Court. Whether this is in fact so is another 
issue. 
 
The officers of the court shall be appointed by the President from among persons qualified to 
be appointed as High Court judges in terms of s 96(3) of the Botswana Constitution.  
Normally, a judge shall sit with two nominated members selected by him or her, one from a 
group representing employers and the other from a group representing employees, as 
submitted to him or her.  
 
6.7.2   The question of law and equity 
 
Since the court may regulate its own procedure and is not bound by the rigidities of the 
formal courts, it may use any resources considered appropriate in the furtherance of its 
mandate.401  The court is referred to as one of law and equity because it does not concern 
itself with only matters of common law and Roman-Dutch law notions of justice. Therefore, 
the Act gives the court a discretionary power to order reinstatements and award compensation 
within certain parameters in the event of unfair dismissals or termination of contracts. The 
court also deals with fairness, ethics and norms of international best practice. Discretion, 
fairness and ethics are not necessarily matters of positive law but an attempt to empower the 
court to take any steps within accepted practice and norms to enhance industrial relations. 
Therefore, with the end goal as good industrial relations instead of abstract juristic and 
doctrinaire justice, it is acceptable for the court to be referred to as a court of law and equity, 
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even if its operational framework is pre-determined. 
 
6.7.3     The Industrial Court and worker formations 
 
This role of the Industrial Court suggests that it also enjoys the power to determine who may 
or may not form and join worker formations. With regard to the recognition of unions at the 
workplace, the law stipulates that such recognition ought to be granted unless the 
representativeness has not reached the one-third threshold with reference to all employees, in 
terms of s 48 of the TUEOA, or the Industrial Court has authorised the withdrawal of such 
recognition for a stated period. The conditions warranting such an order are not specified but 
are assumed to form part of the broad range of jurisdictional prerogatives of the Industrial 
Court. 
 
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights requires that ratifying 
states must ensure the right of everyone to form trade unions of their choice and for unions to 
function freely.402 Article 22 acknowledges the right to strike subject to compliance with 
domestic laws. Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights also 
provides that employees of the state also have the freedom to form and join trade unions. Yet 
Convention 98, somewhat ambivalently, specifically defers to municipal discretionary 
authority with regard to the position of public servants engaged in the administration of the 
state, including those in essential services, while contending that this deferential position 
adopted is without prejudice to those affected.403 
 
A more robust teleological role by the judiciary could have helped, for example, by diluting 
the restrictive impact of legislation compared to constitutionally guaranteed rights. In Britain, 
the passage of the Human Rights Act of 1999, which came into effect in 2000, gave statutory 
effect to the European Convention on Human Rights. It also provided that the most direct 
method of upholding the Convention rights is by allowing the courts to enforce them directly 
against public authorities, including the state.  
 
In the European Union, one can see, from the GCHQ case among others, the stand of the 
ECHR on the position ceded to the state on how and, more importantly, how far to impose 
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restrictions on segments of the society. In Botswana, the constitutionality of the exclusion of 
state employees from union membership has not been called into question until now. Rather, 
certain other sections have been challenged as unconstitutional. Perhaps the primary role of 
the Industrial Court in particular is to safeguard state interests in these matters.  
 
In 2008, the Botswana Railways Crew Union approached the Industrial Court for the court to 
determine whether the Botswana Railways management had a right not to recognise the 
union, after it had been duly registered. In his ruling, the Judge President interpreted the 
relevant Act (TUEOA) as saying that, inferentially, the crew members were employees of the 
railways engaged in the same trade as other employees and could therefore demand 
recognition as a separate negotiating body. However, Botswana Railways countered that the 
Act stipulated a threshold of one-third of employees of an enterprise, not a specialised trade 
or vocation forming part of that enterprise.  
 
In January 2010, the Botswana Railways Corporation challenged the Industrial Court 
decision before the Appeal Court, questioning the interpretation of the Act as proffered by the 
Industrial Court, particularly as the crew were already members of the Botswana Railway 
Workers Union, which recognised because it satisfied the requirement of 25 per cent of the 
total workforce. To understand the dilemma better, we need to refer to s 48 of the TUEOA 
and s 32 of the TDA. Section 48 of the TUEOA stipulates that to be recognised as a 
negotiating body, a trade union must represent ‘at least one third of the employees of an 
employer’. Once this requirement is fulfilled, the union may apply to the Commissioner of 
Labour under s 32 of the TDA.  
 
However, s 32 of the TDA incorrectly refers to s 50 of the TUEOA in respect of recognition 
at industry level for bargaining purposes. This is now located under s 48A. Under the two 
statutes, there is no mention of the physical or vocational peculiarities of a union. It follows 
then that if individual trades were to form unions and get registered, unless they associate 
with other formations, it is impracticable to attain a constant one-third of the workforce of 
most enterprises. The internal arrangements of employers’ organisations comprise several 
layers and categories of employees. The problem begins with getting registered as a union of 
fitters, if there are only 10 fitters in a workforce of 1,000. This is why in countries such as 
South Africa, unions describe themselves as ‘allied’ or amalgamations. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the Industrial Court owes workers, employers and sister 
courts a definitive interpretation of the law: does one-third cover all employees or the 
separate categories of employees? By implication, the law intends to ensure the acquiescence 
and deferential acceptance and application of administrative rules disguised as law. In the 
case above, the exchanges between the bench and respondent counsel were mainly 
exploratory and hypothetical, suggesting that even the Appeal Court was struggling to get to 
grips with the fragmented statutes, because the Industrial Court had failed to initiate a proper 
codification of the labyrinth of the labour law regime obtaining in Botswana. 
 
The role of the Industrial Court epitomises the role of the courts within the dynamics of the 
state–labour–judiciary relationship in Botswana. Secondly, it also provides an insight into the 
internal force that propels the courts in a given direction in their relations with other social 
actors.  
 
  6.7.4   The Industrial Court and industrial action  
 
In 1969, in the course of the debate on the Trade Union Bill in the Botswana parliament, a 
‘strike’ was defined as including other forms of a strike, such as ‘go slow’, ‘no overtime’, or 
‘withdrawal of goodwill’. Since then, the strike has come to be embodied in the definition by 
Lord Denning MR in Tramp Shipping Corporation v Greenwich Marine Inc. His Lordship 
defined a strike as– 
 
a concerted stoppage of work by men done with a view to improving their wages or conditions 
of employment or giving vent to a grievance or making a protest about something or other or 
supporting or sympathising with other workmen in such endeavour. It is distinct from a 
stoppage which is brought about by an external event such as a bomb scare or by apprehension 
of danger.404 
 
Industrial action includes strikes, but not all disruptive activities are strikes as the Act sought 
to clarify in the expression ‘concerted stoppage’. In the world of work, the etymology of 
industrial action is not coterminous with sabotage or mayhem. It should be seen as a right 
inherent in the ramifications of the contractual relationship. Strikes are not the equivalent of 
the managerial prerogative to unilaterally change work conditions, but they suffice as 
                                                          
404 Tramp Shipping Corporation v Greenwich Marine Inc. [1975] 2 AER 989 CA 
146 
 
inducements or deterrents against abuse of employer prerogatives. In social ethics, a system 
which compels people not to withdraw their labour is totalitarian in intention. 
Sometimes, strikes are called psychological vents for tension created by the relationships 
generated by the labour contract. They are in the nature of other social protests. As Davies 
observed, ‘to think of industrial relations in terms of strikes or of labour law in terms of 
strikes is absurd’.405 Legislating strikes into oblivion is possible with the proscription of all 
labour collectives, but this is antithetical to democracy and social cohesion.  
 
According to Khan-Freund and Hepple workers will go on strike, whatever the law 
may have to say about it. The common law of conspiracy was unable to suppress 
strikes just as French legislation failed against coalitions and Pitt’s Combination Acts 
were unable to suppress trade unions in England. Freedom to strike is a legal, not a 
sociological concept, and, where strikes are forbidden, there is no such freedom, 
however frequently they may occur.406 
 
6.7.5             Statutory definition of service as ‘essential’ 
 
In South Africa, the Essential Services Committee (ESC) has, over the past fifteen years, 
after due notice and public investigation, designated a large number of services as essential 
services. Among these are: municipal health, municipal security, the supply and distribution 
of water, the security services of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, fire-fighting, 
services required for the functioning of the courts, and blood transfusion services provided by 
the South African Blood Transfusion Service.  
 
The following services in the public sector are part of those determined to be essential 
services: emergency health services and the provision of emergency health facilities to the 
community or part thereof, all electrical services, all safety services, all security services, and 
the maintenance and operation of water borne sewerage systems, including pumping stations 
and the control of discharge of industrial effluent into the system and the maintenance and 
operation of sewerage purification works. What this suggests is a transparent, ongoing 
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process openly discussed and not arbitrarily and strategically imposed measures intended to 
coral and harness labour formations. 
 
Unions required to give strike notices in essential industries where the proposed strike will 
affect the public interest will have to act with considerable prudence in deciding not to give 
such notices. The unions may have great difficulties in assessing in advance whether the 
proposed strike will affect the public interest with the consequence that, if notice was not 
given, the strike will be regarded as unlawful. If workers are unable, collectively refuse to 
work as a last resort, they cannot bargain collectively and effectively. The power of 
management to shut down the plant (which is inherent in the right of property) would not be 
matched by corresponding power on the side of labour. These are the ultimate sanctions 
without which the bargaining power of the two sides would lack potency and credibility.    
 
It is to this end that Holmes postulated that- 
 
Combination on the one side is potent and powerful. Combination on the other is the 
necessary and desirable counterpart if the battle is to be carried on in a fair and equal 
way. They have the same liberty that combined capital has to support their 
interests.407 
 
The rationale behind collective bargaining is to maintain industrial peace. However, there 
must be a peace to maintain. To have the peace, the workers must have a corresponding 
power manifested in the collective right to strike. In essence, without this collective power, 
workers will be at the mercy of the employer.  
 
The Labour Relations Act (LRA) of South Africa recognises this constitutional right to strike 
but subjects the right to a number of limitations. Among those limitations is a limitation 
which provides that no person may take part in a strike if that person is engaged in an 
essential service. Because the right to strike is so important, a limitation of this kind needs to 
be justified. To be justified it needs, among other things, to be limited. The essential services 
limitation on the right to strike in the LRA has not been subject to constitutional challenge 
and it is unlikely that it will be, because it is clearly justified and properly circumscribed in its 
scope.  
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In Botswana rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights may be limited in terms of laws of general 
application. This is to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open 
and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.408 There is thus a need 
to balance the right to strike with other fundamental rights, such as those to health, safety, 
food, water and social security, which are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights. From this point 
of view, in order to achieve an appropriate balance, workers in essential services should not 
be totally denied their basic freedoms of association, organization and movement in open 
democracies. The position is based on the earlier discussion of ILO provisions but from a 
different perspective. 
 
 In this regard, the interpretation is that, though this exclusion has been tacitly sanctioned by 
the ILO, it is only to a limited extent. The Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations of the International Labour Organisation (CEACR) 
recommends that the right to strike should be restricted only in relation to public servants 
exercising authority in the name of the state and in relation to genuinely essential services, 
namely, ‘those the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of 
the whole or part of the population409’. 
 
As said earlier, there is the element of arbitration in determining whether a service 
contemplating a strike is essential. Some countries have codified this common law of interest 
arbitration into a statute. An important subsidiary principle which applies in such arbitration 
is that public sector employees should not be expected to subsidise public services. They are 
not second-class working citizens. If the reasonable wages they should receive are such that 
they render the public authority unable to continue to provide the service, then that is a 
political problem, not one that should be reflected in an arbitral award.   
 
Consequences of an unprotected strike include those consequences that have a potentially 
punitive impact on the participants in any conduct in contemplation or in furtherance of such 
a strike. Such persons do not fall within the protection provided by the TDA of Botswana.  It 
provides that persons who take part in a protected strike or in any conduct in contemplation 
or in furtherance of a protected strike do not commit a delict or a breach of contract by doing 
                                                          
408 Constitution of Botswana Chapter 11 Chapter II  
409 ILO,198b, par 214 
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so. The result is that any person who suffers harm as a consequence of an unprotected strike 
may claim damages from a union and/or workers who participated in or furthered the strike. 
This may be done in terms of the common law or in terms of the relevant legislation.  
 
In such instances, in appropriate contexts and in accordance with its jurisdiction, the law 
gives the   Industrial Court or the High Court the power to order the payment of just and 
equitable compensation for any loss attributable to the strike. Actions of this kind are 
uncommon because, once the dust has settled after a strike, employers are reluctant to ‘rock 
the boat’ with court actions, and the average person on the street is reluctant to take on a 
union in court because of the costs and delays involved. Failure to comply with such an 
interdict or order is a factor which the industrial Court may take into account when ordering 
just and equitable compensation. The court grants such interdicts and trade unions are not 
expected to flout these interdicts contemptuously. The fact that union organisers have seldom 
been summoned before court to explain their contempt does not imply that such powers of 
the court are non-existent.  
 
6.7.6    Statutory definition of essential services 
 
In South Africa, s 213 of the LRA widely and clearly defines essential services as follows: 
‘(a) A service the interruption of which endangers the life, personal safety or health of the 
whole or any part of the population; (b) the Parliamentary service; (c) the South African 
Police Service.’  
 
This definition is openly acknowledged as being in line with ILO recommendations and not 
just a reference to nebulous principles in the name of a domestic legal system or legal theory. 
If that was all that the Labour Relations Act (LRA) did to define essential services there 
would be much uncertainty about which workers fall within the definition and which do not. 
In order to limit such uncertainty, the LRA provides for the establishment of an Essential 
Services Committee (ESC) which must determine which services fall within the definition. 
The LRA provides that the Minister of Labour, after consulting the National Economic 
Development and Labour Advisory Council (NEDLAC), and in consultation with the 
Minister for the Public Service and Administration, must establish an ESC under the auspices 
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of the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA). Members of the 
ESC are required to have knowledge and experience of labour law and labour relations.410    
The functions of the ESC are to conduct investigations as to whether or not the whole or a 
part of any service is an essential service and then to decide whether or not to designate the 
whole or a part of that service as an essential service. The ESC is also required to determine 
disputes as to whether or not the whole or a part of any service is an essential service. In 
addition, at the request of a bargaining council, the ESC must conduct an investigation as to 
whether or not the whole or a part of any service is an essential service.  
 
The LRA also prescribes the process which the ESC must follow in designating a service as 
an essential service. In essence the ESC must give notice of an investigation and invite 
interested parties to submit written representations and to indicate whether they require an 
opportunity to make oral representations. Interested parties are then given a right to make oral 
representations in public. The ESC is then charged, after having considered any written or 
oral representations, to decide whether or not to designate the whole or a part of the service 
that was subject to an investigation, as an essential service. 
 
If the ESC designates the whole or a part of the service as an essential service, then the ESC 
must publish a notice to that effect in the Government Gazette. Importantly, the 
Parliamentary Service and the South African Police Service are deemed to have been 
designated essential services. The effect of this is that no investigation and determination by 
the ESC is required in respect of those services.  However, the disciplined services sus as the 
South African Police Service was held to be confined to the service performed by members 
of the South African Police Service, the South African Defence Force and others, excluding 
other employees employed in such services. While they may form and join unions dealing 
with its members’ welfare they cannot go on strike.411 
 
To date, there is no provision for an essential services committee in the Botswana legislation 
and this critical lack has been responsible for many misconceptions. This state of affairs has 
resulted in the state unilaterally arrogating to itself the right to determine labour matters. The 
determination of labour matters should be a collective, deliberative and democratic process. 
 
                                                          
410 Labour Relations Act (LRA) s 115 –Functions of the CCMA 
411SA National Defence Force Union v Minister of Defence and Another. (1999)   20 ILJ 2265 
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6.7.7    Industrial action and essential services in Botswana 
 
The new definition of ‘trade dispute’ includes a dispute between unions, a grievance, and any 
dispute over the application or the interpretation of any law relating to employment; the terms 
and conditions of employment of any employee or class of employees, or the physical 
conditions under which such employee or class of employees may be required to work; the 
entitlement of any person or group of persons to any benefit under an existing collective 
agreement; and the existence or non-existence of any collective agreement. 
 
Other disputes are the dismissal, employment, suspension from employment, retrenchment, 
re-employment or reinstatement of any person or group of persons; and the recognition or 
non-recognition of an organisation seeking to represent employees in the determination of 
their terms and conditions of employment. With regard to essential services, the relevant 
schedule had, prior to the recent questionable amendment, identified the following specific 
areas as   essential services, unlike the approach adopted by the ESC in South Africa under 
the LRA. These are Air Traffic Control, Botswana Vaccine Laboratory, Electricity, Fire, 
Water Services, Transport and Telecommunication Services, as deemed necessary, 
Operational Services of the Railways, Health Services and Bank of Botswana.412 
 
Relative to the ILO understanding of core essential services, some of those in the schedule 
immediately become superfluous. In furtherance of the minister’s discretionary powers, he 
may invoke s 49 of the Act to amend the schedule, by order published in the Gazette. The 
minister may also make statutory regulations with regard to any matters required to be 
prescribed under the Act. The key question is whether the minister has the authority to amend 
a core element of a statute without parliamentary approval, bearing in mind that statutory 
discretionary authority exists only in relation to subordinate or delegated legislation.  
 
Secondly, assuming the amendment as gazetted was effected as a statutory instrument then it 
ought to have been subjected to parliamentary scrutiny and approval. In effect, the validity of 
widening the basket of essential services without proper justification and in contempt of both 
domestic law and the ILO’s remonstrations creates room for concern. That singular act of 
defying the legislature, international norms and practices and proceeding on grounds of 
                                                          
412 S 49, [Cap 48:02] and Schedule of Essential Services 
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domestic monist prerogative suggest a state in siege and a government bent on emasculating 
the nascent labour front.  Regarding legal strikes, the regulatory interventions do not and 
cannot determine the lawfulness or otherwise of strikes with regard to essential services, 
given that the procedures are deliberately cumbersome. It is therefore ironic that these 
fragmented unions are credited with better resourcefulness than the state and its agents in the 
theatre of labour relations. The role of the Industrial Court in particular is expected to be 
crucial in matters related to the issue of employees, worker formations and essential services. 
In view of this, more will be said about the court later. 
 
6.8           Interpreting the reality 
 
This section is germane to the position of the paper mainly as an illustration of the dynamics 
of the state–labour relationship in Botswana. Its other role is to provide insight into the 
pivotal concern with the exploration of the internal motive force that propels the state in its 
relations with other social actors such as labour. It discusses some major cases that have a 
bearing on the subject matter of essential services.  
 
The first of these cases was between the Botswana Land Boards and Local Authorities 
Workers Union, the Botswana Public Employees Union, the National Amalgamated Local 
and Central Government and Parastatal Workers Union, versus the Director of Public Service 
Management and the Attorney General. 
 
This case concerned the interdiction of public sector unions by the Industrial Court at the suit 
of the Attorney General.  The interdict sought by the Attorney General to bar the unions from 
further involvement in a strike. The ground for the appeal was that the workers were from 
essential services and the strike was therefore unlawful. The union members were therefore 
liable to sanctions including dismissal. The unions noted an appeal to the Court of Appeal. 
Prior to the hearing of the appeal, the Director applied to the Industrial Court for leave to 
execute the court’s judgement which held that the strike was unlawful.413  
 
                                                          
413 Director of Public Service Management and Another v Botswana Land Boards and Public Authorities 
Workers Union and Others In Re: Botswana Land Boards and Local Authorities Workers Union and Others v 
Director of Public Service Management 2012 BLR 93 (IC). 
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The concerned unions raised a point in limine that, according to the common law, the noting 
of an appeal automatically suspended the execution of the judgement. While noting the 
argument, the court nevertheless stated that it has a wide discretion to grant or refuse such 
leave. Subsequently, the leave was granted. This was followed by the collective dismissal of 
the members of the above-mentioned unions.  The third case became known as the ‘mother of 
all strikes’ in Botswana.414 
 
It is important to briefly recall the circumstances of the cases. On 18 April 2011 the members 
of the aforementioned unions embarked on nationwide industrial action that also involved 
some essential services employees as well as employees from non-essential services such as 
veterinary services, education, transport and other services. The Industrial Court, at the behest 
of the state, subsequently issued an interim interdict restraining participation in the strike by 
the essential services workers. This order was ignored and, because it was subsequently 
executable, the state dismissed those essential service workers who had refused to return to 
work.  
 
In June 2011, the Botswana Federation of Trade Unions (BFTU) was informed by the office 
of the Commissioner of Labour of an impending meeting by the Labour Advisory Board, the 
purpose of which was to amend the schedule listing essential services so as to include 
veterinary and teaching services. According to the court records, the Commissioner made 
reference to the ILO definition and categorisation of ‘essential services’ which, from the 
foregoing parts of this study, was a misinterpretation of the ILO position. First, animal 
husbandry is not cited as an essential service and, in any case, given the poor performance of 
the Botswana Meat Commission and the cattle industry in terms of Gross Domestic Product 
as a whole, cattle could not be regarded as the ‘backbone of the economy’.415   
 
Another contention was that is an essential service. The rational was that, without teaching, 
there ‘would be no education’.416 It is common knowledge that intramural teaching is not the 
only form of education. Further, strikes by teachers targeted at short-term goal such as salary 
increase often peter out once the goal has been obtained, no matter how little. As a 
                                                          
414 Botswana Public Employees Union (BOPEU), Botswana Teachers Union (BOTU), National Amalgamated, 
Local & Central Government and Parastatal Workers Union (NALCGPWU), Botswana Secondary Teachers 
Union (BOSETU) v Minister of Labour and Home Affairs, Attorney General and the Director of Public Service 
Management (DPSM)  MAHLB-000674 (2012). 
415 Para 14, page 4. 
416 Ibid. 
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consequence thereof, Statutory Instrument no. 49 was gazetted on 17 June 2011, changing the 
scope of the schedule of essential services. It also added ancillary services like 
telecommunications, transport, veterinary services, teaching services, diamond-sorting, 
cutting and selling services as core essential services and all support services in connection 
therewith. 
 
The Legislature then amended nullified the Schedule to annul SI 49 and directed the Minister 
to gazette the annulment. Rather than doing so, the Minister ignored the order and proceeded 
to gazette the same changes using a new Statutory Instrument (No.57). In the face of this, the 
Appeal Court endorsed the irregular and unlawful amendment in the following case and 
virtually usurped the power vested in the Legislature. Further, the Court of Appeal 
subsequently declared the following to be essential services-  
 
doctors, nurses, other specialists, support staff, caterers, grounds men, cooks and night 
watchmen,417 even when there was no provable looming disaster or ‘acute national disaster’ 
as explained by the ILO.418 This also refers to ‘acute national emergency or genuine crisis 
situations such as those arising from serious conflict, insurrection or natural disaster’.419  
 
The union then decided to challenge these developments on several grounds, in particular the 
validity of Statutory Instrument 57. The study has only selected a few pertinent grounds and 
these are examined below: 
(a) The minister’s powers under s 49 of the TDA were ultra vires s 86 of the Botswana 
Constitution. This is because the use of such discretionary authority conveys the 
impression that the legislature, contrary to the Constitution, purported to relinquish its 
legislative authority and oversight and, by so doing, conferred unconstitutional power 
on the executive to amend an Act of Parliament.  
(b) By placing a limitation on the right to strike, which must be seen to be reasonably 
justifiable in a democratic country, the minister’s amendment of s 49 is ultra vires s 13 
of the Constitution. 
(c) The amendment is ultra vires s 49 of the TDA which, on a proper reading, does not 
empower the minister to unilaterally publish an order whose effect is incompatible with 
                                                          
417 Civil Appeal No. CACGB-053-12  (see especially Para 40 pages 97-98) 
418 ILO 1996 para 527.  
419 Ibid para 152. 
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Botswana’s international law obligations as a recognised member state of the ILO that 
has ratified the Conventions relevant to this case. 
(d) Botswana’s membership of the ILO and ratification of its Conventions gives rise to a 
legitimate expectation by workers that the minister will not include services outside the 
ILO standards, and any such act shall be susceptible to review. 
 
Before making his order, the judge referred to a recent report by the ILO Committee of 
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR, 2011) about 
events in Botswana. Of note is the following observation: ‘The Committee considers that the 
new categories added to the Schedule do not constitute essential services in the strict sense of 
the term and therefore request the Government to amend the Schedule accordingly.’420 
 
In his decision, the learned judge held as follows; 
(a) Section 49 of the Trade Disputes Act 15 of 2004 is incompatible with the Constitution 
of Botswana and is accordingly invalid. 
(b) The Trade Disputes (Amendment of Schedules) Order contained in Statutory 
Instrument 57 of 2011 is invalid and of no force or effect. 
 
This study contends that, on the face of it, the issues raised in this 98-page judgement need no 
further interpretation because it indicated and conveyed a clear message as to developments 
in the future and suggested that there would be more interesting developments. Indeed, the 
developments came in the form of the second case decided by the Appeal Court on 20 March 
2013, where the decisions of the court a quo were overturned. This case was an appeal 
against the decision of the High Court that declared the interdiction and subsequent 
dismissals above as unfair, unlawful and invalid. The case is examined below. 
 
Attorney General 
 versus  
Botswana Land Boards & Local Authorities, Workers Union, Botswana Public Employees 
Union, National Amalgamated Local & Central Government &Parastatal Worker’s Union 
and Kefilwe Toteng  
 
                                                          
420 ‘The BOPEU Case’ page 7 para 225.  
156 
 
It should be remembered that this trio of cases is related to the same issues  discussed above 
in which 2,934 workers were dismissed for failing to comply with an Industrial Court 
interdict against a planned strike that took place in 2011. As indicated above, the High Court 
set aside the order of the Industrial Court and declared the dismissals to be unlawful and 
invalid. The Attorney General then appealed. 
 
Briefly, the Court of Appeal upheld the appeal, set aside the order of the High Court, and the 
costs were to be paid by the respondents jointly and severally. Given that the decision was 
supported by the full bench, it becomes necessary to examine how the bench arrived at such a 
sweeping conclusion, with serious implications for constitutional and administrative law, 
together with the perceptions conveyed to the workers at large. 
 
Regarding ‘essential service’ the court concluded that all employees in the health services 
were included. There has been no such provision in both the Public Service Act and the Trade 
Disputes Act. Irrespective of that, the Appeal Court pronounced as follows- 
 
In our view, all the employees in an essential service play an important role individually 
towards ensuring the effectiveness of the team delivering the essential service in question. 
Along with doctors, nurses and other specialists, the support staff, caterers, grounds men, 
cooks, and others ensure a hygienic, safe and healthy environment conducive to the effective 
delivery of the service and in the health and swift recovery of patients.421  
 
The Judge President went further to declare that essential services include not only those 
mentioned in the original schedule of the statute and the subsequently amended list by the 
Minister, but also – 
 
but any other [undertaking] whose interruption might endanger the life, personal safety or 
health of the population or part thereof.422 
 
He did not attempt to address the impracticality of such a subjective definition and the 
imprecise explanation of acts that endanger life in his quest to justify the harnessing of 
workers for easy control. The court did not deem it necessary to examine the ILO range of 
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services that may be essential and the method of arriving at this.423 The court, however, after 
asserting the adequacy of domestic legislation to deal with labour matters, sought support 
from the same ILO document where the ILO expresses its reluctance to interfere in spheres of 
domestic legislation.424  
 
Finally, the Judge President concluded that  
it would be totally unacceptable for the withdrawal of essential services including 
public medical services, to be used as a weapon in a general strike.’  
 
In contradistinction to this opinion, it is apt to recall that the  
freedom to strike is a legal, not a sociological concept and where strikes are 
forbidden, there is no such freedom however frequently they may occur.’425  
 
Attention is also drawn to the fact that, as far back as 1942, it was observed that  
[t]he right of workmen to strike must be seen as an essential element in the principle 
of collective bargaining.426   
 
It is worth noting that, while the court dismissed the analogy of a boxing match, it had much 
earlier been suggested that every strike is in the nature of war, where gain on one side implies 
loss on the other. Further, it is submitted that the Court of Appeal erred in not undertaking a 
survey of the voluminous literature on industrial action whether by essential services workers 
or not. At any rate, current labour legislation in Botswana does not prohibit strikes per se.427A 
brief survey of Parts VI to VIII of the Trade Disputes Act would have alerted the court to the 
realities and saved them the need to pontificate. There is thus a need to re-examine the 
relevant statutes and formulate workable procedures because strikes are inherent in 
employment relations irrespective of what the Appeal Court might say.428 In retrospect, the 
                                                          
423 Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) Observation 
Report (Botswana) ILO Session Adoption 2011. 
424 Freedom of Association Digest of Decisions and Recommendations, Committee of the Governing Body, ILO 
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426 Per Lord Wright in Crofter Harris Tweed Co. Ltd v Veitch 1 AER 142, 1942. 
427 See s 39(1) of Part VI of the Trade Disputes Act [Cap 48:02] where it is stated that every party to a dispute of 
interest has the right to strike. Furthermore, s 45 provides for a minimum service to be in place prior to any 
contemplated industrial action. The procedure for lawful industrial action in essential services is laid out in Part 
VIII of the Act. However, all the procedures are expected to culminate in s 45(4) which does not as yet exist.  
428 Part XI of the Public Service Act provides the same freedom to associate and undertake industrial action 
(except for those in ‘management’) once laid-down procedures are followed. 
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tone and nuances of the Judge President conveys a veiled tussle between the Young Turks of 
the High Court and the executive-minded Old Guards of the Court of Appeal  
 
6.8.1     Trade disputes and essential services in Botswana 
 
The Trade Disputes Act provides very elaborate procedures for the settlement of trade 
disputes generally, and the settlement of trade disputes in essential services. It distinguishes 
between disputes of right and disputes of interest for the purposes of what can trigger a strike 
and which disputes must ultimately be resolved by the Industrial Court. The labour laws of 
Botswana do not prohibit industrial action in any form once it is lawful, constitutional and 
official. Every party to a dispute of interest has the right to strike or lockout. However, there 
are extensive and stringent conditions, as well as the quasi-judicial powers of the 
Commissioner of Labour and the specific powers of the mediators and arbitrators. In addition 
there is the political–administrative oversight of the responsible minister. 
 
The procedure for legal strikes in these areas alone is daunting. The Commissioner must be 
informed of any contemplated action in terms of s 5(2), (3) and (4). Should the minister not 
acknowledge or initiate action within 21 days, then three days before such action, he or she 
must be notified of a secret balloting process to be supervised by labour officers, and 
occurring simultaneously at all branches in the country. There must be a two-thirds majority 
decision to strike. Assuming all these conditions are complied with, the employer and 
employees must agree on a nominated skeleton staff to man these services during the course 
of the strike (ss 43 and 44). 
 
If indeed strikes are legally permissible, these procedures, covering these sensitive areas, can 
be only be seen as restrictive regulations intended to make strikes legally impractical. Section 
41 defines the nature of the punishable offence regarding essential services. It provides that 
any action or inaction whose known or probable consequence would be to deprive the public 
or any section of the public, either wholly or to a substantial extent, of an essential service or 
to endanger human life or public health is unlawful. Section 41 also covers serious bodily 
injury to any person or the exposure of valuable property to risk. The schedule that provides 
the list of essential services effectively covers all the strategic organisations and monopoly 
state corporations. Such organisations would need to appoint a minimum number of officers 
to man these services during a strike.   
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The two-thirds majority secret balloting must be organised under the supervision of labour 
officers at all branches simultaneously (there are only a handful of these officers in the whole 
country). Should the Commissioner of Labour react, even by way of an acknowledgement, 
the strike is thrown into abeyance sine die. In addition, transport and maintenance services in 
relation to these are also affected. Much of these are public sector monopolies in the form of 
departments and corporations fully or partially controlled by the central government. These 
are directly or remotely related to the operations of the key areas of the Botswana economy 
and are therefore supposedly strategic. 
 
State-driven industrial relations can be seen as a process of structuring the labour force in 
general into a stable atmosphere, and this derives from the logic of capitalist development. In 
sanctioning compulsory dispute resolution, the state assumes a defensive posture on behalf of 
the public in labour relations. By curtailing strikes and other forms of disruptive 
manifestations of dispute, it contains conflict and maintains civil peace. More importantly, by 
legislation, the state steers labour relations in a preferred direction, using the law as an agent 
of regulating the parameters of workplace relations.  
 
The relationship between the state, labour relations and labour disputes is that disputes are 
partially caused by the attitude and socio-economic policies of an active state. This state then 
seeks to mediate using industrial relations structures which it creates or seeks to influence, 
regulate and control. As long as the workplace is representative of the wider society, labour 
disputes and the prevailing labour relations system will dictate a form of legal intervention, 
because the state sees the workplace as unstable. The state therefore sees a need for 
regulating workplace relations. There is no inherent evil in resolving labour disputes. The 
problem appears to be the methods put in place. As a result, the formalisation of structures 
and of procedures place labour dispute resolution in the domain of public bureaucratic 
oversight.  
 
6.9    The Industrial Court in perspective 
 
It must be remembered that the court was created under an Act of Parliament with ministerial 
supervision. Its judges hold the same rank as High Court judges. Secondly, arbitral awards 
from the ad hoc ancillary mediation structures carry the same force as High Court decisions 
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but are subject to the Industrial Court’s oversight. The Industrial Court is empowered to 
make, subject to ministerial consultation, arbitral rules outside the parameters of the 
Arbitration Act. To all intents and purposes, the Industrial Court is a manifestation of a close 
affinity between the state, law and the bureaucratic elite, rather than the conventional 
judiciary.  
 
The Industrial Court does not come across as a standard bearer for separation of powers as a 
juristic concept in an environment imbued with a fusion of these very powers. Taking 
cognisance of this, it should therefore indicate whether, rather than being subject to the 
appellate jurisdiction of the High Court, it prefers to have its own Industrial Appeal Court. 
This would ultimately constitute a parallel structure to the normal judiciary. The justification 
for this is that, in practice, the alternative dispute resolution structures fall under the 
Commissioner of Labour. Their decisions then proceed to the Industrial Court from where 
reviews, endorsements and other supervisory deliberations and decisions could go to a higher 
court of similar specialised focus, training and competence.  
 
Labour legislation in Botswana is still evolving. Changes are bound to take place. First, when 
the colonialist decided to import laws of little or no relevance into Bechuanaland, it was for 
political and economic reasons. Secondly, the laws evolved and transmuted into series of 
Acts in constant transition symbolising the transfer of state power to trusted acolytes within a 
dependency relationship where continuity apparently became preferable to a thorough 
dismemberment in order to select what fitted the situation. In Botswana, labour law and its 
attendant disputes will continue until such time as the parties appreciate parity and plant the 
seeds of collaborative and reflective engagement in their search for ways to reduce and 
manage labour-related disputes. 
 
It is clear that, since its inception, the Industrial Court in Botswana has acted more as an 
extension of the state bureaucratic machinery by supporting state labour regulatory measures. 
Although it is a higher court, it has been more of an appendage to the senior courts of the 
judiciary. Similarly, the Appeal Court has done its best to defend state intervention by 
resorting to the parochial interpretation of labour legislation. To date, the decisions affecting 
how the laws are interpreted and applied on the ground have not been addressed, resulting in 
the state having its way in how it interprets and applies labour relations law in Botswana. It is 
not that the Appeal Court is unaware of existing precedent, to which it has easy access. 
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In the celebrated case of Vegelahn v Guntner,429 Holmes said the following about labour 
combinations and those of employers and their rights: ‘Combination on the one side is patent 
and powerful. Combination on the other is the necessary and desirable counter-part if the 
battle is to be carried out in a fair and equal way. They have the same liberty that combined 
capital has to support their interests.’ Sometime later, in 1942, Lord Wright, in the case of 
Crofter Harris Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch430 declared, and rightfully so, that ‘it is far more 
important that the substance of many of the norms of collective bargaining should defy the 
use of legal sanctions. As such, the right of workmen to strike must be seen as an essential 
element in the principle of collective bargaining.’ 
 
This study contends that that it is more useful to find the causes of strikes and eliminate them 
than to sharpen the tools of control and regulation. The purpose of the law must be to 
maintain an equilibrium of power.  The role of law must be to regulate the normal exercise of 
power. The power of the ‘lockout’, whether it is in furtherance of the right to security of 
property or not, must be countered by the power of the collective refusal to work. Obviously, 
there can be no equilibrium in industrial relations without the right to strike.  The law must 
take cognisance of this fact and must protect the aspirations of workers in relation to the 
might of the employer.  
 
This could be achieved by recognising the right of employees to legitimately utilise their 
collective sanction. Workers do not resort to strikes because they are ‘ill-informed’ or ‘ill-
advised’. It is also not true that ‘strikes may be the last resort for the workers’, or that 
‘government [must] be more concerned about the harm that strikes can cause to the economy 
of the nation’, particularly a nation ‘which relies mainly on foreign investment’.431 But, it is a 
fact that, when social conditions deteriorate, when avenues for democratic participation in 
resource allocation and not in their production are non-existent, then a strike becomes like a 
‘cancer, and cancer when it is not cured at an early stage kills the whole body.’432  
 
It is submitted that the cure for such a ‘cancer’ is not legislation per se but legislation that is 
holistic in its intention and effect. Strikes, like litigation, are a waste of social resources. As 
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social services grow in response to demand, the definitive turf of the ‘essential’ continues to 
change contours. This in itself imposes enough restrictions on the strike without any 
aggressive reactions to the agitations of an emasculated labour force. 
 
This study fully concurs with the following observation that epitomises the inherently 
dichotomous nature of industrial relations:  
 
It is difficult to see how, in a case of a conflict of interests, it is possible to separate the objects 
of benefitting yourself and injuring your antagonist. Every strike is in the nature of an act of 
war.  Gain on one side implies loss on the other, and to say that it is lawful to combine to 
protect your interests, but unlawful to combine to injure your antagonist, is taking away with 
one hand a right given with the other.433  
 
The authorisation to declare strikes unlawful and to proceed to interdict them presumes a 
strict compliance with the confusing maze of procedural requirements indicative of a 
deliberate, regulatory and control regime of laws to subvert the legal strike. 
 
It would appear then that the objective is not to facilitate a free democratic environment in 
which free protest can breed so as to be manageable, but to create a judicial posturing that 
precipitates confrontation and invites the deployment of the state’s coercive authority. This 
study appreciates the wide differences between issues of the workplace as an entity and 
between individuals to a contract. That being the case, the problem this study faces is that 
there seems to be a conscious, albeit misplaced, focus on elevating industrial action into a 
unique phenomenon so as to demonise it. This elevation relegates the theatre of work and the   
socialisation processes thereof to an amorphous entity with the potential for socio-political 
intrigue and conspiracy.  
 
The role of the Industrial Court in this regard appears to be that of an administrative tribunal. 
Its interdiction powers deal with any act or contemplated act wherein the union is enjoined to 
notify the employer and furnish the Commissioner. Any default creates a cause for an 
interdiction order. The question is whether this apparently automated processing adds value 
to labour dispute resolution. The Industrial Court should always emphasise the need for 
                                                          
433 Fitzjames History of the Criminal Law of England  Vol. III 
volhttp://www.barnesandnoble.com/noresults/9780930342777  III   
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evidence to support any attempts to unravel the confusing and circuitous design of the law. 
Furthermore there is no hard evidence so far from the Industrial Court to suggest efforts 
attempts at reducing the legal regime to more accessible and easily understandable 
procedures.  
 
As discussed above, the events leading to the BOPEU434 confrontation with the Industrial 
Court was in sharp contrast to the decisions of the High Court. There is a festering climate of 
distrust and lack of legitimacy. This was demonstrated when the striking workers chose to 
ignore the interdict issued by the Industrial Court. For now, it is feared that the Industrial 
Court could become a victim of structural dependency and by so doing transform itself into 
an agent of the politico-legal trajectory of the state at a time when its neutrality and 
legitimacy are most required. 
 
Section 24 of the TDA provides a range of remedial steps available to the Industrial Court in 
the event of wrongful termination of the employment contract or wrongful disciplinary 
action. Within this framework, statutory remedies such as reinstatement and compensation 
are provided, together with the conditions under which these may be awarded. The 
discretionary element is also statutory as the Act provides guidelines regarding range and 
choices. Thus, the Industrial Court does not enjoy absolute, unfettered discretion in these 
matters. For example, a statutory ceiling of six months’ monetary compensation is imposed in 
any applicable circumstance. 
 
Section 24(1) stipulates that compulsory reinstatement should be considered only where the 
termination was found to be unlawful in terms of s 23 of the Employment Act dealing with 
automatically unfair dismissals, read with s 24(2) of the TDA. In such an event, the court 
may order compulsory reinstatement with or without compensation. Prior to that though, the 
court is free to take into account the integrity of the enterprise and the effects on labour 
relations, the employability of the employee outside the enterprise, an irretrievable 
breakdown in trust, and an equitable balance between the employer’s and employee’s 
interests, among other matters.435 Compensation may be ordered with or without 
reinstatement. Section 24(3) of the TDA provides that, with reinstatement, compensation 
must not exceed the employee’s actual pecuniary loss as a result of the wrongful dismissal. 
                                                          
434 MAHLB 000674-11/8/2012, unreported. 
435 Onalenna & Maffa v L.B.B. Steam Contractors (Pty Ltd) IC 8/98 
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Section 24(4) provides the conditions for the award as above. Section 24(5) and (6) provides 
for compensation of the employer as a result of the employee’s wrongful termination. Here, 
the court is allowed to determine the amount of compensation, but within a range not 
exceeding six months’ monetary wages. 
 
The Industrial Court, while enjoying its discretionary authority, is nevertheless expected to 
provide reasons for its choice of determining factors originating from a basket of statutory, 
court-derived and National Industrial Relations Code of Practice guidelines in respect of any 
remedies awarded.436 From the foregoing, the Industrial Court would appear not to have been 
playing a pivotal role in mediating industrial relations friction. This is only in the problematic 
areas chosen, where the interests of the state appear to clash with those of labour and even 
employer formations. Overall, in the arena of wage delays and underpayment, it has 
performed well. This applies also to complaints, harsh treatment, both substantively and 
procedurally unfair discipline, and occupational injury. 
 
It is submitted that the Industrial Court as a specialised court, a court of law and equity, if not 
hidebound by covert ideological pursuits or any rules of court, can assert its authority in an 
area that is coterminous to politics and public administration. Modern labour law accepts that 
modern governance is undertaken in areas that form the subject matter of industrial debate 
and consequent industrial action. Reflectively, the court should adopt a stance that seeks to 
educate the parties, build bridges and deepen collaborative industrial relations. To do this, its 
decisions must not simply amount to a juristic rendition of problematic legislation and an 
affirmation of state infallibility. Rather, it should show the way out of the legal maze that is 
labour law in Botswana. It should make bold pronouncements on key issues and demonstrate 
teleological leadership.  
 
In Botswana, practical labour law, labour relations defined in terms of disputes and suspicion. 
The resultant disputes indicate a fractious association. This state of affairs will persist until 
such time as the parties come to respect each other and create a platform for social discourse. 
 
6.10   Conclusion 
 
                                                          
436 Botswana Building Society v Samuel Bolokwe IC 15/99. 
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It is clear that, since its inception, the Industrial Court in Botswana has acted more as an 
extension of the state bureaucratic machinery in its supportive role of state labour regulatory 
measures. Although it is a higher court of the judiciary, it has been more of an appendage to 
the senior courts of the judiciary. Similarly, the Appeal Court has done its best to defend state 
intervention and the parochial interpretation of labour legislation. To date, the decisions 
affecting how the laws are interpreted and applied on the ground have not been addressed, 
resulting in the state deciding on how it interprets and applies labour relations in Botswana. 
 
There have been ongoing efforts to harmonise the various statutes that have segregated 
particularly public sector employment law into petty fiefdoms overseen by bureaucrats. This 
amalgamation of regulatory mechanisms governing the public service is crucial in order to 
give practical effect to ILO-engineered reforms. However, this is also an indication of the 
problems caused by the provisions in the Constitution allowing derogation.  
 
The conclusion to be drawn therefore is that the legislature reserves the right to exclude some 
segments of workers as it might deem fit. This is with regard to the notion of a complete 
freedom to strike on the one hand and, on the other, a prescription of the modalities for 
industrial action in respect of some employees and their categorisation. This also risks 
unjustifiably stifling the rights envisaged by s 13 of the Constitution of Botswana.  
 
In its overall effect, labour legislation and policy formulation in Botswana as an evolving 
process is still essentially elitist and prescriptive rather than co-regulatory. One hopes the 
cases above will set the trend in asserting the intervention and guidance of the judiciary. 
Secondly, the requirements for lawful strikes by essential services are crafted so that a lawful 
strike is not possible. There is no sub-s (4) as referred to in s 45, which is necessary to 
legalise the procedures required for contemplated strikes. The said reference needs to be 
either completed or deleted and, ideally, a harmonised procedure adopted for both essential 
and non-essential services. 
 
The industrial relations scene in Botswana can best be summarised as prescribed and 
regulated stability. Tripartite structures are essentially symbolic, as any union official who 
attends such meetings would confirm. Institutional mechanisms are largely advisory as they 
are mainly given statutorily prescribed roles. Their membership reflects the state’s leadership 
position and the subjective and selective empowerment of the social partners, particularly 
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organised labour. Just as in the colonial past, the centrality, dominance and arrogated 
leadership by the state in all spheres, including labour matters, are still very evident. This 
position becomes the key cause of labour disputes. Contrary to expectation, it would appear 
that s 23 of the Employment Act [Cap 47:01] regarding automatically unfair dismissals is 
being flouted to victimise employees for their union activities. 
 
On another level, it is apparent that there is a continuous wage disparity, even in the public 
sector.437 This is in terms of the annual schedule of minimum wage rates in the face of 
increasingly high cost of living.438 This is occurring in tandem with evident, differentiated 
and structured conspicuous consumption and accumulation by some segments of society. 
This could create socio-economic cleavages that might manifest themselves on the shop 
floor. It may also produce a simmering sense of injustice followed by periodic displays of 
dissatisfaction by workers. Left unresolved, these can crystallise into protracted conflict with 
unpredictable outcomes. 
 
Another worrying development is that, since the recent amendments to the labour laws, 
worker formations have increased in number but have also become more fragmented. This is 
remarkable because, hitherto, the registrar of unions had been vigilant in exercising his vested 
discretion not to register or de-register unions. Initially, this was supposed to prevent this 
very situation of potential duplication, waste of resources and dissipation of worker collective 
capacity. Evidently, this is now prevalent. 
  
Botswana may indeed be an economic success story but the labour front testifies otherwise. 
For the success to permeate all layers of the stratified society, there must be seen to be an 
inclusiveness. This is particularly so with regard to the processes for labour legislation and 
policy formulation. This is also because the regenerative labour force has, throughout the 
historical evolution of Botswana, played a constructive role in wealth creation. Yet, 40-odd 
years after independence, domestic workers and employees in agricultural undertakings have 
only recently been brought under the protective ambit of minimum wage policy and law.   
 
By way of recommendation, it is time for an omnibus definition of a public servant or an 
employee in the public service. An employee is a worker whether he or she is described as a 
                                                          
437 See Sunday Standard of 28June to 4 July 2015 at 23. 
438 Ibid. 
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temporary, permanent, manual, industrial or management worker. Basically, an essential 
service worker should also be seen as an employee who possesses the power to exercise 
authority in the name of the state. In this way, the labour laws should cater for all. With 
regard to essential services, there should be no presumption that each worker can be a threat 
to public health, security or welfare. This is why an essential services committee should be 
created. A minister should not be given this responsibility as he or she is, after all, a political 
appointee whose kind of work has no bearing on the realities of the workplace. 
 
Such a committee should exercise the power to designate essential services, as is done in 
South Africa. Its first objective should be a minimum service level framework agreement as 
part of any bargaining council negotiation process. The functions of the committee should 
include the ratification of essential services agreements and the enforcing of minimum 
agreements. Ways of identifying problems, resolving them and providing guarantees against 
engaging in unnecessarily disruptive industrial action should also be included.439 Naturally, 
problems would be encountered primarily because both essential and non-essential 
employees fall within the same bargaining unit whose interests are collectively pursued by 
the same union.  
 
Realistically, employers find it easier to group all employees together because all public 
sector workers can easily categorised as essential services employees, who can be easily 
restricted or even prohibited from going on strike. In essence, the best possible approach is 
bargaining and negotiation as preludes to determining the minimum service agreement. These 
conclusions are preliminary as several issues are re-visited in detail within the context of the 
prevailing conditions in Lesotho and Swaziland.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Lesotho Perspective 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 6 explored the Botswana situation. The study undertook this task by weaving 
together a tapestry of the past and the present with reference to the evolution of labour 
legislation, theory and reality. The exercise brought up certain issues regarding institutional 
practices and the general perception of the state in action. 
 
The same approach is adopted in this chapter on Lesotho. However, because the Botswana 
discussion is somewhat detailed, this Lesotho chapter focuses on more empirical evidence 
that can help us to understand the Lesotho situation in the context of employment relations 
and labour disputes. 
 
7.2           Background 
 
Lesotho might not have had a labour history path like Botswana’s but, in several ways, it 
bears similar scars from the past. Lesotho, formerly the kingdom of Basutoland, is a tiny 
kingdom completely surrounded by South Africa. Its growth and history are therefore 
inextricably linked with both South Africa and Britain, as Botswana was since 1885. Both 
territories were therefore equally affected by events in South Africa. The Kingdom of 
Lesotho, or Basutoland, as it was known through in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, 
owes its origins largely to the genius of Paramount Chief Moshoeshoe I (1786–1870). 
 
In 1884, Britain resumed direct responsibility for the Protectorate of Basutoland.440 The 
political and legal powers of the senior chiefs were largely maintained under the British 
policy of indirect rule – a situation that lasted well into the 20th century. The British set up a 
system of dual rule and left considerable power in the hands of the paramount chiefs, all of 
whom were descendants of Moshoeshoe I. Under these leaders, authority was delegated 
through ranked regional chiefs drawn from the royal lineage and the most important 
chiefdoms. A system of customary law was adopted, with the land held in trust by the 
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paramount chief for the people, while crucial aspects of local government were also left to the 
chiefs. The British administration was concerned primarily with balancing Basutoland’s 
budget, which it facilitated by ensuring that a substantial proportion of the population worked 
for wages in South Africa.  
 
The local chiefs could do little to halt the increasing social and economic deprivation within 
Basutoland. Education was left to missionary societies, and there was little development of 
economic infrastructure or social services. Between 1929 and 1933 the Great Depression 
coincided with a massive drought, resulting in the exportation of black labour, a phenomenon 
that drove numbers of able-bodied men into South Africa. The net effect was that the 
population in Basutoland hardly increased for a decade. In the early 1930s the British 
attempted to reduce the number of chiefs. During World War II, more than 20,000 Basotho 
served the British in North Africa and parts of Europe. 
 
On 4 October 1966, when Basutoland received its independence from Britain, it was renamed 
the Kingdom of Lesotho and headed by paramount chief Moshoeshoe II (named for the 
nation’s founder) as king and Chief Jonathan as prime minister. Executive power was given 
to the prime minister in 1967. However, it was only in 1950 that the first minor concessions 
were made to the elective principle in Basutoland, though the British still refused to concede 
legislative powers. In the background, however, rapid socio-economic and political changes 
were under way, not only in Basutoland, but in South Africa too. As the self-confidence of 
educated commoners grew, they began to take interest and play a more prominent role in 
Basutoland, to a great extent displacing the chiefs as the backbone of society. It was accepted 
that the paramount chief would henceforth be a constitutional monarch. 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century, mineral discoveries were made in South Africa and their 
enormous potential laid the foundation for the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910. 
In order to acquire cheap labour and to end competition from independent African 
agricultural producers, the white landowners and mine-owners encouraged the adoption of 
policies that deprived the indigenous population of neighbouring territories of their social and 
political rights and most of their land, particularly in Lesotho. That notwithstanding, Sotho 
farmers took advantage of the markets for foodstuffs in the growing South African mining 
centres. They utilised new farming techniques to produce substantial surpluses of grain, 
which they sold on the South African markets.  
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The migrant labour pattern continued unabated as Sotho workers continued to pour into the 
mines to sell their labour for cash and firearms. Lesotho’s labour history in the twentieth 
century was thus dominated by an increasing dependence on labour migration to South Africa 
and increasingly discriminatory and dehumanising legislation. Deliberate policies were 
crafted so as to normalise arbitrary and exploitative taxation. This situation was worsened by 
an increasing population growth behind a closed border, the depletion of the soil, and the 
need for resources to supplement agricultural production. Sotho workers became an important 
element of the South African mining industry, and Basutoland became the classic example of 
the Southern African labour reserve, with its people dependent on work in South Africa for 
their survival. In 2005, there were 52,926 Basotho working in South Africa.441 
 
Although opposition to the colonial system grew, no radical political organisation was able to 
topple the colonial administration and its traditionalist allies. The Sotho were unified, 
however, in their opposition to Basutoland’s incorporation into South Africa and their fear 
that the British might cede the territory to South Africa without consulting them. During the 
1970s Lesotho received an increasing amount of foreign aid in support of its struggle against 
apartheid South Africa. The funding helped to increase the pace of modernisation and urban 
development, spur economic improvements in infrastructure, education, and communications, 
and create a privileged bureaucracy. It failed, however, to alleviate the long-standing 
problems of poverty and dependence. Thus, although mine wages and payments from the 
Southern African Customs Union increased in the 1970s, Lesotho was unable to use these 
revenues productively and remained dependent on South Africa. 
 
7.3   Emerging trends in labour relations and legislation in Lesotho 
 
Political instability, economic deprivation and looming poverty appear to be the current 
situation in Lesotho. This is coupled with the intransigence of the military. This means that 
Lesotho was and is still not able to focus on internal labour related issues. This situation is 
exacerbated by the institutional inability to create and nurture an environment for robust 
parliamentary debates. This would have provided a window into the relationship between 
organised labour (such as there is) and the state, as is the case in Botswana. 
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The foregoing was intended to capture a picture of the Basutoland as it was before the advent 
of modern labour law and progressive external influences. It also dealt with the post-colonial 
situation. Later developments in Lesotho, specifically from 2000 onwards, have seen the 
statutory creation of several structures within the labour legislation framework. Among these 
are the Industrial Relations Council, a Director of Dispute Prevention and Resolution 
(DDPR) and the Labour Appeal Court. The Labour Code also formalised the positions of the 
President and Deputy President of the Labour Court. These will form part of the discussions 
on Lesotho subsequently. Before then, in keeping with the structure adopted for chapter 6, 
certain conceptual and problematic issues need attention. 
 
7.4 Employment in the context of Lesotho labour legislation 
 
The Roman-Dutch and common-law connotation of the employment contract transcends the 
borders of most SADC countries, except for minor variations of prescriptive detail. In 
Lesotho, the employment contract is defined as a contract by which an employee enters the 
service of an employer. It assumes therefore that, like Botswana, all the other essentials of 
contract and the particularities of the parties will fall into place.442 
 
The Labour Code Amendment Act classifies all employees as workers ‘in continuous 
employment’. This means to be an employee one must be a person who has worked not less 
than four weeks in each year of uninterrupted service under the same employer, business or 
management. It therefore also assumes that all the conceptual and doctrinal issues raised in 
chapter 6 in this regard are germane. These include the determination of employee status, 
employer prerogatives and the inherent inequalities in the power relationship that underpins 
the environment of employer–employee relations.   
 
The Labour Code Order excludes members of the Royal Lesotho Defence Force, the Royal 
Mounted Police or any other disciplined force within the meaning of the Independence Order 
of 1966 and the Constitution of 1993. The Order then continues by stipulating that no 
exemptions shall be made. As in Botswana, this exemption runs counter to any ILO 
Conventions that have ‘come into force in the Kingdom of Lesotho’. This provision will be 
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revisited later with regard to worker formations and the position of the ILO, much of which 
has been covered in chapter 6. 
 
The law further defines an employee as anyone working in any capacity under a contract, be 
it in an urban or rural setting, government department or a public authority.443 This omnibus 
definition would therefore suggest a wider net of issues regarding workplace relations, such 
as dismissals and how these are resolved. It follows then that the multi-faceted approach in 
chapter 6 relating to the conceptualisation and actualisation of the employment relationship is 
in order. This is so because the jurisprudential and juridical foundations would be equally 
applicable. This assumption needs testing, however. This is what the following section does. 
The study asserts that there is almost no problem at the point of entry into the employment 
relationship. It follows then that the problems occur mainly during the actualisation of the 
relationship and until its end. 
 
7.4.1   Termination of the employment contract 
 
In Nkojane v FNB and Another, the appellant had sought a review of his dismissal. The court 
ruled that the alleged unfair dismissal was in fact both procedurally and substantively fair. 
The case revolved around insubordination, the ground on which the applicant appealed. The 
court found that the appellant had indeed refused to comply with the manager’s reasonable 
and lawful instructions. 
 
The court found further that ‘such conduct is so reprehensible that the employer is entitled to 
take disciplinary measures even if there is no specific rule prohibiting such conduct under the 
employer’s regulations. Common labour law does not permit such conduct.’444 The 
application for a review was therefore dismissed with costs as a measure of the court’s 
displeasure for the act of pursuing a clearly frivolous review. In this instance, in terms of the 
facts, the Labour Court was correct in its findings.  
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444 Nkojane v FNB and Another  LC.REV/62/2010  
173 
 
TZICC Clothing Manufacturing (Pty) Ltd v President of Labour Court and Another445 was 
another application for review. This case raises a number of questions about the employment 
relationship. This was an application for review of a ruling by the Labour Court. In that case, 
the Labour Court varied an award by the DDPR by changing the award from reinstatement to 
compensation. The court held that such conduct amounts to an irregularity. The applicant was 
therefore ordered to comply with the DDPR award. Furthermore, there is no provision in the 
laws for a non-legal practitioner to represent a party in a matter before the Labour Appeal 
Court. The court clarified that s 228E(5) of the Labour Code Amendment Act 3 of 2000 
provides that an award issued by the DDPR shall be final and binding and shall be 
enforceable as if it were an order of the Labour Court. 
 
What this means is that matters pertaining to rights that are covered by s 34 of the Labour 
Code Order 24 of 1992 should be understood distinctly and properly. With due respect, if the 
findings of the DDPR on the assumption of proper jurisdiction is not appealable, then 
concern must be shown because it is also the forum of first instance. It must be said then that 
justice cannot be done if there is a flawed award. The other issue is the demonstrated 
possibility of the labour laws, functions and powers being misinterpreted. This can occur 
even at the level of the Labour Court, notwithstanding good faith. The other concern is 
whether it would be equitable to find an illiterate, naïve worker guilty in such an instance. It 
is also necessary to note that, according to the Court of Appeal, no appeals shall lie against 
any decisions of the Labour Appeal Court.446 Clearly, simplicity and justice are being 
sacrificed on the altar of statutory complexity and the jurisdictional confusion of the Labour 
bench, whose political and juridical responsibilities include building faith and trust in the 
dispute redress framework. It is quite possible for the regulatory and judicial structures to 
lose legitimacy. 
 
In M B Mokubung and Lesotho Flour Mills447 the central issue was whether there can be what 
is known as dismissal on the grounds of the employer’s operational requirements. The other 
issue is whether, assuming such dismissals were unfair, the Labour Court had exclusive 
jurisdiction to resolve such a dispute. In this instance, the Labour Court did not determine 
what ‘dismissables’ are. That notwithstanding, it however concluded that such termination 
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must be by agreement and the retirement package must be mutually acceptable to both parties 
in order to avoid the liability for an unfair labour practice. In sum, the court had to determine 
whether the plaintiff was ‘dismissed’ under the guise of operational reasons. Termination on 
operational grounds ought not to be classified as ‘dismissal’.  
 
Similarly, in the case of T Shelane and Mohale Dam Contractors,448 the basic issue was 
whether in a case regarding termination on grounds of redundancy, a claim of unfairness 
should have been duly lodged before the DDPR as provided for by s 225(6) of the LCO.   
However, in this case, the question for examination focused rather on whether redundancy 
should be classified as ‘dismissal’ in labour law terms. In an attempt to come to grips with 
this constructive problem, the learned judge referred to retrenchment as ‘to cut down, to 
reduce the number of employees because of redundancy, a superfluity of employees in 
relation to the work to be performed, lay off a number of his employees.’ Further, he quoted 
Cheadle as saying ‘retrenchment means dismissal because the ex-employee is redundant. The 
redundancy … can be caused by the introduction of new technology, the organization of the 
business, a rationalization consequent on a merger, a drop in production caused by an 
economic downturn or any number of circumstances.’ It would appear that the South African 
authors referred to in the court decisions are heavily relied on by the Lesotho labour courts as 
there is no evidence of further reference to other sources.  
 
Dismissal connotes removal from a job for an offence, or to sack or fire an employee, 
whereas retrenchment suggests the necessary laying off and the reluctant dispensing with the 
services of a ‘clean’ employee. All of these result in an employee being jobless. The issue is 
that the causal factor must guide the description of the consequential conduct. Even then, 
assuming retrenchment was dismissal in general common-labour law terms, the courts are 
enjoined to ensure that the retrenchment process is not abused. The issue of fairness will still 
be pertinent. Similarly, dismissal under the disguise of operational requirements ought not to 
be condoned by the courts established to ensure and promote fair labour practice and justice. 
For example, an approved leave period cannot occur within a termination period ostensibly 
on the grounds of retrenchment. Neither can a disciplinary hearing be convened after a 
purported termination of the employment contract on the same grounds of retrenchment.  
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In a normal situation, disciplinary measures that ultimately result in dismissals need to 
comply with statutory requirements of both substantive and procedural fairness. Therefore, 
where these are missing, in addition to non-compliance with procedural routes for labour 
dispute resolution, then the appropriate structures as referred to may intervene (not interfere). 
This intervention will seek to ensure substantive and procedural fairness or to avert a 
probable miscarriage of justice. The action taken may be a review or the initiation of 
proceedings de novo. It is submitted then that dismissals, in an ideal labour environment, 
should deal with disciplinary matters, whether serious misconduct or infractions, but not 
organisational socio-economic variables for which the employee cannot be faulted. It is 
evident that the employee is already a victim of capital and its bureaucratic machinery to 
which he or she has become an unwilling appendage. Therefore:  
 
[T]he causes which are sufficient to justify dismissal must vary with the nature of the 
employment and the circumstances of the case. Dismissal is an extreme measure and not to be 
resorted to for trifling causes. The fault must be something which a reasonable man could not 
have expected to overlook.449  
 
In Botswana, very simple matters, such as the refusal to provide grounds for dismissal even 
though adequate notice was given, are construed as contrary to natural justice and ipso jure 
constitute wrongful and unlawful termination.450 In the same way, the refusal to give reasons 
and the failure to convene a disciplinary hearing in the case of even a herd boy constitute 
unlawful dismissal.451 
 
The applicability and effectiveness of such stipulations and juristic interpretations in Lesotho 
may therefore appear to depend largely on the principal legislative and constitutional 
framework and the degree to which the courts are prepared to provide a jurisprudential basis 
for their rulings. In Makoa v Lesotho Highlands Project Contractors and Others,452 the issue 
was whether the applicant had been dismissed or retrenched and, if so, whether he had been 
relieved of his duties while on leave. The complainant had been employed without reference 
to time or duration. Subsequently he was informed by the employer that the enterprise was 
undergoing restructuring. Rather than retrench workers, they were going to transfer the 
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employees to areas of their choice. In the same month (on 18 August 1993) a letter of 
retrenchment was sent to the complainant, which he refused to accept. 
 
He proceeded to go on leave. Upon returning to work, he applied for an extension of the 
leave days. The leave was denied on the grounds that he was no longer an employee. 
Apparently, the retrenchment had been agreed to between the trade union and the employer in 
his absence. This was termed a collective agreement with the workers’ union, CAWULE. He 
said he was not a member of the union and so did not regard the agreement as binding on 
him. According to the court, where a lawful retrenchment occurs, the court cannot order 
reinstatement but payment of all outstanding entitlements owed to the affected worker. 
 
In Tebello Thandazo and Others v Nien Hsing International Lesotho Ltd453 an unfair 
dismissal claim arose from an alleged participation in an illegal strike or unlawful work 
stoppage. The issue at stake was whether the subsequent dismissal was fair. The applicants 
alleged that they did not participate in any illegal strike or unlawful work stoppage. The 
applicants, all former employees of the respondent company, were dismissed for allegedly 
participating in an illegal strike or work stoppage on 11 December 2009. The alleged unfair 
dismissal arose from an alleged failure on their part to comply with ultimatums that were 
issued by the respondent consequent to the alleged illegal strike or an unlawful work 
stoppage embarked on by the applicants, among others, on the said date. The applicants 
contended that their dismissal was both substantively and procedurally unfair and sought an 
order of reinstatement, which was changed to an order for compensation during the 
proceedings. 
 
The facts were as follows; the applicants of their own accord decided to have a celebration 
during the lunch hour from 12h00 to 13h00. They indicated to the court that the employer 
was far from pleased with this celebration, interpreted it as a strike and consequently 
switched off the electricity. The court found that the employer had failed to prove that the 
workers had conspired to and did engage in unlawful industrial action. That being so, 
dismissals should be consequential to disciplinary matters and not with organisational and 
socio-economic variables for which the employee cannot be faulted. It is evident that the 
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employee is already a victim of the capital and its bureaucratic machinery to which he or she 
has become an unwilling appendage. 
 
In Lesotho Highlands Development Authority v Mohlolo and Others,454 the appellants 
contended that Mohlolo and others should have first approached the Directorate of Dispute 
Prevention and Resolution in order to qualify to bring the case before the Labour Court.  
Further, whether the Labour Court a quo was competent to grant a condonation had to be 
determined. The Labour Appeal Court concluded that should the Labour Court have lacked 
appropriate jurisdiction or overstepped its boundaries, then all other issues regarding locus 
standi in judicio would have fallen into place. The court then proceeded on a lengthy 
discourse about jurisdiction and the authority vested in specified agencies regarding labour 
dispute resolution.  
 
In sum, the court ruled as follows: 
 
(a) The Labour Court was created under the Labour Code Order of 1992. In s 25, the 
Labour Court was vested with exclusive jurisdiction regarding all matters relating to 
the Labour Code Order. 
(b) Further, the Code provides that no ordinary or subordinate court shall exercise its civil 
jurisdiction in any matter provided for by the Code. 
(c) Section 26 provides that the jurisdiction vested in the Labour Court shall not limit the 
jurisdiction of any other court in criminal cases.455 
 
The court then provided a brief history of the Labour Court. As a result of these statutory 
provisions, the Labour Court was vested with the power, authority and civil jurisdiction. This 
authority had earlier resulted in a perceived dilution of the unlimited original jurisdiction of 
the High Court in terms of s 119(1) of the Constitution. The Appeal Court solved the problem 
when it decided that the Labour Court was free to exercise its jurisdiction from the Code just 
as the High Court can enjoy its jurisdiction in terms of s 19 of the Constitution. 
 
The court explained that the DDPR was intended as a creature of statute, to attempt to 
prevent trade disputes from arising or escalating. In addition, its brief is also to resolve 
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disputes via conciliation and arbitration, to advise employers’ organisations, employees and 
trade unions. The Labour Court functions as a juristic person. That being so, the judge 
concluded that the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve a dispute about the 
nature of retrenchments (as in this case) and other disputes of right, including unfair 
dismissals. The forum of first instance is the DDPR which must be approached within six 
months of the commencement of the dispute.456 However, by interpretation, s 226 (as 
amended) enjoins the Labour Court, given its exclusive jurisdiction, to resolve by 
adjudication all matters listed in the section.457 This does not eliminate the key role of the 
DDPR as a statutory facilitator whose role is to shorten the duration of disputes. Its function 
is intended to be relatively informal and quasi-judicial, and its role is a precursor to appearing 
before the formal courts. 
 
The court concluded as follows: ‘In my opinion, therefore, while the Labour Court has been 
given jurisdiction to resolve dismissal type disputes, the jurisdiction to settle such disputes 
reposes in the DDPR. The DDPR has jurisdiction to attempt to settle disputes before such 
disputes can be ultimately resolved by adjudication in the Labour Court.’  For the above 
reasons, the appeal succeeded with costs. 
 
This suggests that the DDPR should attempt to resolve disputes. Its failure to do so would 
then allow those disputes to be subjected to arbitration prior to litigating at court. It is only 
then that both the Labour Court and the Labour Appeal Court are expected to settle the said 
dispute. In this regard, to resolve, according to every day usage, means ‘to find an acceptable 
solution to a problem or difficulty’ or ‘a formal statement of an opinion agreed to by a 
committee or a council’.458 On the other hand, to settle means ‘to put an end to an agreement 
or a disagreement.’459 
 
It follows then that a resolution could amount to preliminary action taken to arrest a 
deteriorating situation. This suggests a potential for failure which raises the question of the 
DDPR being a final decision maker. Obviously, the ultimate forum of last resort is the 
Labour Appeal Court. From the foregoing, the multiplicity of structures charged with both 
the resolution and the settlement of disputes may lead to jurisdictional confusion. Such 
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confusion at the level of the employee could be worse than any turf war between the courts. 
Retrenchments and internal transfers do not form part of the disciplinary regime resulting in 
the termination of employment. They also do not imply that an employment relationship has 
to come to an end for this statutory entitlement to mature. At least the employee is protected 
by the Wages and Conditions of Employment Order of 1974, despite the fact that it has since 
been repealed. According to s 79, severance benefits are payable to any employee who 
completes more than one year of continuous service with the same employer. Such an 
employee, on termination, shall receive a severance benefit of two weeks’ payment for each 
year of service.  
 
The issue of compensation as a result of injuries sustained ‘out of and in the course’ of 
normal contractual service is another contentious area. This is illustrated by Labour 
Commissioner versus The Lesotho Highlands Development Authority and Chief Executive 
Officer.460 In this instance, the applicant was employed by Muela Hydropower Contractors 
(MHPC) in 1996. Upon employment, he underwent a pre-employment medical examination. 
The test revealed a pre-existing injury to his right leg which was why that leg was shorter 
than the other. He stated that the injury in question was not from his current work. 
Subsequently, he sustained an injury to the same leg when a four-pound hammer fell on the 
leg. Tests revealed that he had suffered an abrasion, and then a minor contusion, on an 
already existing leg ulcer.  
 
The employer did not report any of this as did not regard the medical condition as serious 
enough. In 1998, the plaintiff instituted civil proceedings against the employer. The court 
ruled that, in terms of the law, any claim for compensation can be made only through 
criminal proceedings. The employer contested the claims. The court, referring to the relevant 
law, ruled that such claims should be reported within a period of six months of the date on 
which the injury occurred. Secondly, an appropriate court may grant condonation after six 
months but not beyond three years. The claim was thus denied and the case was dismissed. In 
Botswana, the Workers’ Compensation Act has no prescription period. In this case, it would 
seem that the court was punishing the claimant for what he did not know.461 This is not to say 
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that some should be excluded from the dictum that ignorance of the law is no excuse. Each 
case must be treated on its own merits because that is the essence of equity. 
 
This study argues that the notion of ‘severance benefits’ should not be tied to the termination 
of service but to a recognition of dedicated service which may continue. The same problem 
occurs in Botswana, where the benefits are linked to the termination of employment.  
However, it is acknowledged that benefits shall be payable after every 60 months of 
continuous service. Such benefits may be payable at the final termination of the employment 
relationship if the employee so chooses. This is akin to a gratuity which does not fall due only 
when the employment relationship is terminated, but according to the specified duration of 
each period of renewable engagement. It is submitted that most unskilled workers fall victim 
to unscrupulous employers who terminate contracts prior to the maturity of severance 
benefits, only to re-hire the same workers to commence another period of continuous service. 
   
7.5    Freedom of association and organisation 
 
A collective labour law environment directly affects the balance of power between political, 
social and economic forces in varied historical and cultural contexts. This often results in 
strong resistance to any attempt to tamper with the status quo, in spite of the fact that all it 
suggests is a window of opportunity for allowing progressive and international influences to 
permeate the closed domestic legal system. The principle of freedom of association is 
considered a kind of customary rule within common law and independent of any Convention. 
Such perceptions can, when appropriate, be harnessed and appended to the letter and intent of 
an international norm or Convention in its quest to influence change.   
 
A contentious area and thus fertile ground for labour disputes derives from the fundamental 
question of the freedom to form or join workers’ associations of one’s choice. The exercise of 
this freedom provides a platform for collective bargaining, and also implies the power to 
withdraw collective labour power as leverage during negotiations. Freedom of association 
and the right to organise and collectively bargain owe their generic roots to the very 
fundamental ILO Convention on freedom of association and the protection of the right to 
organise (Convention 87), to which Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland became signatories in 
1966. This Convention is intertwined with Convention 98 of 1966, which addresses the right 
to organise and collectively bargain. Some pertinent issues in this regard have been raised in 
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both chapters 5 and 6 and need not be reproduced here. However, as events below show, 
because the state cannot prohibit trade unions completely, it has devised a means of achieving 
the same result through the ever-increasing net of essential services.  
 
The language of the Conventions presupposes mandatory compliance, once a signatory state 
has ratified the Convention. In the absence of ratification, or when a state denounces the 
ratified Convention, it puts itself beyond the reach of the ILO and its moral, doctrinal and 
juridical persuasive authority. The ILO explicitly accepts that if a state does not ratify its 
Conventions, there is no means of supervising their application. In addition, the supervisory 
mechanisms of the ILO will be unable to create room for either the expedited examination of 
complaints or punitive sanctions.  
 
In effect, the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Fact-Finding and Conciliation 
Commission on Freedom of Association are simply bureaucratic organisations with no 
coercive power. This also means that notions of public international law and the ILO precepts 
on these matters are merely doctrinal and moralistic. Therefore, these international standards 
and their benchmark value need closer examination. This will then be followed by subsequent 
empirical validation. This is critical particularly because the phenomenon of essential 
services is under siege.  
 
In this context, siege means the practical usurpation of the concept of ‘essential’ service and 
by extension, the curtailment of basic fundamental freedoms. By practical usurpation is 
meant the fact that some states have seized the notion of ‘essential’ and turned it into a 
mechanism for casting their regulatory net wide. In effect, the practical elasticity of the 
‘essential’ has been transformed into a regulatory tool used to harness worker formations. 
Such conduct is in complete contempt of the ILO and its precepts. The following case is 
informative. 
 
 In Mapiloko v Pioneer Seed RSA (Pty) Ltd and Others,462 the first respondent (R1) was a 
South African company. The applicant was assigned to carry out his duties in Lesotho under 
the second respondent (R2). Before then, he had been employed since 1998 by R2 and based 
in South Africa. This was why a disciplinary was held in Grahamstown, South Africa. His 
                                                          
462  Mapiloko v Pioneer Seed RSA (Pty) Ltd and Others LAC/APN/08/08, {[2009] LSLAC 2.} 
182 
 
contract was terminated by R2 in 2006. The applicant was not satisfied with the termination 
and challenged it in the Labour Court. The court denied his application. The applicant then 
challenged the decision of the court, claiming its conduct was ultra vires s 28 of the Labour 
Code Order of 1992. 
 
Subsequently, the issue was raised in an application for review and also for the determination 
of the question of the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. The court had initially referred the 
matter to the DDPR, which was considered the correct forum. While the matter was pending 
at the DDPR, the present case was lodged under s 38A (3) of the Labour Code Amendment 
Act. The learned judge proceeded to read out the relevant provisions as they affect the 
authority of the Appeal Court to hear a case without it first passing through the DDPR and or 
the Labour Court. 
 
iii) … any administrative action taken in the performance of any function in terms of this Act 
or any other labour law read with Labour Appeal Court Rules 2002 entitled as ‘The Court 
sitting as a Court of first instance-------- 
 Section 14(1) states; 
a) A party may apply to the Judge in chambers, on good cause shown, for a direction 
that a matter before the Labour Court or the Directorate of Dispute Prevention and 
Resolution be heard by the (Appeal) Court sitting as a Court of first instance. 
 
In the main, the application for leave to seek a review was based on the grounds that the 
applicant did not comply with s 69 relating to the submission of written statements about the 
reasons for dismissal and with s 76 in respect of the accrual of rights on the termination (of 
the contract of employment), and that this should have warranted the interpretation of s 226 
(2) on the resolution of disputes.  
 
The court ruled that, on the facts, the applicant had not made a case to support his application 
to change the forum without exhausting the preliminary statutory steps. Therefore, he had to 
return to the DDPR. Again, it would appear that workers are being taught practical procedure, 
taking into account the time lines imposed on each step to be taken, irrespective of how long 
it might take to learn how to proceed in the event of disputes.   
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7.6     Essential services: Theory and practice in Lesotho 
 
The question of essential services is discussed extensively in chapter 6. However, it is 
instructive to add the following report from Botswana. In June 2015, the state gazetted a Bill 
informing the public of its intention to repeal the existing Trade Disputes Act [Cap 48:02]. Of 
critical importance is the fact that the Bill widens the categorisation of essential services to 
include teaching, all workers in diamond-related services, and the staff of the Botswana 
Vaccine Institute, among others in the public sector.463 Effectively, those public sector 
workers who went on strike in 2011 have all been included in the scheduled list of essential 
services. As noted earlier, there is no Essential Services Committee in Botswana. Thus the 
applicability and effectiveness of these ILO Conventions with regard to Lesotho may 
therefore depend largely on the principal legislative and constitutional framework and also on 
the ideological orientation of the state.  
 
Furthermore, the effectiveness will also depend on the degree to which the courts are 
prepared to provide a jurisprudential basis for their rulings. However, the inherent 
deficiencies of the Conventions as noted earlier in the study need to be acknowledged. 
Secondly, Convention 87 states that the ratification of the Convention ‘shall not be deemed to 
affect any existing law, award, custom or agreement’ that relates to any segments of any 
state. Since the theoretical and doctrinal issues have been addressed, the next step is to 
demonstrate the legislative effect on this key area in employment relations. 
 
In the Lesotho Union of Bank Workers (LUBE) case, the philosophical premise was whether 
workers had the right to form and join unions. If they did, then restrictions such as those 
implied in ‘essential services’ could be deemed contrary to the principle of freedom of 
association as enshrined in the Constitution.464 In this case, the demands of the LUBE 
workers were as follows: 
 
(a) That the 1991 strike action entered into by the applicant against the respondents be 
regarded as lawful; 
(b) That the 1982 Act passed by Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan that declared banking to 
be an essential service was ultra vires; and  
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(c) That a discriminatory and therefore unfair labour practice resulted from the 
respondents’ act of dismissing members of the applicant and subsequently reinstating 
some to the exclusion of others. 
(d) That such act was therefore null and void and of no effect on the members of the 
applicant as intended by the respondents when some were dismissed. 
 
This application arose out of strike action by members of the applicant on 22 July 1991. What 
was not contested was the fact that members of the applicant banks had at all material times 
been employees of the respondent banks, by virtue of contracts of employment entered into at 
different times between members of the applicant union. What was not at issue was whether 
it was the Prime Minister and not the Minister of Labour who passed an order in 1982 that 
declared banking to be an essential service, and, secondly, that the order was to apply 
retrospectively from 1975 when the Essential Services Arbitration Act of 1975 was passed. 
 
The Order was passed in 1982 as a result of which the applicant’s members were given an 
ultimatum to go back to work or be dismissed. They did not go back to work and were 
summarily dismissed on 8 August 1991. Subsequent to the dismissals, the respondents 
announced on the radio that the applicant’s members should reapply. Out of those who 
reapplied, only a fraction were re-employed to the exclusion of the others. The state averred 
that ‘[f]undamental collective bargaining was a duty to bargain in good faith that the strike 
was an essential and integral element of collective bargaining and that when an impasse had 
been reached in negotiations either party was free to take unilateral action.’ 
 
The respondents denied in their affidavits that there had been any effective collective 
bargaining which they thwarted. Besides the admission of certain factual averments there was 
neither admission by the respondents, nor was there documentation to prove that there had 
been collective bargaining which was thwarted by respondents, save that in para 5(e) of their 
supporting affidavit the applicants conceded that their abstention from work was illegal. The 
applicant acknowledged that banking was, in 1991, an essential service. That being so, the 
provisions of Part IV of the Essential Services  Arbitration Act 1975 applied to strike actions 
by bank employees. In terms of ss 16 and 17, strike action was illegal unless the Labour 
Commissioner first decided that a trade dispute existed.  
 
The court observed that 
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[t]he view put forward by LUBE to the Labour Commissioner was that ‘both’ 
parties had breached the law.... I would be inclined to agree with Applicant that 
where the Respondents employed delaying tactics to frustrate the procedure of 
collective bargaining then Applicant could undertake strike action which would not 
have been unlawful in the circumstances465. 
 
Citing a South African case, the judge quoted Goldstone as follows: ‘There is nothing so 
subversive to collective bargaining, however, as to bargain entirely or to pretend to bargain 
without doing so, going through the motion with no intention of reaching agreement.’ 
Nonetheless, the applicant should have at least attempted to prove these allegations by 
documentation, especially where the respondents had expressed a vehement denial. 
  
As a general rule, dismissed strikers will only be afforded protection if they employ the strike 
as a remedy of last resort. The applicant could have argued that the strike action was 
functional and lawful with regard to collective bargaining law and procedure. It could be 
functional if it was consistent with the collective bargaining procedure. Citing the case of 
NUMSA v Eim Street Plastics the court ruled that the test to be applied in determining 
whether the strike was functional and lawful was that the strikers must have negotiated in 
good faith before embarking on the strike, and they must have reached a deadlock after the 
negotiations.466  
 
The applicant union also sought a declaration that the 1982 Act declaring banking to be an 
essential service was ultra vires. Secondly, if this action by the Prime Minister was found to 
be ultra vires then the strike action would not be unlawful. This was so because, in terms of 
the Essential Services Act, banking was not an essential service. But if banking was an 
essential service, then the Act clearly laid out the procedure for addressing the labour dispute, 
which first had to be declared as such by the Labour Commissioner. In the words of the 
applicant, the issue was therefore whether the act of declaring banking an essential service by 
the Prime Minister was ultra vires and therefore of no force or effect.  
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In addition, where a statute expressly provided for the functions of a junior minister and not a 
senior minister, such conduct would be ultra vires. The relevant section in the Essential 
Services Act is s 20: ‘The Minister may by notice in the gazette, add any service to, or delete 
any service from the schedule to this Act.’467 It cannot be said that in Lesotho, when a 
minister is delegated a function by the legislature, he or she can ignore the oversight authority 
of the legislature in relation to the statutory instrument he or she purports to publicise in the 
gazette. 
 
In 1982, by Legal Notice 21 of 1982 the Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan declared banking to 
be an essential service. The applicants argued that reference to the ‘minister’ in the Essential 
Services Act meant the Minister of Labour. The applicants sought to rely on the authority of 
the Carltona case468 to contend that the prime minister usurped the powers of the junior 
minister and that he thus acted ultra vires. The applicant did not however go on to challenge 
the constitutionality of such an act except to rely on the wording of the statute which ex facie 
differentiates between the minister and the prime minister. Authorities abound on the 
question of ultra vires acts. In most cases this issue arises where a delegated or otherwise 
junior body performs functions that are not permitted by the enabling authority or statute. 
 
The operative word in most cases is proportionality. That is, such act must not be in excess of 
the given authority. In other words, the person who acts unlawfully must be the one who goes 
beyond the bounds of his or her authority. Thus, the usurping of a junior authority’s powers 
would be ultra vires only if the act itself is repugnant to the authority or statute which is itself 
an enabling statute to the usurper. Or rather, the exercise of the powers must be beyond or in 
excess of such authority.469 The applicant did not even go to the extent of saying that the 
declaration was tainted because banking could not be an essential service. But it is clear from 
para 5 of the founding affidavit that if there was any protest at all about the declaration of 
banking as an essential service, it was by the ILO and not by the applicant. So it can be said 
that the applicant did accept that it was bound by the 1982 declaration. 
  
According to the court, where the prime minister did not act ultra vires and there was no 
challenge as to the retrospective effect of such a declaration, the applicant was bound. That in 
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effect rendered the strike action unlawful. If the declaration of banking as an essential service 
could not be attacked under the Essential Services Act then, in 1991, when the strike action 
took place, banking had properly been declared an essential service and the strike by 
members of the respondents’ staff was illegal. 
  
The court proceeded to rule that the applicant contended that the dismissals were unlawful. It 
did not argue that they were unfair. The lawfulness of such dismissals could be determined 
only by looking at the contracts of employment. That is, legislation had been enacted only to 
protect employees against unfair dismissal without interfering with the right of the employer 
to hire and fire. It is trite that, at common law, employers are free to hire and fire subject only 
to the terms of the contracts between themselves and their employees. The courts will only 
interfere if the dismissals were in breach of a contractual obligation. The sanctity of a 
contract in this context was best described by Brassey et al: 
 
How little the common law feels for commercial rationality is evident from the fact that it does 
not, in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, require the parties to have good reason 
for terminating the relationship before they do so. All it demands is that they should time the 
termination properly and precede it by the requisite notification of notice.470  
 
In Lesotho Union of Bank Employees v The Solicitor General,471 the bank workers 
established that both Barclays and Standard Chartered Banks recognised the union for 
bargaining purposes. Subsequently, in 1981, the banks reneged on an agreement to 
implement a new salary structure in keeping with their counterparts in South Africa. The 
workers then reacted with a letter to the banks and the responsible minister, threatening a 
strike, which took place in 1982. The minister did not succeed then in effecting a resolution.  
 
Subsequently, he decided to send the dispute to arbitration in terms of s 56(1) of the Trade 
Unions and Trade Disputes Law.472 Having rejected the arbitration order, the workers went 
on strike again on 23 March 1982. On 25 May, the Prime Minister declared all banking 
services to be essential in terms of the Essential Services Arbitration Act of 1975. Failing to 
resolve the dispute, the Commissioner sent the dispute to the Arbitration Tribunal for 
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settlement. The arbitration did not take place until November 1982 when, by proclamation in 
the Gazette No 47), the prime minister appointed another arbitrator. 
 
The workers challenged the order, stating that the role played by the prime minister in 
appointing an arbitrator was irregular and contrary to the Essential Services Arbitration Act.  
 
The banks claimed that, according to the Act, there was no dispute to arbitrate. Secondly, 
what the workers prayed for was not a matter for arbitration because the issue at stake was 
one of law, which did not fall in the listed category. The court concluded that both the 
Commissioner of Labour and the prime minister dealt with the statutory implication on the 
same day. The Commissioner issued Legal Notice 22 of 1982 on the same day that the prime 
minister, acting on powers vested in him by s 4(2), appointed an arbitrator. In effect the Legal 
Notice, emanating from the Act as did the order of the prime minister, could not be set aside. 
The appeal failed. 
 
Essential services, as observed, have become a source of labour disputation mainly because, 
as noted earlier, governments appear to have found a hitherto stable environment where they 
can restrict workers’ collectives from flexing their muscles. A classic example is the ex post 
facto retroactive Executive Order in 1982 which arbitrarily re-categorised banks as falling 
within essential services, and also backdated the order to 1975, when the first law dealing 
with essential services was passed.   
 
In Lesotho, not all workers have the right to form and join trade unions. Civil servants known 
as ‘public officers’, such as the Police Force, the Defence Force, the National Security 
Service and the Prisons Service, are excluded. However, although the Lesotho Constitution 
guarantees freedom of association, public employees are prohibited from forming and joining 
trade unions. They can form or join ‘associations’ instead, whose role is limited to providing 
their opinion when such is sought. The government has promised the ILO (CEACR) that the 
new Public Service Bill will guarantee the right of public workers to form and join any 
associations authorised to conduct collective bargaining. The law allows unions to conduct 
their activities without interference. 
 
Unsurprisingly, s 20 of the Public Services Act prohibits the right to strike in the public 
sector. The CEACR has emphasised that this is a violation of the relevant ILO Conventions 
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and has recommended that the prohibition be limited only to public servants who ‘exercise 
authority in the name of the State’. In addition to that, there are no compensatory guarantees, 
such as arbitration procedures, for those workers whose right to strike is prohibited. Finally, 
the law prohibits strikes in essential services, but the government has not yet listed which 
services are considered to be essential.  
 
 It is noteworthy that the prime minister flouted constitutional norms in his ex post facto, 
retroactive declaration of banking as essential with effect from 1975. This is repugnant to 
administrative law and practice. Secondly, it would appear that the prime minister felt he 
could rely on powers delegated to functionaries rather than play a supervisory role. Again the 
confusion as to who does what and how this is done is dominant in the actualisation of the 
labour law regulatory framework. 
 
In Ts’eliso Shelane and Mohale Dam Contractors473 the issues were more doctrinal and 
therefore complex. The matter was reported to the court by the DDPR in terms of s 225(6) of 
the Labour Code, as amended. The applicant claimed his dismissal was motivated by malice 
and was not necessary on the grounds of redundancy, and could therefore not be justified as 
part of operational re-structuring. In fact, as he alleged, the same job was given to his 
colleague to perform. Therefore, he believed that he was dismissed unfairly. 
 
Quoting s 66 of the Labour Code Order, he indicated that any dismissal had to comply with 
the requirements stipulated therein. The key issue was that, if his position had indeed been 
declared redundant, then no one should be performing his job again. He viewed the issue as 
either a dismissal or a termination. Citing a South African case, the judge explained 
retrenchment as ‘[t]o cut down, to reduce the number of employees because of redundancy – 
a superfluity of employees in relation to the work to be performed. Retrenchment does not 
necessarily involve the abolition of a “post”: the employer may merely lay off a number of 
his employees.’474 
 
He proceeded to explain that the employer was only rationalising his resources. He may 
continue with the same business but may engage fewer hands. Quoting Cheadle, he said:  
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[R]etrenchment means dismissal because the employee is redundant. The redundancy … can be 
caused by the introduction of new technology, the organization of the business, a rationalization 
consequent on a merger, a drop in production caused by an economic downturn or any number 
of circumstances. 
 
As asserted earlier, dismissal as it is commonly understood means to remove from a job for 
an offence, or to sack,475 whereas redundancy is a situation where the employee is no longer 
needed at work due to the insufficiency of work.476 Grogan defines a dismissal as ‘when the 
contract of employment is terminated at the instance of the employer’.477 Effectively 
therefore an employee can hardly dismiss him- or herself but he or she can end the 
employment contract on his or her terms. 
 
 As earlier asserted, retrenchment is not dismissal as it does not connote disciplinary action of 
sorts. An employer who is forced to let his workers go as he cannot pay them anymore cannot 
claim he has dismissed those workers that he has come to value. In the current case, time-
keeping was not a job requiring any particular skills with a permanent post attached. 
Anybody could do such a job and what the employer did was to combine the job with others 
that anyone could do. In view of the evidence adduced, the court ruled in favour of the 
employer. What is evident in this case is the apparent conflict between dismissal, 
retrenchment and redundancy as proffered by the experts. Obviously, the lot of the employee 
would be dismal. Such could be the situation between those referred to as statutory and 
authoritative institutions and the defenceless position of the naive and probably misinformed 
employee. 
 
7.7       Other provisions of the Labour Code  
 
Section 168 of the Labour Code Order provides that all employees and employers in all 
sectors of the economy, including those in agriculture, shall enjoy the right of association and 
combination as workers. In terms of the Constitution, every person shall be entitled to, ‘and, 
except with his own consent, shall not be hindered in his enjoyment of freedom to associate 
freely with other persons for ideological, religious, political, economic, religious, political, 
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economic, labour, social, cultural, recreational and similar purposes’. However, as in 
Botswana, the Constitution then immediately imposes restrictions on the exercise of these 
rights of formation and membership emanating from any law whose purpose is to secure 
defence, public safety, public order, public morality or public health as shall be so defined. 
Impliedly, therefore, this freedom can also be denied on the same grounds. 
 
The Lesotho Constitution also provides for imposing restrictions on public officers with 
regard to unspecified conduct and areas of freedom of association and freedom of peaceful 
assembly (‘without arms’). Freedom of association appears to be differentiated from freedom 
to assemble or to combine collectively, which ought to be the defining essence of the 
actualisation of the freedom of association. 
 
7.7.1    Institutions and labour legislation 
 
The Labour Code Order is described as a law intended to restrict the ‘right of freedom of 
association, as enshrined in numerous regional and continental treaties and standards.’ 478 
With due respect, this sweeping statement is misleading if not fallacious.479 Freedom of 
procession and marching is not equivalent to meeting for the purpose of conferring or 
deliberating at a designated forum. Neither is it assembly. Freedom of assembly is 
consequential to the existence of an association but is not the rationale for associating. As in 
Botswana, there is a critical need for the state and its functionaries to understand that strikes 
are legal and are the legitimate expectation of workers. It is part of their legal, inherent and 
inalienable right.480  
 
This includes the right to collective picketing or the right to down tools. The concept of ‘no 
work, no pay’ does not cover lawful and protected strikes. Strikes do not necessarily 
degenerate into violence, vandalism and the manhandling of scab workers. Further, no clear 
distinction has been made between association, assembly, and identifying with, sharing or 
                                                          
478 Section 2, Interpretation, Public Order Act [Cap 22:02]. 
479 See s 7(3) of the Constitution of Lesotho. Section 16(2) (a), (b) and (c) prohibits certain forms of association. 
480 Section 225 deals with the procedures for dispute resolution. Section 229 provides the conditions for a 
protected strike. 
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advocating a particular position.481 The Labour Code Amendment Act and the Public Service 
Act have been clothed with the authority to regulate employees in respect of unionisation.482 
 
Most Constitutions make this distinction and authority is granted to law enforcement 
authorities to issue permits.483 In Botswana the Constitution refers to freedom of assembly 
and association, but not procession,484 and the Constitution of Namibia refers variously to the 
freedom to assemble peaceably without arms and specifically to freedom of association, 
which shall include the freedom to form or join trade unions or unions, including trade unions 
and political parties.485 Similarly, it refers to the freedom to form and join associations, trade 
unions and political parties.486 The Labour Code (Exemption) Order and the Public Service 
Act expressly prohibit ‘public officers from associating freely or joining political parties.’487 
The Labour Code Order as it currently stands has put in place a complex maze of procedures 
before a union can officially declare a strike.  
 
In practice, there have not been any official strikes in the country for many years, but only a 
few spontaneous protest actions. Such actions are technically defined as illegal; thus, they 
pose the risk of dismissal to any worker who takes part. The unions need to register at the 
Registrar’s Office in order to be recognised. Each year the government reviews non-
functioning or non-compliant unions and deregisters them. The Ministry reported a total of 40 
deregistered unions during 2006 and 2007; they were deregistered for failing to submit 
annual reports.  
 
In terms of the law, collective bargaining is recognised only for trade unions that are 
representative enough.488 The Labour Code Order defines a representative trade union as ‘a 
registered trade union that represents the majority of the employees in the employ of an 
employer’. Section 198A 1(c) specifies that ‘a majority of employees in the employ of an 
employer means over fifty (50) per cent of those employees’. The state of affairs when no 
union covers more than 50 per cent of the workers has yet to be clarified. 
                                                          
481 Section   16 of the Constitution of Lesotho. 
482 Labour   Code (Exemption Order) 22 of 1995. 
483 Section 13(1) of the Constitution of Botswana. 
484 Section 13(1) of the Constitution of Botswana. 
485 Article 21(1) (d). 
486 Article 21(1) (e). 
487 Labour Code Order Part 111, Division D and Part V not to apply to Public Officers. 
488 Section 198 A   1 (b).  
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The exercise of collective bargaining meets particular difficulties in the education sector, 
where the Lesotho Teachers Trade Union’s long-standing disputes have been pending before 
the High Court for 11 years. Additionally, the Ministry of Labour prevented the Congress of 
Lesotho Trade Unions (COLETU) from taking part in the work of the commission in charge 
of setting wages, which is supposed to be a tripartite body.  
 
The right to strike is recognised only in the private sector, after an exhausting procedure. The 
rights to freedom of assembly are generally respected, with some exceptions, such as the June 
2007 curfew, which lasted a week and featured military deployments and roadblocks in the 
capital, Maseru. Moreover, in 2005, the Congress of Lesotho Trade Unions accused the 
police of denying workers permission to celebrate May Day by holding a parade, on the 
grounds that the celebrations coincided with local government elections. There is no mention 
of the physical act of engaging in processions. 
 
It is accepted that strikes are virtually impossible in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. 
Violations are so serious and widespread that they certainly have a negative impact on wages 
and working conditions in every undertaking. In Botswana, the Public Order Act is the only 
statute dealing with a public procession, which the Act defines as a ‘procession in, or 
through, across or along a public place’.489 Only a police officer may grant a permit for such 
a procession, imposing a subjective restriction or prohibition on a public procession. This is 
why people are seeking the repeal of the Act.490 To do this, the structural context needs to be 
properly located. 
 
In the preamble to the Lesotho Labour Code Amendment Act of 2000491 the key innovations 
are the promotion of labour dispute prevention and settlement at the source, the integration of 
mediation, conciliation and arbitration into the dispute settlement system, the autonomy of 
the dispute settlement machinery, the establishment of a Labour Appeal Court, and 
stakeholder participation in the administration of the system. Specifically, this entailed 
arrogating to the minister the powers of intervening in and preventing labour disputes that 
might erupt into national crisis, by appointing conciliators.  
                                                          
489 Section 2, Interpretation, Public Order Act [Cap 22:02]    
490 Richard ‘Lesotho Must Increase Citizenship Participation’ OSISA-AFRIMAP March 2013. 
491 Supplement No. 1 Government Gazette No. 30, 25 April 2000. 
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The Act also authorises the minister to cause to be published non-binding codes of good 
practice, model agreements and guidelines to assist the courts and arbitrators. In pursuit of the 
overall aim of labour justice and industrial harmony, the Labour Court system was created. 
All its functionaries, including the registrar, are appointed by the Judicial Service 
Commission in consultation with the Industrial Relations Council as the embodiment of the 
tripartite system of industrial relations, intended to bestow legitimacy on the dispute 
settlement processes. 
 
7.7.2      The Labour Court 
 
The Labour Court is established as a court of exclusive civil jurisdiction in terms of powers 
given under the Act. Its jurisdiction covers the determination of the rights and duties of 
employees, providing appropriate relief and, in the case of trade disputes, the rescission of 
contracts of employment, fixing the value of services and quantum of compensation, and the 
authority to commit offenders to jail terms and to penalise (s 24). Regarding trade disputes, 
the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes of right covering the interpretation 
and application of the Labour Code, unfair labour practices, unfair dismissals due to strikes, 
lockouts and operational requirements. Certain disputes need to go through the prior process 
of arbitration. This generally includes all disputes of right, which are subject to DDR pre-
conciliation procedures. 
 
The creation of a Labour Appeal Court is a logical corollary to these reforms. The court co-
opts a judge of the High Court as its presiding officer, assisted by two assessors, all appointed 
in consultation with the Industrial Relations Council. While the judge holds sway on matters 
of law, a majority decision is sufficient for matters of fact. Essentially, the Labour Appeal 
Court is intended as a court of finality in matters proceeding from the DDR through the 
Labour Court to the Appeal Court, and attracts all the procedural and substantive provisions 
relating to such judicial structures (s 38). 
 
These officers of the Labour Courts may not be holders of office in the public service. The 
emphasis is on the independence and impartiality of the Labour Court. To buttress this, the 
Act elevated the Labour Court to a subordinate status to the Labour Appeal Court and 
generally refers matters from the DDPR to the Labour Appeal Court for final settlement. In 
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effect, the DDPR must necessarily be the forum of first instance for conciliation and 
mediation within a statutory period, before the dispute proceeds to arbitration, adjudication or 
industrial action. This is supposedly intended to close the door to forum shopping with regard 
to labour dispute resolution. 
 
7.7.2.1      The battle for recognition 
 
The Labour Court system initially received a cold shoulder from the formal courts as they 
regarded the Labour Court as usurping their constitutional powers and authority. Motaung v 
National University of Lesotho and Others was a case brought before the High Court492 in 
which the applicant sought a review of a case of unfair dismissal. The applicant averred that 
the correct forum for the case was the High Court as a court of original jurisdiction. This was 
after the case had hitherto been dismissed and redirected to the DDPR or the Labour Court 
according to the provisions of the Labour Code Order of 1992 and the Labour Code 
Amendment Act of 2002. 
 
The court commented that matters regarding the proper forum for cases such as the one in 
question had been brought before the High Court and the Appeal Court. Reference was made 
to s 66(1), (2) and (4), as well as to s 25(1) of the Labour Code Order. These references were 
with regard to matters of dismissal of employees. This was followed by a lengthy quote of s 
25. The gist was that exclusive jurisdiction had been conferred on the Labour Court regarding 
any matters covered by the Labour Code. Therefore, the High Court cannot invade that 
jurisdiction, and the application amounted to a review of a Labour Court decision, which was 
explicitly excluded. 
 
The learned judge, referring to earlier decisions, stated that s 119 of the Constitution grants 
the High Court unlimited jurisdiction, including the power to review the decisions of any 
inferior court or any judicial, quasi-judicial or public administrative proceedings. The 
question then was whether the Labour Court is a tribunal performing judicial functions. This 
means it must have been created by Parliament as a specialised tribunal. The Appeal Court 
later declared that ‘in matters provided for under the Code, the High Court has no jurisdiction 
                                                          
492 Motaung v National University of Lesotho and Others (CIV/APN/182/06).  
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and only the Labour Court has jurisdiction’.493 If the High Court were to entertain such cases, 
this would only encourage forum shopping. 
 
For the purposes of this study, a case of unfair dismissal ought not to become an opportunity 
to debate legalities such as matters of jurisdiction or the fine constitutional differentiation 
between a court of law and a ‘tribunal’ vested with exclusive jurisdiction to deliver justice 
through the application of law and equity. In addition to the labour courts, there is a whole 
range of statutory administrative structures whose overall purpose is to prevent, manage or 
resolve labour disputes. These include the National Advisory Committee of Labour (NACL) 
and the National Advisory Council on Occupational Safety, Health and Welfare, 
(NACOSHW) and the Labour Code (Conciliation and Arbitration) Guidelines and the DDPR 
regulations. However, the wage bill of such a multiplicity of field functionaries is a drain on 
the resources of a country such as Lesotho. 
 
7.7.2.2            The industrial relations council 
 
The following section briefly summarises the issues examined above. The IRC is, to all 
intents and purposes, a quasi-political/administrative oversight entity. It is constituted as 
follows. The minister appoints members for government, for employers in consultation with 
the National Advisory Council on Labour (NACL) and for employees after consultation with 
their representatives on the NACL. The IRC’s role is to advise on the qualifications and 
appointment of judges, assessors, the director of the DDPR, conciliators and arbitrators; to 
make relevant rules and recommendations on codes and fees for conciliation staff; to make 
general improvements to dispute prevention and resolution; and to prepare annual reports for 
the NACL and the minister. 
 
In composition, the IRC is more like the National Employment, Manpower and Incomes 
Council of Botswana (BOCCIM) now known as Business Botswana, The functions of the 
IRC are more like those of the Labour Advisory Board in Botswana. The NACL has little 
functional relevance even though it has a higher status than the IRC. As said, the IRC is an 
advisory body. It is therefore not charged with hearing and, resolving disputes. 
 
                                                          
493 See Attorney General v Lesotho Teachers Trade Union and Others (C of A) 1991–1996 (1) LLR 16 at 25. 
See also Lerotholi Polytechnic and Another v Lisene LAC/CIV/05/2009.  
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7.7.2.3     The Directorate of Dispute Prevention and Resolution (DDPR) 
 
The DDPR is regarded as a juristic person, independent of government, political parties and 
other social partners (s 46B). It is intended to house conciliators and arbitrators who are 
appointed by the minister on the advice of the Industrial Relations Council, the Minister of 
Finance for the financing of its activities through parliamentary votes. It is similar to the 
provisions of the Trade Disputes Act in Botswana. There, a panel of conciliators, mediators 
and arbitrators established by the minister are under the overall control and supervision of the 
Commissioner of Labour.494 
. 
The core functions of the DDPR in Lesotho are the prevention and resolution of trade 
disputes through alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, including arbitration, advice to 
employers and employees, statistical and educational data creation, and dissemination. 
Essentially, it is the forum of first instance. It ensures that no dispute reaches the Labour 
Court without its intervention. It concentrates on disputes as categorised below.  
 
a) Disputes of interest 
The Labour Code Order defines such a dispute as a trade dispute concerning a matter of 
mutual interest to employees.  Section 225 places the responsibility for settling such disputes 
on the DDPR with the following conditions: 
1. The dispute must be referred to the DDPR in writing, with proof that all parties have 
been duly served with copies. The director shall then appoint a conciliator to settle the dispute 
within a 30 day period. 
2. If the dispute is resolved, the conciliator shall issue a report signed by all the parties. 
3. In the event of a failure to conciliate within the 30 day period, the conciliator shall 
issue a report so that the dispute can then be referred for arbitration, subject to the consent of 
all the parties, or, where they fall within the essential services categorization, in terms of s 
232(1). Although it is advisable to issue the report in the presence of the aggrieved party, 
unjustifiable absences may warrant the issuing of any report at the expiration of the statutory 
period. 
 
b) Disputes of right  
                                                          
494 Trade Disputes Act  [Cap 48:02] Part 11 (s 3) of Botswana 
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Disputes of right are defined as disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the 
Labour Code Order or any other labour law, or collective agreements, or contract of 
employment.  The Labour Code Order confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Labour Court for 
the adjudication and resolution of labour disputes. Section 226 provides that this jurisdiction 
comprises the following: 
1. the application or interpretation of the provisions of the Labour Code Order or any 
other labour law; 
2. unfair labour practices; 
 
7.7.3    Settlement of disputes of right in Lesotho 
 
Section 227 of the Labour Code Order provides that any party to a dispute of right may in 
writing refer such dispute to the DDPR once the issue is one of unfair dismissal within six 
months of such event. All other disputes must be referred within three years of such dispute 
arising, with the proviso that the DDPR may, on reasonable grounds, condone a late referral. 
The Act enjoins an arbitrator to first attempt to resolve the issue by conciliation before 
proceeding to arbitration.  
 
Secondly, even if the dispute may ultimately be referred to the Labour Court, there must be a 
demonstrated attempt to conciliate. Conciliation as a basic ADR process must precede 
arbitration and subsequent adjudication and settlement by the Labour Court system. This is 
conclusively mandatory with conciliation, mediation, and arbitration being dispute resolution 
roles apportioned to the same functionaries within the labour relations system.495 
 
7.7.4   Arbitration awards and the powers of the arbitrator in Lesotho 
 
The arbitrator or conciliator shall issue a reward in the event of a successful resolution of the 
dispute. In addition, he may postpone a hearing, dismiss a referral, or make  appropriate steps 
such as will give effect to a collective agreement, proper interpretation of relevant rules and 
applicable legislation so as  to actualise the Labour Code Order, reinstate or re-employ, and 
to prescribe compensation or award. The Director must provide written reasons 30 days after 
the award and enable the DDPR to serve copies on the parties and file the original with the 
                                                          
495 Section 227(2) to (5). 
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registrar of the Labour Court. He or she may issue final and binding awards enforceable by 
the Labour Court and vary or rescind an award on the grounds of error, ambiguity or a 
mistake common to the parties.496 In terms of s 228F, the Labour Appeal Court may entertain 
appeals against awards by the DDPR applied for 30 days after the award. 
 
While the job title differs, both the DDPR in Lesotho and the office of the Commissioner of 
Labour in Botswana perform essentially the same functions. The major difference, however, 
is the specific statutory roles expected of the DDPR in Lesotho. In Botswana, under the Trade 
Disputes Act, a panel of mediators and arbitrators is established whose membership, terms 
and conditions and tenure shall be determined by the minister. The panel is chaired by the 
Commissioner, who is empowered to direct and control the same.497 
 
In this regard, where the Commissioner apprehends or has reason to suspect the likelihood of 
a dispute, he or she may intervene by delegating a mediator to provide the disputing parties 
with advice and training in the design of in-house procedures for dispute prevention and 
resolution, the recognition of trade unions, the design and content of collective agreements, 
and codes and procedures for discipline and the termination of contracts of employment. 
 
By so doing, the Commissioner has diffused authority of a quasi-judicial nature for a civil 
servant, which includes determining which disputes should go through the preliminary 
processes of alternative dispute resolution. There are other statutory structural and procedural 
similarities and variations. In Botswana, a party to any trade dispute may refer the matter in 
the prescribed form to the Commissioner or a delegated labour officer within 30 days if the 
dispute concerns the termination of employment, with a copy served on all parties concerned. 
An illiterate employee must be assisted by the labour officer to put his or her grievances into 
writing. The Trade Disputes Act therefore does not specifically categorise such a dispute as 
only deserving of arbitration. However, the Act enjoins the Commissioner to investigate, or 
cause to be investigated, the substance of the dispute and set in motion the appropriate 
modalities for the resolution of the dispute. 
 
In fact, the Act provides that the Commissioner shall appoint a mediator to attempt to resolve 
the matter, using his or her discretion to determine the venue, time and date, and the details of 
                                                          
496 Section 228E. 
497 Section 2 of Part 11 of the TDA 15 of 2004. 
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the grievance as adduced in written form, and the modalities and the number of meetings 
within the 30 day period, subject to extensions as provided for by a collective agreement or 
inter-party consensus. That notwithstanding, the Commissioner may resort to direct 
arbitration where any part of the Act or the consensus of the parties so dictate.498 In the event 
that such mediation fails, the Commissioner may refer the dispute to arbitration or to the 
Industrial Court. 
 
There is no implication of automatic reference to either arbitration or to the Industrial Court. 
It follows therefore that the determination of the mediator must first be known and his or her 
decisions are subject to appeal to the Industrial Court. However, for this to happen, the 
mediator must first issue a certificate of failure to settle.499 
 
7.7.4.1    Arbitration awards and the powers of the arbitrator in Botswana 
 
In terms of s 9 of the Trade Disputes Act, the Commissioner shall refer a trade dispute to 
arbitration where the parties have so requested, where the parties are from an essential 
service, where the dispute is one of interest, and where the Industrial Court has so directed 
the Commissioner. Pursuant to this, the Commissioner shall consult with the parties, assign 
an arbitrator from the panel, determine the venue, date and time for the proceedings, and 
provide any relevant advice. The arbitration process also has a 30 day period, during which 
time all other dispute resolution methods could still be kept open. 
 
The important element is that the arbitrator makes an award for a specific period of time, so 
that such an award can be rescinded if necessary, as is the case in Lesotho. Ultimately the 
arbitrator makes a binding award that has the same force and effect as an order of the 
Industrial Court and shall be so enforced as a judgement order. Therefore, such arbitral 
awards may be appealed against in the Industrial Court.500 Finally, the Industrial Court 
President may, after consultation with the minister, publish rules for the conduct of 
arbitrations under the Trade Disputes Act outside the framework of the Arbitration Act as 
principal legislation. The implications of the provisions will be discussed in due course. 
 
                                                          
498 Sections 7 and 8 of the TDA. 
499 Section 8(7) and (11). 
500 Section 9(12) and (13). 
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7.7.5           Pertinent issues 
 
In Lesotho, workers have the right to form and join trade unions, except for civil servants 
known as ‘public officers’, such as members of the Police Force, the Defence Force, the 
National Security Service, and the Prisons Service.501 Public employees can form or join 
‘associations’ instead, whose role is limited to providing opinions when these are sought. The 
government had promised the ILO (CEACR) that the new Public Service Bill will guarantee 
the right of public workers to form and join any associations authorised to conduct collective 
bargaining. In simple terms therefore, the Labour Code has not categorically abolished or 
prohibited the formation of unions. This ought to indicate that typical union activities will not 
be circumscribed with other forms of regulatory measures. That said, reality might prove 
otherwise. 
 
For example, s 20 of the Public Services Act502 prohibits the right to strike in the public 
sector. The CEACR has emphasised that this is a violation of the respective ILO Conventions 
and has recommended that the prohibition be limited only to public servants who ‘exercise 
authority in the name of the State’. In addition to that, there are no compensatory guarantees, 
such as arbitration procedures, for those workers whose right to strike is prohibited. Finally, 
the law prohibits strikes in essential services, but the government has not yet listed which 
services are regarded as essential.503 
 
In Lesotho, civil servants are prohibited from joining trade unions.504 That being so, since 
they cannot join trade unions, they cannot strike as individuals. There are unlawful and lawful 
strikes. Preventing the lawful strike using accepted procedures leaves no choice but to take 
the unlawful road. In Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, lawful, protected strikes are 
virtually impossible.  
 
It has been suggested that, in Lesotho, there have been repeated violations of labour rights by 
enterprises in the Export Processing Zones, which has a major impact in turn on the prices of 
exports as production falls. These violations of trade union rights impede trade union 
activities and deprive millions of workers of a tool to achieve a fairer distribution of income 
                                                          
501 Constitution of Lesotho   1993. 
502 Section 20(2)   of the Public Service Act 1 of 2005. 
503 Lesotho Union of Bank Employees v Solicitor General and Others CTV/APN/30/83. 
504 Supra. 
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and an escape from poverty.505 The ratification by Lesotho of the ILO Convention on 
Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise No 98 of 1949 and the ILO 
Convention on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining No 87 do not appear to have 
had much impact. However, the levels of unionised workers remain low, representing some 2 
per cent of the national workforce, producing a combined membership for functioning trade 
unions of 25,070. 506 
 
Although the labour laws prohibit discrimination against unions, many employers are said to 
ignore this and deny union organisers access to industrial premises to recruit, discuss, 
organise or represent workers in disputes. Threats of dismissal are common, particularly in 
domestic industries, while the textile and apparel sector unions have reported that their 
members are treated unfairly in order to compel them to leave.507 
 
One of the tacitly endorsed areas of poor labour practices is the Export Processing Zones. 
Lesotho has eight export processing zones, which employ 44,000 workers and consist mainly 
of textile and pharmaceutical companies. In the export processing zones there are apparently 
a growing number of petitions, complaints and reports filed against the practices of textile 
employers from South Africa, Hong Kong and Taiwan, who ignore national legislation, pay 
wages below the statutory minimum,508 and make use of intimidation practices to prevent 
union membership, including the export sector. In Lesotho, the correlation between violations 
of workers’ rights and the existence of export processing zones demonstrates a clearly 
negative influence of international trade and investment on workers’ rights. This is not what 
the African Growth and Opportunities Act was intended to achieve. 
 
7.8  Conclusion  
  
The government of Lesotho needs to enable the proper exercise of trade union rights by 
lowering excessive requirements for union formation and registration, and by lowering the 
percentage of representativeness that grants a union collective bargaining rights. The 
promotion of collective bargaining instead of compulsory arbitration, and the taking of 
                                                          
505 Extracts from the 2009 Report for the World Trade Organization (WTO) Council ‘Review of Trade Policies 
of the Five Countries of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)’.  
506 Ibid. 
507 Ibid. 
508 Equal pay for equal work. (Employment and Equal Remuneration).  Convention No 111 (1958)   
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measures to ensure that collective agreements are applied are definitely more desirable. 
Lesotho, in particular, should grant civil servants the right to organise by ensuring that anti-
union discrimination provisions in its new Public Service Act are examined again, as in 
Botswana.  
 
In keeping with the historical antecedents, the state in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 
demonstrates a fixation with unionisation. Therefore, instead of loosening its grip on worker 
formations, the state appears to be devising methods of further restrictions. Ideally, the state 
and the government should simplify the procedural requirements for declaring a strike. 
Ideally, the state should also amend any anti-discrimination and equal remuneration 
legislation in order to bring it in line with the respective ILO Conventions, thus acceding to 
the CEACR’s requests. 
 
What is clear is that institutional structures have been established to improve employment 
relations and the atmosphere of work, thus allowing for peace and stability. This is the 
intention as captured in the preambles of the Bills preceding the formal amendments. It 
appears, however, that the multiplicity or plurality of structures claiming authority from the 
same sources creates serious confusion. The lines are blurred and institutions appear to be 
replicating each other’s functions. 
 
Such situations create anxiety and generate insecurity. For the state, the public sector wage 
bill will escalate. It becomes impossible for the workers to familiarise themselves with rules 
and procedures. Ultimately, distrust of the system can result in the internalisation of 
grievances. The price might be periodic episodes of explosive anger with its attendant 
consequences for both the employees and the employer. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Swaziland Perspective 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is the last of the inventory of institutionalised structures, their evolution, the 
legal frame work within which they operate, and the ground realities of labour dispute   
resolution and settlement. Chapter 7 examined Lesotho using this contextualised approach. In 
keeping with the structure of this study, an overview of the history of labour legislation in 
Swaziland prefaces the discussion in this chapter. This provides not only a historical setting 
but also a better understanding of Swaziland as it grapples with emerging trends, and the 
challenges and realities of labour dispute resolution. 
 
In many ways, the colonial situation in Swaziland mirrors the origins and evolution of labour 
legislation and relations in what was then Bechuanaland. During this period, the inclusion of 
Swaziland within the High Commission Territories (HCTs) was established in terms of the 
Swaziland Order-in-Council of June 1903. Swaziland had earlier been annexed in 1868 by 
the South African Republic.509 
 
Without any substantive administration either from the British or the Boers, the King used 
‘concessionairing’ as a trade-off for stability and security. The consequence of this was that 
the most viable areas of land were handed over to expatriates. These expatriates, while 
achieving freehold rights, created the impression of being tenant-beneficiaries of usufructs. 
These usufructs consisted of large tracts of Swazi land. The helplessness of the territory in the 
face of the Boers or ‘Free-Booters’ resulted in the Conventions of 1881 and 1884. By using 
these, both Britain and South Africa sought to reach a common ground for guaranteeing the 
safety of Swaziland, as was the case in Lesotho. 
 
The British went on to abdicate responsibility for Swaziland while South Africa considered 
itself inherently entitled to Swaziland. There was no proven justification for this entitlement, 
apart from access to rail, surveys, telegraphs, postal services for the mineral and sugar cane 
                                                          
509 Dundas & Ashton Problem Territories of Southern Africa: Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate, 
Swaziland South African Institute of International Affairs BNB 342 Government Archives, Gaborone (1952). 
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concessions, and, above all, access to the sea. The usurping of communally owned land was 
justified as returns on assistance allegedly given to the King of Swaziland. Thus, the fate and 
future of Swaziland came to depend on the changing fortunes of both South Africa and 
Britain, as epitomised in the outcome of the Anglo-Boer war. It is important to note that these 
developments were the precursors of modern Swazi labour relations. To this may be added 
property accumulation, whether by one individual, the King and the iNgwenyama, or the 
coalition of the traditional elite. For this study, all these factors are essential ingredients in 
modern labour disputes in Swaziland. 510 
 
8.2       The legal evolution of Swaziland 
 
In 1893, the Organic Proclamation conferred administrative and suzerain authority on South 
Africa with the consent of the Queen Regent (Ndlovukazi) of the Kingdom. In 1894, South 
Africa took complete control until her defeat in 1899. By 1903, the jurisdiction of the Crown 
over Swaziland had become established. Britain’s interest was essentially to protect British 
economic investments from ‘uncivilised’ conditions.511 Though all the HCTs were 
administered externally from the HCTs’ seat of government in the Cape Colony, the 
difference was essentially the dual nature of internal governance in Swaziland. This was 
occasioned by the large expatriate, white economic class.  
 
This white economic class realised that, in order to sustain the status quo, it had to enter a 
coalition with the traditional elite. The genesis of Swaziland’s labour laws thus lay in the 
perceived need to contain and accommodate socio-economic changes. These were perceived 
as likely to flow from the economic disparities that expropriation would produce. 
Subsequently, what was being pre-empted did occur and is still taking place. 
 
The Concessions Partition Proclamation of 1907 gave indications about the intent of colonial 
administrative policy. From 1909 to 1914, a moratorium was placed on the expulsion of 
natives from the concessions. After this period, the terms of tenancy were privately 
negotiated between landless peasants and their new economic masters.512 This was the 
                                                          
510 See s 211 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Swaziland Act (2005). Land is vested in the King and the 
iNgwenyama in trust for the people of Swaziland. The royal family are not subject to taxation for any property 
they may acquire, whether fixed, real or movable, private or public.  
511 Ibid. 
512 BNB 449, National Archives, Gaborone, Botswana. 
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colonial administration’s way of solving the land problem by transferring responsibility to a 
settler community that would require the coercive presence of the state to sustain its hold on 
the land. The landless native Swazis became aggrieved about the loss of their birthright and 
their link with the ancestors.  
 
Most particularly, the loss of a sense of identity caused by land expropriation had a traumatic 
effect on the natives. It also rocked the economic, political and social foundations of 
Swaziland, leaving long-term consequences. Ultimately, in 1913, Proclamation 24 resulted in 
the outright removal of natives from the farms. They could do nothing because they had not 
negotiated any forms of tenure with the expatriate owners of the concessions. They became 
dislocated, landless and homeless in an environment that had until then ensured communal 
subsistence agriculture. 
 
The Swaziland Native Administration (Consolidation) Proclamation 79 was passed in 1950 to 
curb the powers of chiefs and to create agencies of local government through the Swazi 
National Council or Sibaya, which formed the highest policy and advisory council of the 
Libandhla system. Thus the King also became the Paramount Chief of Chiefs charged with 
effecting indirect rule. The King cautioned against the unleashing of ‘too forceful winds of 
change’.  He then proposed a race-federation amounting to a coalition of the aristocratic elite, 
white settlers and South African support, which would effectively entrench a dual legal and 
socio-political system. 
 
 This was similar to but without the privations of an all-out apartheid system.513 In 1962, in 
reaction to simmering racial tensions, the Race Relations Proclamation was passed. Affairs 
took a dramatic turn at this point with the formation in 1962 of the Mbandzeni National 
Convention (MNC). Its purpose was to form a single, national, territorial and organised 
labour centre under the King, in order to pre-empt the formation of unions. In 1966, Sobhuza 
was finally recognised as King with full rights of internal self-rule.514 
 
8.2.1    The legal framework  
 
                                                          
513 Ibid. 
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The Removal of Natives from the Concessions Proclamation of 1913 indicated without any 
doubt the kind of protectorate envisaged for Swaziland. Five hundred concessionaires had 
been identified as forming the core of the landed aristocracy. Of these, 60 per cent resided in 
Swaziland as the white capitalist segment of the society.515 In essence, by 1960, Swaziland 
had become a territory where 40 per cent of landowners were absentee landlords and 
‘weekenders’. They were a collection of white and Boer farmers who were chronically averse 
to change and who described both politicians and unions as ‘communists’, ‘demagogic’ and 
‘power-grasping’.516  
 
In terms of the Special Levy Proclamation 7 of 1947, native males were forced to pay a levy 
of 20 shillings. In a hitherto non-capitalist community, which depended largely on 
subsistence farming and barter, this levy contributed to the externalisation of labour. This in 
turn caused the dislocation of families as the males were herded into the mines in South 
Africa.517 The regime of laws was for the most part the same for the three HCTs, which had 
identical judicial systems. These were later headed by a HCT Court of Appeal established by 
an Order-in-Council in 1955. It is important to remember that although judges, in theory, do 
not make law, by merely expounding on the unknown, they turn it into law and thus impact 
on its shape and form. They are therefore equally instrumental in the evolution of the legal 
framework and its impact on the community.518  
 
The Swaziland African Labour Proclamation 45 of 1954 was intended to consolidate and 
amend the law relating to the recruitment of African workers and their contracts of 
employment. While para 2 defined ‘contract’ contextually as service by a manual worker, the 
Proclamation also provided for labour agents and runners. The Proclamation also defined 
‘worker’ as specifically an African, and by implication excluded natives from the purview of 
the common-law notions of contract. It constructed a special contract status for natives, 
subject only to changes by the Resident Commissioner. The following Acts were also 
included in this regime: the Aliens Act, the Employment of Women and Children Act In, 
Incitement of Natives To Rebellion Proclamation (1899), the Maintenance of Peace Act 
                                                          
515 BNB 342 at 66. 
516 BNB 449 at 197. 
517 Swaziland Special Levy Proclamation 7 of 1947. The levy was imposed on all able-bodied males.  The 
policy resulted in the externalization of labour in the mines of South Africa BNB 1121 Government Archive, 
Gaborone. 
518 Denning ‘The Changing Law’ (1958) 2 Journal of African Law 7. Op. cit. 
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(1907), the Master and Servants Act (1925), the Native Administration (Consolidation) Acts 
(1941, 1950), the Native Labour Contracts of Employment Act (1942), the Trade Unions and 
Trade Disputes Act (1942), the Workmen’s Compensation Act (1949), and the Works and 
Machinery Act (1934). 
 
Through these legislative mechanisms, the HCTs became labour reserves for the sugar 
plantations and mines in South Africa and Swaziland. This state of affairs produced the first 
indigenous labour agitation in the form of a strike in the Havelock Asbestos Mine in 1948.  
The Swaziland Mining Workers Union was established and became operational in 1962, with 
the next two years witnessing a spate of labour unrests, arrests, trials and imprisonment. In 
the course of the evolution of labour legislation, the ILO Committee on the Application of 
Conventions had indicated that out of 102 Conventions, only six were remotely relevant and 
could be applied with modification in the HCTs. Given this situation, a Trade Unions Act 
was at best theoretical and academic. What was needed was training for artisans and semi-
skilled workers for the future, via the ILO African Field Services office. However, some 
initial steps had been taken, such as the repeal of penal provisions for breach of contract by 
minors below the age of 18 years.   
 
The strategy of the colonial government was to impose a dragnet of specific legislation 
designed to weaken all spheres of native political and economic effort. Superimposed upon 
this were the ineffectual, all-embracing benchmarks for dependent territories by the ILO, 
which were neither contested nor actively implemented. The reasons were both regulatory 
and strategic. This explains why, for example, the Catchpole Report of 1960 glossed over the 
deprivation and slave labour under which natives were engaged.519 
 
8.3    Labour legislation 
 
Swaziland is governed as a sort of modernised traditional monarchy. The King embodies 
legislative, judicial and executive powers. The legal system is a dualist mixture of unwritten 
law and custom with enacted laws and administrative agencies created by a partially elected 
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Parliament.520 Since the 1968 Constitution was abolished in 1973, the constitutional source 
and guarantee of freedom of association also ceased to exist. The King has the power to issue 
decrees that have the effect of overriding both parliament and the judiciary. The only means 
of political expression of opinion is via the semi-elected parliament and the Tinkhundla 
system of village-level meetings of a non-partisan nature.521The history and political 
economy of Swaziland shows early settler penetration and a subsequent calculated and 
carefully planned strategy of land deprivation and surplus extraction. The result has been the 
almost total reliance on any form of wage labour both internally and externally.  
 
By 1960, capitalist expansion and the externalisation of labour through repressive taxation 
and the externalisation of male labour power to South Africa resulted in a shortage of labour 
for the domestic market. Thus the need arose for some form of improvement in labour 
conditions for inducement and retention purposes. These included marginal increases in 
wages and the provision of food and transport to workers. Between 1960 and 1980, events 
had created a situation that called for a different outlook on labour issues. First, the incipient 
agitation and gradual unionisation of workers in reaction to working conditions and 
suppression exploded into the strikes of 1963. The state reacted with fear and called for 
external assistance to quell the strike. 
 
For the state, trade unions became synonymous with a dangerous and virulent foreign 
ideology. This perceived threat culminated in the abolition of the Constitution in 1973.  
Unfortunately, this was not enough to contain what had been festering since the 
expropriation. In addition, the labour situation in the sub-region had been creating its own 
dynamics and momentum. Given that Swaziland was a satellite economy of South Africa, 
certain reforms became inevitable as the changes in work and labour philosophy were 
transported into Swaziland from the South African labour law environment. However, by 
1976, Swaziland had ratified 16 ILO conventions, including those on freedom of association 
(Convention 87) and the right to organise and bargain collectively (Convention 98). In 1980, 
the first Industrial Relations Act was passed, together with the Employment Act, and 
immediately resulted in a storm of protest.  
 
                                                          
520 The King and iNgwenyama decreed a parliament of not more than 60 elected representatives based on 
provincial election through the Tinkundla system of provincial demarcations, deriving largely from chiefdoms 
under an executive committee called the Bucopho, and 10 representatives nominated by the King. 
521 US Department of State Swaziland: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (2001) at 1. 
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The protest was a result of the fact that the Act embodied repressive powers that formed an 
arsenal of restrictions on individual freedoms in the Kingdom. In 1989, the government 
resolved to seek the assistance of the ILO in the revision of the Industrial Relations Act. A 
draft statute was submitted by the ILO in 1991 and was promptly rejected by both the 
Swaziland Federation of Employers and the government.522 The Wiehahn Commission was 
appointed in 1992 to enquire into industrial relations in Swaziland, and was assisted by two 
assessors representing the Federation of Employers and the Swaziland Federation of Trade 
Unions (SFTU). The report indicated that the Industrial Relations Act was not in itself 
unacceptable and inadequate, but needed certain amendments to meet ILO standards. The 
Commission report submitted in November 1993 was not endorsed by the SFTU 
representative as it did not reflect the core concerns of the unions. These concerns became the 
26 demands that subsequently formed the platform for further agitation after they were 
submitted to the government in October 1993. 
 
In 1994, the government expressed its intention to amend relevant legislation, including the 
1980 Act. A draft Bill was tabled in 1995 which, to some extent, addressed some of the 26 
concerns. However, the Bill introduced a number of restrictions on trade union rights, 
particularly the rights of federations to engage in legitimate trade union activities. Prior to the 
enactment of the Bill, a tripartite forum was convened to provide a protocol on the Bill. This 
forum produced 65 proposed amendments in its protocol, of which 62 were generally and 
unanimously approved. 
 
However, the Bill was introduced without the contents of the protocol being included. The 
Bill was rushed through and assented to on 20 January 1996 in anticipation of a national 
strike that had been called for 22 January 1996. The new Act prohibited mass abstentions and 
strikes called by unions while hearings were pending. Therefore, the participants in the strike 
action became offenders under the new Act. A joint negotiating forum was established in 
February 1996 to itemise and segregate the concerns of the SFTU into three categories: 
constitutional, legislative and industrial relations.523 The legislative aspects of the 26 itemised 
concerns and the tripartite protocol were submitted to the Labour Advisory Board, which 
subsequently submitted them to the minister responsible in March 1996. 
                                                          
522 See Case No 1884 of ILO Governing Body Interim Report at 22. 
523 Ibid. 
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8.4      Application of labour laws in Swaziland 
 
A new Industrial Relations Act was enacted in 2000. The Act provided for the Industrial 
Court, the Labour Advisory Board and the Conciliation Board. The Act underwent further 
amendments in November and was then approved by the ILO’s Committee of Experts. It is 
also important to add that the Employment Act of 1980 was repealed and replaced by the 
Employment Act of 2001 in order to harmonise employment law and the Industrial Relations 
Act. The Industrial Relations Act permits employees other than those in essential services to 
participate in peaceful strikes or protest action to promote their socio-economic interests. The 
Act also makes an important exception to the generality of strike regulation in Botswana and 
Lesotho.  
 
The Industrial Court in Botswana adopts an attitude that interprets strike action as an 
individual decision to absent oneself from work. However, the Industrial Relations Act 
stipulates that where an employee goes on strike or has been subjected to a lockout, he or she 
should be re-employed in his or her post, provided that he or she returns two days after the 
end of the strike.524 The Act also retains the provisions regarding the Industrial Court and the 
Labour Advisory Board. Under the Act, unions are free to draw up their own constitutions 
within the framework laid down regarding the core issues that must be covered. These 
include the election of officers by secret ballot. Where a union loses its legal status, this may 
be reinstated once the Commissioner of Labour is satisfied that all legal requirements have 
been met. The Act stipulates procedures for dispute resolution by defining legal and illegal 
strikes, and shortens the notice period from 21 to 14 days prior to a protest action. 
 
Though these provisions appear to be the outcome of tripartite discussion, the government 
seems desirous of testing how far their practical and jurisprudential limitations could be 
stretched. One of these tests was to see the reaction of workers and the courts to a completely 
unexpected request. 
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The Swaziland Government v The Swaziland Federation of Trade Unions and the 
Swaziland Federation of Labour525 is a case in point. The government filed an 
application seeking an order to: 
1) declare the protest action called in terms of notices of 2 December 2002 to be 
unlawful; 
2) interdict and restrain the respondents from supporting or participating in the 
aforesaid action on 23 and 24 January 2003; 
3) interdict and restrain the respondents from any conduct in furtherance of the said 
protest action; 
4) interdict and restrain the respondents from calling their affiliates and members to 
participate or otherwise be involved in the said protest action; and 
5) declare that any person or organization or federation that took part in the protest 
action of 19 and 20 December 2002 and intended to take part in the protest action 
scheduled for 23 and 24 January 2003 would not enjoy the protection conferred by 
the Industrial Relations Act. 
 
In their answering affidavit, the respondents raised the following points in limine: 
1) The applicant was abusing the judicial process as the matter was substantially 
the same as Case No 347/02, which was dismissed with costs. The matter was 
therefore res judicata. 
2) The applicant’s attorneys had no legal rights as they were not duly registered 
in terms of s 30 of the Legal Practitioners’ Act 5 of 1954. 
3) The grounds for interdiction were not justified as contemplated by s 40 of the 
Industrial relations Act, which had been fully complied with. 
4) He who comes to equity must do so with clean hands, which was not the case 
here. 
 
In its ruling of 1 January 2003, the court held as follows: 
1) The applicant was not in contempt of the court by issuing a statement read by 
the prime minister. In any case, the respondents had not filed any affidavit nor 
attested to the contempt so that the court could advise itself. 
                                                          
525 Case No IC 349/02. 
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2) The social and economic relevance of the two matters in contention fell within 
the ambit of s 40 of the Industrial Relations Act. These concerned the 
conscious assault on the rule of law by the state and the misuse of taxpayers’ 
money to purchase an extravagant jet in these lean times. There was thus no 
merit in an application for an interdict. 
3) The issue of the legal right of attorneys was dismissed as the state’s legal 
representative was the Attorney-General. 
 
The Industrial Relations Act provides for the compulsory resolution of trade disputes by the 
Labour Advisory Board. Therefore, no protest action is legal until all prescribed avenues 
have been exhausted and a secret ballot conducted regarding the contemplated action. For this 
purpose, a strike is understood to mean a complete or partial stoppage of work or slow-down 
of work carried out in concert by two or more employees, or any other concerted action 
designed to restrict output and thus to induce the employer to accede to a demand or abandon 
the modification of the said demand. Strikes are expressly prohibited in ‘essential’ services, 
which include the police, security forces, correctional services, fire-fighting bodies, health 
services and other key civil service sectors. 
 
The Act recognises the right to organise and collectively bargain and prohibits closed shops.  
An employer may therefore recognise a union in terms of associational and other rights only 
if it is representative of 50 per cent of its employees, although this appears to be 
negotiable.526 Once accorded the recognition, the union acquires the right to conduct its 
activities during company time and on company premises. What is significant is that although 
the threshold is far in excess of the usual one-third, the law allows collective agreements 
flowing from such union and employer interaction to be registered with the Industrial Court 
according to the requirements. The Act permits workers’ councils in enterprises having 25 or 
more employees, but not representative unions.  
 
The following South African cases are illustrative. In SACCAWU v The Hub,527 the union had 
claimed organisational rights under the South African Labour Relations Act because it 
represented 41 per cent of the employees in all the 12 outlets together, and more than 30 per 
cent of the employees in seven of the 12 outlets. In the other five outlets, it represented less 
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than 30 per cent. The employer had conceded at arbitration that it gave the union rights and 
access to check-off subscriptions from all outlets. In demanding access to the workplace, the 
union argued that ‘premises and workplace’ referred to the company in its totality. The 
Commissioner concurred that the union was thus the only union and had been given rights by 
the employer. It therefore qualified as a representative union and 30 per cent was a fair 
‘representativity’ threshold. 
 
In OCGAWU v Total SA (Pty) Ltd,528 the analytical approach was similar, but the 
Commissioner took a different view when the union attempted to fragment the workplace in 
order to claim access, stop-order and leave rights. The Commissioner found that when 
integrated into the 38 centrally co-ordinated depots, the union had only 2.5 per cent 
representation of the national workforce, and this was too low to render meaningful the right 
to join a union.    
 
Such progressive changes are occurring and ought to be a very persuasive argument for a 
change in the intention and interpretation of labour legislation in Swaziland, and perhaps in 
the other two countries too. The social partners of the government, specifically the SFTU, 
have been of the opinion that the 26 concerns are still relevant and therefore stand. However, 
the issue goes beyond the recognition, redress and containment of shop floor issues. What 
one sees is a claim to a multidimensional role that trade unions such as those in Botswana and 
Swaziland feel they ought to assume. These would appear to include a social voice and a 
social policy role, given the socio-economic and political contexts in which they function. 
The relationship between social protest, the concerted stoppage of work and the employment 
contract appears inherent, embedded and replays itself at the level of legislation and policy 
formulation. This is evident in the state’s camouflage of its proprietorial interests. This is 
often conducted through the mechanism of legislation, using political and administrative 
agencies. 
 
This is amply demonstrated in the case of Swaziland Government v SFTU and SFL,529 which 
is discussed below. On 18 December 2002 the government brought an urgent application in 
the night for an order regarding a protest action planned for the next day, 19 December 2002. 
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The government sought the following from actions from the court. These are divided into two 
bundles of issues, A and B:  
A 
1) To set aside the court rules and deal with the matter as one of urgency. 
2) Pending the outcome of the application, no matter how long it took, to 
interdict and restrain the respondents and their affiliates and members from 
embarking on, promoting, encouraging, supporting or participating in the 
protest action called for 19 December 2002. (emphasis mine)  
3) To re-schedule the said action and notify the members accordingly. 
4) That the said application as per the founding affidavit of the Minister for 
Enterprises and Employment should operate. 
B 
1) To finalize the order in A above. 
2) That an order be granted declaring the strike contrary to s 40(10) of the Industrial 
Relations Act and s 29(1)(w) of the Act regarding union constitutions. 
3) That the affected unions and their members be rendered liable to prosecution. 
4) That a deadline time limit of 9.00 am on 19 December 2002 be set for opposing 
the application to the court by the Government 
5) That service of the answering affidavit be set for 12 noon on 19 December 2002. 
 
The hearing commenced at 9.00 pm on 18 December 2002 with only the designated Court 
President in attendance.  Though s 6(6) read with s 6(7) of the Act required the prior 
agreement of the parties for the judge to sit alone, the objections were overruled in 
accordance with rule 9(1)(e) of the Industrial Court Rules of 1984 regarding extraordinary 
circumstances. The respondents also objected to the application as being a matter of urgency 
as no certificate of urgency was annexed explaining the averment of urgency. The application 
by the state was dismissed with costs.  
 
In doing so, the court made a very resounding pronouncement that had (and hopefully still 
has) far-reaching implications for labour law in Swaziland. These are summarised as follows: 
1) Regarding the issue of urgency, the court found that precedent from both the 
High Court and Appeal Court of Swaziland have held that the practice of 
annexing certificates of urgency is mandatory. This is regardless of the fact 
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that an Industrial Court, as a court of equity, may dispense with rules of 
procedure and evidence if this will not result in injustice. It held further  
2) That the applicant had rushed to court in the night under extremely 
inconvenient circumstances, but had nevertheless failed to show cause why it 
was justifiable to deprive the respondents of the opportunity to reply and state 
their case in the face of such serious allegations and. 
3) that affidavits of the applicant confirmed that it had been given notices via the 
Labour Advisory Board on 2 December 2002 advising of the intended action 
in terms of s 40 of the Act. Mediation had actually been attempted, leaving 
two unresolved issues: the purchase of the jet and the violations of the rule of 
law and 
4) that the  prerequisites for lawful protest action, although complicated, are set 
out in the Act and were met and 
5) that the respondents were lawful organizations in terms of the Act and were 
bona fide entities in terms of s 40(5) of the Act and had complied with all the 
necessary provisions. Further, the court noted  
6) that the founding affidavit was riddled with speculation by both the state and 
the Police Commissioner regarding potential violence arising from the protest 
action and  
7) that the applicant failed to act timeously after the notice to ascertain all the 
facts and could have given the respondents adequate time to file opposing 
papers if it had wanted to do so. The respondent had failed to establish the 
grounds for urgency and a prima facie right to the relief sought and finally  
8) that the issues of the extravagant purchase of a jet and the state violations of 
the rule of law fell within the ambit of s 40 as these touched on the very 
foundations of the Swazi nation and were therefore indeed social and 
economic in nature. 
 
Given the state of affairs in Swaziland, this was indeed a landmark ruling that seemed to 
polarise the society even further by forcing the courts to make pronouncements of a socio-
political and economic rather than purely jurisprudential nature. The Employment Act, ex 
facie at least, was intended, together with the Industrial Relations Act, to harmonise the law 
governing employment. The premise was to enact laws that would conform to minimum ILO 
standards. For this, the new Employment Act repealed the Employment Act of 1980. With 
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regard to this avowed aim, the employment Act could be described as similar to the 
Employment Act of Botswana. 
 
However, being more exhaustive than the Botswana law, it defines the employment contract 
as not just a contract of service but also of apprenticeship and traineeship, whether express or 
implied, written or oral. It also considers anyone who works for remuneration as an 
employee. The next issue then is dismissal. This study regards any dismissal as a disciplinary 
action and thus not voluntary. McIntyre v Hockin the court found that the dismissals were 
both wrongful and unlawful. Before reading out his ruling, the judge quoted a celebrated case 
as follows:  
 
[T]he causes which are sufficient to justify dismissal must vary with the nature of the 
employment and the circumstances of the case. Dismissal is an extreme measure and not to be 
resorted to for trifling causes. The fault must be something which a reasonable man could not 
have expected to overlook.530  
 
Based on the facts of the case, the employer was deemed at fault because no reasons were 
adduced for the dismissal, no natural justice was afforded the complainants regarding the 
validity of the grounds perceived as germane. Although notice of three months was given, 
there were still no reasons given. The employer had to pay damages plus interest of 10 per 
cent per annum from the judgment date. It appears that employers either do not know the 
ground rules imposed by the law or are enslaved by the ‘prerogative’ mind set. Similarly, in 
the case of Segolwane v Baletlwa the dismissal action was found to be both procedurally and 
substantively unlawful and unfair. Even though the complainant was just a herd boy, there no 
reasons adduced and no disciplinary inquiry.531  
 
Employment must be undertaken as a contract of service or under any other arrangement 
involving control by or sustained dependence on another person for the provision of work 
The meaning of ‘employer’ is expanded to include any agent, representative, foreman or 
manager of the person entering into a contract of employment with an employee.532 The place 
of employment shall be any place at or in which the employee works. The Act applies to all 
sectors of work except the Royal Swaziland Police Force, the Umbuto Swaziland Defence 
                                                          
530 McIntyre v Hockin   [1889] Ontario  CA per Maclennan  JA 
531 Segolwane v Baletlwa (1) BLR 3 (IC) 
532 Part I Section 2.   
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Force and Correctional Services, and no exceptions are permitted. These stipulations are 
contrary to and incompatible with the ILO Conventions in force in Swaziland. Section 6(3) 
provides that the Minister may exempt, subject to the publication of a notice in the Gazette 
and the consideration of objectives, any one worker or group or class of workers from the 
coverage of the Act.  
 
The Commissioner of Labour has sole responsibility for the administration of the Act, which 
is intended to achieve labour management and sound industrial relations. This study has 
already commented on this practice of clothing the state bureaucratic and administrative 
agencies with powers that result in rule-making, interpreting the rules and performing quasi-
judicial functions. The Employment Act is important because there is no specific provision 
excluding membership of unions. What exists is the exclusion of a class of employees and by 
extension their exclusion from membership of unions. The case of Swaziland Hotel and 
Catering Workers Union v Swaziland SPA Holdings Ltd533 is important precisely because it 
illustrates an attempt by the courts to examine statutory provisions that provide blanket 
authorisation for employers. This is an example of employers arbitrarily manipulating the law 
to exclude their more informed and articulate employees from union membership in the name 
of ‘management’. It also shows the divergence in relationships where the judiciary 
consciously supports the arbitrariness of a rule.534  
 
On the other hand, as in the case below, the court tried to apply jurisprudential objectivity. In 
this case, the issue was whether all posts by ‘management’ were beyond unionisation. 
Hassanali JA said, quoting Julius Stone in Social Dimensions of Law and Justice: 
 
The modern claim to freedom of association presents itself as essentially a claim of 
the individual to be permitted to establish relations with others of his own choosing,  
for the purpose of obtaining for the whole group, some special strength or advantage 
in the pursuit of a common end.535  
 
In this case, the union had negotiated to deadlock with the employer over whether all 
managerial, supervising and confidential staff should be excluded from union membership. In 
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534 Botswana Power Corporation Workers Union (BPCWU) v Botswana Power Corporation (BPC) Civil 
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his ruling, the presiding judge opined that a person in a managerial or supervisory position 
performs vital roles in carrying out management policy, including disciplinary matters, and is 
accountable to the management. Were such a person a union member, his or her acts may 
bring him or her into conflict with fellow union members. It is therefore necessary to draw a 
line between management and the managed. However, this division has to reflect the realities 
of each industry.536 
 
The honourable judge concluded that exclusions must be justifiable, looking at the job 
descriptions, the level and scope of supervision, and responsibilities in terms of the 
implementation of management policy. Thus, those in posts that could be open to union 
membership cannot have access to confidential, financial and organisational documents, 
records of employees’ financial affairs, recruitment, dismissal, transfer, promotion or powers 
or recommendation. In effect, formidable and ostensibly powerful posts with no real authority 
or actual powers and lacking in managerial and supervisory content cannot constitute 
management positions.  
 
In the light of the foregoing and within the context of the case, the following posts were 
declared to be outside ‘management’. Within that specific context therefore, all the following 
functionaries can form and join trade unions outside the confines of ‘management’- 
 unit maintenance manager, assistant estate manager, restaurant manager, assistant 
convention and banquet manager, assistant accountant, bookkeeper, internal auditor, 
assistant food and beverages manager, front office manager and executive 
housekeeper.537  
 
This court objectively addressed the rift such statutory provisions could cause, as was the 
case in Botswana. With reference to offences, s 15(1) of the Act provides that no person shall 
disclose, publish, communicate or otherwise make use of any information supplied by the 
employer. How this is interpreted in relation to access to and use of information for 
bargaining purposes remains to be seen. Section 18 makes the prescribed written particulars 
and the form mandatory for an agreement to constitute a written contract, and this must be 
issued no later than 60 days after the date of appointment.  
 
                                                          
536 Swaziland Hotel and Catering Workers Union v Swaziland SPAR Holdings Case No. IC 1/90 
537 Ibid 
220 
 
The position of the Commissioner of Labour is firmly woven into the labour law 
administrative fabric. He or she assumes responsibility for the administration of the Act. He 
or she has the powers of an inspector. An inspector is anyone appointed as deputy 
Commissioner of Labour, Assistant Commissioner, Principal Labour Officer, or Factories 
Inspector, those in similar or lower ranks within the public service, or anyone so designated 
in writing. He or she receives, investigates, and conciliates any issues arising out of an 
employer–employee relationship and advises both parties and government as necessary.  
Inspectors have powers of entry into any workplace and may, with the help of others such as 
police officers, apprehend, impound materials or detain and issue a compliance order. 
 
In effect, such quasi-judicial administrative functions that are intended to promote effective 
industrial relations could prove problematic unless and until a proper work ethic is forged 
within a productive atmosphere. It is only then that a framework can be nurtured to produce 
positive results. This problem applies in Botswana also. For example, as discussed earlier, 
some of the cases were dismissed because the Industrial Court lacked jurisdiction and the 
employee lacked locus standi, arising from the Commissioner of Labour not having complied 
with the strict provisions of s 6 of the Trade Disputes Act of Botswana. The issue of s 7 
certificates as a pre-condition for the Industrial Court to hear cases has at times allowed 
plaintiffs to outwit the Commissioner of Labour in court.538  
 
Significantly, the Employment Act provides for the security of employees in the event of the 
transfer of ongoing businesses or prior to take over. This conforms to ILO Convention 173 
which has recently been incorporated into the proposed Employment Amendment Act in 
Botswana. Sections 33 and 34 of the Swaziland Act deal extensively with the automatically 
fair and unfair termination of service in a similar way to ss 17 to 26 of the Employment Act 
of Botswana. 
 
These legislative developments point to the juridification of workers’ rights. The colonial era 
laid the basis for a fractured society. In such a society, law became an instrument of further 
polarisation and the coercive imposition of artificial stability. This chapter has examined the 
historical motives behind the reluctance of the traditional elite to democratise, namely, that 
this might create conditions for the resurrection of the land issue. In essence, therefore, the 
                                                          
538 D Magogodi v Grunwald Construction (Pty) Ltd Case No IC 148/86; see also James Limbo v Cresta 
Mowana Safari Lodge Case No IC 50/96. 
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evolution of Swaziland labour legislation has also been the evolution of the political economy 
and its dynamics over the years. Valuable lessons could be learnt.  
 
One lesson is a perceived incremental compliance with ILO benchmarks, together with 
restrictive domestic legislation in certain spheres. This serves a dual purpose: it keeps 
international pressure at bay while entrenching disparities that characterise the socio-
economic system in Swaziland. In Botswana, the key interpretive problem in some cases has 
worsened the lack of or confusion about the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. This has 
resulted in the absence of the employee’s locus standi because the Commissioner of Labour 
opted for a loose interpretation of the strict provisions of s 6 of the Trade Disputes Act. 
 
8.5       Perspectives on labour dispute resolution in Swaziland 
 
The Industrial Relations Amendment Act of 2000 set out to incorporate ‘certain international 
labour practices’. The Act established an Industrial Court, an Industrial Court of Appeal, a 
Labour Advisory Board, a Tripartite Commission on Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
(TCCMA), and an Essential Services Commission, in addition to the Office of the 
Commissioner of Labour and other structures for collective bargaining. 
 
The TCCMA is described as an Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism but is 
conjoined with the Commissioner of Labour in the execution of its mandate. Thus, trade 
disputes may be reported to either of them within 6 months of its emergence, and there may 
be no extension of time beyond 36 months from the inception of the dispute. Both the 
Commissioner and the TCCMA have extensive discretion in the investigation and referral of 
cases to the Industrial Court, except that conciliation must be initiated and settlement secured 
within 21 days (ss 62 to 66). In Swaziland, the latest Industrial Relations Act was 
incrementally achieved through the persistence of the ILO.  
 
The Industrial Relations Act provides for Joint Negotiation Councils (JNC) and collective 
agreements, works councils, employee and employer organisations and related issues, 
freedom of association, the right to organise and strike, and dispute resolution mechanisms. 
 
8.5.1   Arbitration and a code of practice (Industrial Relations Act) 
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The system of works councils provided for in s 52 confers the power of establishment only on 
the employer. The modalities for representation on works councils are not set out. Rather, 
works councils are empowered to negotiate terms and conditions for those who are not 
members of unions, like the bargaining council of the public sector workers in Botswana. 
This is inimical to the functions of trade unions and collective bargaining. It is more critical 
when young unions like the Botswana Public Employees Union (BOPEUP) are being 
encouraged to ignore workers’ federations such as Botswana Federation of Public Service 
Unions (BOFEPUSU) and to negotiate directly with the state. It remains to be seen whether 
these provisions and the accompanying anti-union attitude can, have and ever will be 
permitted to translate into a framework within which freedom of association, expression and 
assembly in their various forms at the national level can be realised.  
 
Given that the government is synonymous with the state, selective responsiveness, 
accompanied by the rigid, centralised control of all the levels of power, renders the goal of 
compliance with ILO standards merely academic. Given that there are reportedly no national 
minimum wages, that ratified conventions are constantly violated, and that abject working 
conditions exist, the decorous and superficial labour law superstructure belies the realities of 
the tensions between the state, the workers and even civil society. The labour law 
environments of both Botswana and Swaziland demonstrate not only institutional similarities 
but also functional and methodological commonalities. For example, while Botswana has 
three distinct Acts relating to labour law, Swaziland has only a comprehensively codified 
Industrial Relations Act, similar to that of Lesotho and Namibia. 
 
8.5.2      The Industrial Court 
 
Both the Industrial Relations Act of Swaziland and the Trade Disputes Act of Botswana 
provide for an Industrial Court composed of judges appointed in the same manner as High 
Court judges are appointed. The functions of the courts are essentially the same in both 
countries as the courts in both instances are expected to be courts of law and equity. The 
courts also have independent registrars. The jurisdiction of the court suggests an emphasis on 
matters arising from trade disputes and matters needing resolution in order to further good 
industrial relations. Decisions are subject to appeal to the Labour Court of Appeal. While 
Swaziland provides for an Industrial Court of Appeal Botswana does not. This provision 
should be replicated in Botswana as it is the trend in the Southern African sub-region 
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provided it jurisdiction can be clearly stipulated. Its value is that it engenders specialisation 
away from the over-arching demands on the normal civil justice system. Essentially such 
courts will regulate their own procedures and proceedings, which also becomes a 
distinguishing trait. 
 
Considering how the Industrial Court was initially left at the mercy of the established and 
constitutionally protected judiciary in Lesotho, a similar provision under the Industrial 
Relations Act needs attention. The Act provides that the Industrial Appeal Court will 
comprise judges qualified for appointment as Appeal Court judges. Despite that, the Act 
provides that ‘[a] decision or order of the Court or arbitrator shall, at the request of any 
interested party, be subject to review by the High Court on grounds permissible at common 
law.’539 Granted that the High Court has original jurisdiction over both civil and criminal 
matters, it would appear that, as in Lesotho, the Labour Appeal Court and the Industrial 
Appeal Court should be the direct and final forum   for labour cases. 
 
 The distinguishing features of the Labour Court should guarantee ready and inexpensive 
access to justice. It is therefore advisable to drop this notion of concurrent jurisdiction with 
the general courts that impute a questionable seniority and an inherent supervisory authority 
over the Labour Courts. This is also in spite of the fact that the Industrial Court judges are 
considered to be similarly qualified and competent. As has been noted, ‘the government has 
overruled or ignored the rulings of the Industrial Court on several occasions. These practices 
flout the principles of freedom of association, which require that workers have access to an 
independent court system characterised by an independent judiciary.’540 
 
The purpose of the Labour courts is mainly to interpret and oversee the implementation of 
labour laws so as to ensure good, effective industrial relations. Achieving this will require a 
rationalisation and harmonisation of the roles of all the other actors who may be both 
centrally and marginally connected to labour law and relations. The judicial framework, the 
philosophy and expectations are common to the Industrial Court system which makes them 
an attractive institution but this instrumentality must be used to enhance social justice. The 
Industrial Court as the court of first instance should be braced for issues that span the 
                                                          
539 Section 19(5) of the IRA. 
540 International Bar Association, Human Rights Institute Swaziland Law, Custom and Politics: Constitutional 
Crisis and the Breakdown in the Rule of Law (2003) 2–3. See Justice For All: The Struggle For Workers’ Rights 
in Swaziland American Centre For International Labour Solidarity, Solidarity Centre, Washington (2006). 
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spectrum of both individual and collective labour relations. This is with recognition of the 
fact that the Industrial Relations Act has established various structures for dispute resolution. 
There is the need to acknowledge the role of the Industrial Court system and the fact that the 
image of the court needs to be enhanced. Otherwise it may be perceived of as either an 
adjunct of the executive or an appendage of the judiciary. 
 
In the following case the Industrial Court enabled an aggrieved government employee to 
obtain her entitlements. Mdluli was a teacher who entered into an in-service training bonding 
agreement in terms of which the employer agreed under the in-service training scheme to 
cover the costs of her Bachelor of Education studies. Mdluli in turn undertook to return to her 
job to serve for at least two years. An agreement was signed with the employer. When she 
entered university, she discovered that the fees had not been paid in terms of the agreement. 
Upon enquiry, she was told that no such agreement had been concluded, and, if any such 
agreement did exist, that was an error.541  
 
She filed her claim under a certificate of urgency. On a close examination of the relevant 
papers, it transpired that every page had been signed by the responsible education officer. The 
court observed that when a person appends his signature to a document, it means he has 
agreed to be held accountable for the contents. The court therefore ordered that Mdluli be 
paid the university fees for the period under contract and all payments necessary and 
incidental to the bonding agreement, including her salary.   
 
In another case, the complainant, Ms Mkhonto, had been dismissed under unclear 
circumstances. The complainant was applying for an order under a certificate of urgency 
seeking to be reinstated to her post as the industrial relations manager.542 Ms Mkhonto had 
first been employed as an accounts clerk. She was, in recognition of her competence, 
promoted to the post of accountant and then to the position of industrial relations manager. 
Subsequently, she was dismissed on the grounds of redundancy. A restructuring exercise had 
taken place in terms of which some members of the board of directors were also either 
dismissed or had their positions renewed by the managing director. Ms Mkhonto instituted a 
complaint in the High Court against the Electricity Board for wrongful dismissal. The Chief 
                                                          
541 Martha Buyile v The Swaziland Government and The Attorney General Case No IC 304/2002 (23 January 
2003). 
542 Zodwa Mkhonto v Swaziland Electricity Board Case No 343/2002. 
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Justice reversed the supposed dismissals of the board members affected.543 The court found 
the managing director to be unreliable, more so because he had initiated the recruitment of 
staff for the very positions he then declared redundant. The court ruled in favour of the 
applicant. 
 
This was not be the first time that a ‘dismissal’ was effected under the guise of redundancy. It 
is submitted that dismissal is not the same as the termination of a contract of employment 
under normal circumstances. In this instance, even if the principle of ‘last in, first out’ had 
been applied, an industrial relations manager who rose through the ranks could not be 
considered redundant. Secondly, retrenchment does not connote dismissal as dismissal carries 
with it a punitive element. 
 
8.5.3     The Labour Advisory Board 
 
The Labour Code of Lesotho provides for a National Advisory Council of Labour. Both the 
Industrial Relations Act of Swaziland and the Employment Act of Botswana provide for the 
same named board. While the duties of the board are now essentially the same, Botswana 
was, until the May 2004 amendments, rather vague about the composition, meetings, rules 
and procedures, which are covered in detail in Swaziland Act. The latter Act includes the 
approximation of ILO Conventions and the preparation of reports and memoranda submitted 
according to the requirements of arts 19 and 22 of the ILO Constitution among the duties of 
the board. The board comprises 18 members: six senior government officials and six 
representatives each of employers and employees or their alternates, with the Commissioner 
or his deputy as chairperson. This may translate into 12 votes against six, leading to questions 
of legitimacy if and when worker representatives are outvoted, not forgetting the intimidating 
potential of this preponderance of state and employer representation.  
 
8.5.4     Tripartite Commission on Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (TCCMA) 
 
Though there is a nomenclature variation, these two organs, as they are referred to in 
Swaziland and Botswana, are charged with alternative dispute resolution prior to the referral 
of disputes to the Industrial Court. Both are established subject to the consultation of the 
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226 
 
Labour Advisory Board, which shall make recommendations, and membership shall consist 
of those so recommended to the Minister. The Commission in Swaziland receives trade 
dispute reports directly and is ‘standing’ rather than ‘ad hoc’ for this purpose. In Botswana, 
the Commissioner of Labour receives the reports and determines who is suitable to mediate 
or arbitrate, as the case may be, from a pool of full-time and part-time appointees. The 
Commissioner may intervene where he or she apprehends a dispute and may delegate the job 
of resolution to a panel member. The two Acts provide detailed procedures for effecting 
alternative dispute resolution which, in their letter and intent, do not differ, and also indicate a 
preference for compulsory, statutory dispute resolution of disputes. 
 
8.5.5      Joint Negotiation Councils (JNCs)  
 
In Swaziland, a JNC may be formed by an employer, employers’ organisations, or one or 
more registered trade unions, the purpose of which is to negotiate on behalf of employees and 
employers within an industry where the body considers itself sufficiently representative. 
Once the requirements for a JNC are satisfied, a notice is gazetted for the purpose of 
establishing a JNC is published.  Where the Commissioner under the Trade Disputes Act of 
Botswana refuses registration, the only recourse is to the Minister, whereas any aggrieved 
person under the Swazi JNC may refer the matter to the Industrial Court or to the TCCMA. 
As the JNC constitutes an important negotiating machinery from which collective agreements 
emanate and disputes of rights evolve, it is critical for the court to determine objectively the 
grounds for the non-establishment of a JNC rather than leave it to the political discretion of 
the Minister. 
 
The provisions of the Industrial Relations Act and the Trade Disputes Act of Botswana 
regarding dispute procedures, unlawful industrial action and the enforcement of collective 
labour agreements are not substantially different. Both the content and format are identical 
and reconcilable.  
 
8.6     Preliminary conclusion 
 
Structures such as an essential services commission in Swaziland and the detailed, crafted 
roles for mediators and arbitrators are commendable. In Botswana, recent events such as the 
widening the categories of essential services show that such a strategic organ is not likely to 
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be created any time soon. The list of essential services in Swaziland and Botswana has, until 
very recently, been essentially the same by industry or service. In view of the reasons 
adduced earlier, a body comprising equal numbers of representatives from the government, 
employers and employees is ideal for overseeing the broad range of issues concerning 
essential services. The situation in Swaziland is not the result of an absence of regulation. 
 
 In fact, as in Botswana and Lesotho, there are examples of juridification. Therefore, workers 
are overregulated and the work environment is over-administered. The major role player, the 
state, is also the major cause of disputes. The political will to erect solid structures for open 
democratic debate is lacking. The freedom given to worker formations regarding socio-
economic issues in s 40 of the Industrial Relations Act appears to be an irritant to the 
coalition of traditional authorities. The Swazi state prefers an incrementalist and cosmetic 
approach to the ILO minimum floor of rights. Perhaps this is reminiscent of the days when 
the King Sobhuza rejected the Constitution in 1973 as being too modern for Swaziland.  
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CHAPTER NINE 
Conclusion 
 
9.1 Synthesis and conclusions 
 
This study was structured in segments to underscore the discrete nature of the investigation. 
The study is an observation of labour law in action in three different countries. It is not a 
comparative exercise. The segmentation is intended to give prominence to the countries 
under observation. This structure is explained in chapter 1, which is the introductory part of 
the study. This is followed by a historical segment. The function of chapter 2 is to lend 
support and credence to the assertion that industrial disputes can occur only in an industrial 
environment. Such an environment must provide a context of master–servant or, preferably, 
an employer–employee relationship.  
 
The argument here is that because these countries were not practising cash economies, the 
source of the industrial, capitalised organisation of production introduced the disputes 
through the conscious choice of imposing alien legal systems, cultures and practices on 
communities hitherto bound by communal norms and practices. Further, these industrial 
arrangements emanated from an exploitative approach. This approach was often based on 
dispossession, compulsory labour and other forms of coercive authority without popular 
legitimisation. Such were the originators and incubators of latent anger and frustration 
currently encapsulated in the term ‘disputes’.  
 
Colonialism and its agencies were the genesis of disputes within the forms of socialisation 
effected at work. This is also because colonialist rule was repressive and generated mass 
dissatisfaction. This could have been deliberate or the result of acts of commission and 
omission. Essentially, by proceeding from a position of superiority, the colonial rulers sought 
to transform their subjects. Given that these countries were agrarian and subsistence 
communities, their transformation was traumatic. Secondly, the re-engineering of social 
organisation resulted in the dislocation and stratification of the people. The key factors here 
were taxation and the externalisation of labour providers, who were the able-bodied males. 
In chapter 3, the study examined the theoretical and philosophical premises, deductions and 
tested conclusions that must inform such an academic exercise. This chapter offered an 
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opportunity of coming to terms with the marriage between theory and practice. This is 
coupled with the fact that the chapter enabled exposure to ideas and informative debates that 
made the study enjoyable.  
 
Chapter 4 deals with the state as the dominant player in industrial relations because of its 
access to judicial and legislative authority. This is coupled with the administrative authority 
that reposes in its bureaucratic functionaries. As the state is largest employer, it makes sense 
to acquire all these trappings of power. However, their application must be guided by 
responsibility and accountability. The other problem is the effects on the ground when such a 
state is prone to restrictive legislation. In addition to this demonstrated tendency, the state 
may also exhibit contempt for and suspicion of labour formations. In such cases, the state 
installs itself not even as the primus inter pares but rather the de facto superordinate force 
that protects the status quo. In relation to all other social players, it becomes the custodian of 
institutionalised conduct through its control of the legislative machinery. 
 
Chapter 5 identifies the administrative adjunct of the state as the bureaucratic structures that 
are created to augment the pervasiveness and the dominance of the state ideologically, 
economically and also politically. The chapter asserts that this administrative adjunct is a 
self-seeking group on its own. In this chapter, therefore, some questions need to be answered 
with regard to the rationale, cost, efficiency and effect of these structures. The other issues 
are their arrogation of policy formulation and rule-making and their quasi-judicial character. 
Added to this is the relevance of their presence in the field. 
 
Such relevance can only be determined and tested once the goals and expectations are known 
and understood. For example, a structure such as the Directorate of Dispute Prevention and 
Resolution (DDPR) in Lesotho has as its key functions the diversion of disputants from the 
formal courts by providing mechanisms for alternative dispute resolution and the restricting 
of forum shopping. Ostensibly, the worker or plaintiff is compelled by law to seek such 
service for speedy, affordable and effective intervention in disputes. The concern therefore is 
the fact that the same complainants seek reviews of the DDPR’s actions from other forums. 
The question then is how effective such a structure has been. The chapter thus prepares the 
contextual environment and the background against which the effects of such a structure can 
be measured. 
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The structure of the study enables the countries to be discretely examined against the end 
goal of dispute resolution. In chapter 6, Botswana is studied. This study examines the internal 
dynamics and forces at work, and forms the general impression that the most contentious area 
of labour dispute is the active and interventionist role of the state in its entirety. The state 
demonstrates an orientation towards the marginalisation of other social players such as labour 
formations. Therefore, where co-option and accommodation appear inadequate, the state 
resorts to using legislation to command and regulate industrial relations and the collective 
strength of organised labour. There is no better testimony than the ongoing amendment of the 
Trade Disputes Act in Botswana.544 As clearly indicated, virtually all state employees have 
been included in the new categorisation of essential services. Strikes by such services are 
unambiguously prohibited.   
 
Chapter 7 deals with Lesotho. In this chapter, the confusing results of a multiplicity of 
agencies become clear. First, the labour court system had to go through a baptism of fire in its 
formative years as the formal courts sought to reduce it to an administrative tribunal.545 Then 
came the establishment of the many structures created to achieve the same objective. The 
dominant impression is a jurisdictional turf war, due largely to an imprecise allocation of 
functions. In effect, aggrieved and complaining workers led by their ill-informed 
representatives suffer largely from an inability to understand the idea of a forum of first 
instance. This is now compounded by confusion and the misinterpretation of enacted ground 
rules. It was equally portentous when the prime minister widened the list of essential services 
to include banking in 1982. This action was undertaken with retrospective effect from 1975, 
the year of enactment of the Essential Services Arbitration Act.546  
 
                                                          
544 Trade Disputes Bill 12 of 2015 (published in the Government Gazette on 22 June 2015). In Part VII,  a new 
list of essential services is enacted in s 46(1): Air Traffic Control Services, Botswana Vaccine Laboratory 
Services, Bank of Botswana, Diamond Sorting, Cutting and Selling Services, Electricity Services, Fire Services, 
Health Services, Operational and Maintenance Services of the Railways, Sewerage Services, Water Services, 
Veterinary Services in the Public Service Teaching Services, Government Broadcasting Services, Immigration 
and Custom Services and services necessary for the operation of any of the foregoing services. In s 46(2), the 
Minister, after consultation with the Board, by Statutory Instrument published in the Gazette declare any service 
not referred to in s 46(1) essential in the event the interruption of the service which, as a result of the duration of 
strike, endangers life, safety or health of the whole or part of the population. Section 47 proceeds to seal the fate 
of workers in those services by providing that ‘no employee in essential services shall take part in a strike and 
no employer in essential services shall take part in a lockout’. 
545 See Motaung v National University of Lesotho and Others Case No. CIV/APN/182/06; see also Lerotholi 
Polytechnic and Another v Lisene   Case No. LAC CIV/O5/2009 and   Minister of Labour and Employment and 
Others v Ts’euoa Case No. (CIV) 1/2008. (CA)    
546 Lesotho Union of Bank Employees (LUBE) v Barclays Bank Plc and Another Case No. CIV/APN/357/1994 
(11 June 2003). 
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The implications for labour relations and public administration are still being felt today.547 
From 1990, the numbers of miners in South Africa overall, and from Lesotho in particular, 
have fallen fairly rapidly. Total employment in South African mining reached a low in 2001 
at 406,000, before recovering a little. Now that the mines prefer South African workers, who 
can be more easily ‘stabilised’, migrants from Lesotho have been retrenched, so that by late 
2010 the number of mineworkers from Lesotho was estimated to be fewer than 43,000.548 
This suggests that internalised values and survival habits in industrial relations and labour 
law in South Africa will be trans-located in Lesotho. The consequences for Lesotho of the 
end of legal migration to work in the South African mines and the retrenchment of migrant 
workers have been devastating. The attendant socio-economic difficulties have been 
exacerbated by population growth, political instability, drought, continuing soil erosion, and 
the peculiarities of the country’s limited economic development.549 Now, the political 
violence and instability are bound to directly affect production relations. 
 
In chapter 8, Swaziland was examined. Swaziland is a victim of both external greed and its 
own affection for traditional norms and customary law. The land question underpins property 
ownership. The subsequent character of labour relations is determined by an environment 
based on engineered dispossession and dependence. This has forced worker formations to 
shift attention to socio-economic issues. The modalities for this may include strikes because 
the unions are denied by law a platform for open social interaction. However, given the 
current realities on the ground, industrial citizenship cannot co-exist with absolute 
monarchism clothed as neo-liberalism, where land is vested in the King and iNgwenyama.  
 
The best indicator is the latest edict from the King: ‘From yesterday, Swaziland no longer has 
any existing employer and employee federation after government stopped their operations 
with immediate effect.’550 According to the Observer, this effectively means that the Trade 
Union Congress of Swaziland, the Federation of the Swaziland Business Community, and the 
Federation of Swaziland Employers and Chamber of Commerce no longer exist. The minister 
went on to state that the decision also meant that the federations’ membership of statutory 
boards was being ‘terminated forthwith’ and that ‘their representation in other statutory 
                                                          
547 Cobbe ‘Lesotho: From Labor Reserve to Depopulating Periphery?’ Migration Research Initiatives 2 May 
2012. 
548 Ibid. 
549 Ibid. 
550 Swazi Observer Monday, 20 July 2015. 
232 
 
organs will also come to an end.’551 The minister was referring to the Conciliation, Mediation 
and Arbitration Commission, the Swaziland National Provident Fund, the Training and 
Localisation Committee, the National Social Dialogue Committee and the Labour Advisory 
Board.552   
 
9.2      Perspectives of the study 
 
In the   following sections, some particular and general comments are made prior to the 
conclusion. 
 
9.2.1           The historical linkages and commonalities 
 
In terms of the position earlier adopted in the study, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland have 
common legal antecedents. Incidentally, some traditional aristocratic tendencies have 
survived the era of overt traditional royalty. These are now clothed with a semblance of 
transformation and modernization. These pseudo - liberal political systems are tolerated only 
as a veneer and superstructure superimposed on embedded traditional belief and value 
systems. Compliance with edicts, now referred to as the law, has become the norm. 
 
In terms of path-dependence, there is a historical similarity between the three countries. From 
Tshekedi Khama to post-colonial Seretse Khama to Ian Khama, the common thread is royalty 
and its internalised value systems kept intact after colonialism. The systemic regimes of 
order, command and control relate to the era of orders and command of the colonial master. 
The same applies to the era of Chief Moshoeshoe to present-day King Letsie. In Swaziland, 
the dynastic nexus exists from King Sobhuza to King Mswati. This chain of dynastic political 
and socio-economic power has coalesced into an elitist expectation of full, docile compliance 
with regard to all forms of state authority. Sanctions were applied if people defaulted. Such a 
perception has defined current social relationships.  
 
The elitist reward system has survived and helps to define the nexus between the owners and 
the creators of that which is owned the servants. The relationship between servant and master 
is still defined in terms of the power holders and the objects of power. This relationship 
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informs the regulatory framework of labour legislation. As a result, social structures are 
created and institutionalised with patterns of pre-determined conduct that are erroneously 
perceived as contributions to social stability. The reality is actually strategic and instrumental 
compliance, which translates into legislating stability not legitimisation of legal rules. Such 
compliance is rewarded by the state through prescribed entitlements and economic benefits. 
 
9.2.2           The state and industrial relations 
 
In other words, culture and tradition have become fused with modern forms of the exercise of 
political authority without corresponding governance or reflexive rule-making. Transposed 
on modern social organisation, the coalition of the modern state and tradition enable the state 
as employer to preside over societies differentiated into the economically dependent and the 
owners of capital, property and access to resources. This is why the employee is considered 
inferior, subject to command and control. Therefore, concepts such as collective bargaining 
and strikes are irritants. In particular, the boldness of the servant or employee to demand 
better returns on the application of his or labour power is considered as insubordination and a 
challenge to the master’s or employer’s status quo.  
 
This perception of insubordination or disrespect explains the reluctance of the state to allow a 
complete re-conceptualisation of sovereignty. This subjective concept of local sovereignty is 
used to justify the denial of basic rights at work and the strict regulation of the internal labour 
market. Learning from history, the elite are suspicious, imagining a grand conspiracy by 
entities such as the ILO to substitute autocratic, undiluted power with social plurality, both 
inside and outside the workplace. The inevitable consequence is apparent and latent disputes 
which are generally transformed into collective grievances. To discourage such anti-
establishment conduct, individual labour law is used to specifically prohibit the group display 
of dissatisfaction. On this assumption also, the inadequacies of the state are projected onto 
unions as manipulators of collective disputes. In the context of employment relations, the 
strike then becomes the focal point of state intervention.  
 
It must be remembered that the individual cannot represent the conditions of the many. 
Therefore, disputes become a focus of undue attention because it is assumed that, invariably, 
trade unions acquire a collective and synergic force that can destabilise the structured 
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arrangements of society. In sum, both consciously and unconsciously, the state causes 
workplace disputes and, through its intransigence, triggers strikes. 
 
9.2.2.1     Botswana   
 
In Botswana, collective bargaining is allowed, provided that the union represents at least one-
third553 of the workforce. The minimum percentage of representation that enables collective 
bargaining is possible only in the public services, the mining and diamond sorting sectors, 
and, to a lesser extent, in the railway and banking sectors. The Trade Disputes Act vests 
authority in the Commissioner of Labour to ensure that employee unions follow the 
prescribed procedures, including compulsory arbitration. In recent years the government has 
used legislation to order strikers back to work, while private employers are reported to 
ridicule the unions and be hostile towards them, perhaps because they are assured of the 
state’s desire to neutralise labour formations.  
 
For a strike to be lawful, it must first deal with interest disputes and must then conform to the 
provisions in ss 40 to 42 of the Act. The procedures and conditions prescribed must be 
complied with. Since these processes are cumbersome and clumsy, strikes are ultimately 
declared illegal in virtually all cases. Striking workers are therefore at risk of dismissal, 
among other penalties. In 2004, Debswana (diamond mine) workers had to go to court for the 
settlement of their grievances. Similarly, 181 workers at the Bamangwato Concessions Ltd 
company (BCL) had to seek redress before the courts in 2006. In the latter case management 
preferred another union to the main trade union. It is alleged that, as a result, the workers 
went on an unprotected strike. This gave management the grounds for ‘massive’ 
dismissals.554 
 
In general, some employers are equally uninformed about the intricacies of the laws. 
Paradoxically, they then turn around to take advantage of this very absence of clear 
legislative provisions. In addition to dismissals, there have been other anti-union practices, 
including harassment and spying. There have also been threats and a refusal by employers to 
                                                          
553 Section 48 of Part XI of the Trade Unions and Employers Organizations Act [Cap 48:01]. See s 32 of the 
Trade Disputes Act [Cap 48:02]: Recognition at the workplace. 
554 This is an updated version of   extracts from the 2009 report for the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Council review of trade policies of the five countries of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).   
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pay union officials their salaries because they have been deployed to union headquarters to 
undertake officially permitted union activities.  
 
The registrar of unions has the power to de-register a union or to refuse to register a union if 
he or she deems its name or objects as being too similar to those already registered. However, 
an unwelcome development is the multiplicity of legal unions, which has resulted in the 
fragmentation of worker formations as each segment of public sector workers scrambles for 
registration and recognition. An equally worrying consequence is the feuding within the 
unions themselves and between the labour federations in both the public and private sectors, 
instead of these federations creating a confederation. It is submitted that this laxity is a 
strategic move by the state which wants the unions to dissipate their energies. 
 
9.2.2.2   Lesotho 
 
The exercise of collective bargaining meets particular difficulties in the education sector. For 
example, it has been alleged that the Lesotho Teachers’ Trade Union’s long-standing disputes 
have been left pending for as long as ten years in the High Court. Additionally, the Ministry 
of Labour prevented the teachers union from taking part in the work of the Commission in 
charge of setting wages, although the Commission is supposed to be a tripartite body.555 
Unions accuse the police of denying workers permission to celebrate May Day by holding a 
parade. The explanation is usually that such celebrations coincide with local government 
elections. 
 
The right to strike is recognised and such organised action, mostly in the private sector, can 
occur only after satisfying the complex procedures required to officially declare a strike. In 
practice, there have not been any lawful strikes in the country for many years. The few 
spontaneous protest actions have been technically defined as illegal, thus posing the threat of 
the dismissal of any worker who takes part.   
 
The law prohibits anti-union discrimination; however, many employers deny union 
organisers access to industrial premises to recruit, discuss, organise or represent workers in 
disputes. Threats of dismissal are common, particularly in domestic industries, while the 
                                                          
555 Ibid. 
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textile and apparel sector unions have reported that their members are treated unfairly in 
order to compel them to leave. In Lesotho civil servants are prohibited from joining trade 
unions. Furthermore, they may not participate in politics, speak in public, identify with any 
party, canvass, display or wear symbols, rosettes, chant or sing at any rally, or perform ‘any 
other act or conduct whatsoever of a public officer of which the public may reasonably be 
induced to associate or identify the officer with an organization or movement of a political 
character’.556  
 
As noted earlier, in Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland, legal strikes are virtually impossible. 
According to reports,   there have been repeated violations of labour rights by enterprises in 
export processing zones. These violations of trade union rights impede trade union activities 
and deprive millions of workers of a tool to achieve a fairer distribution of income and an 
escape from poverty.557 
 
In Lesotho, workers have the right to form and join trade unions, except for civil servants and 
the police. However, although the Lesotho Constitution guarantees freedom of association, 
public employees are prohibited from forming and joining trade unions. They can form or 
join ‘associations’ instead, whose role is limited to providing their opinion. The law allows 
unions to conduct their activities without interference. The Ministry reported that 40 unions 
were deregistered during 2006 and 2007 for failing to submit annual reports. The rights to 
freedom of assembly are generally respected, with some exceptions, such as the June 2007 
curfew, which lasted a week and featured military deployments and roadblocks in the capital, 
Maseru.558 Collective bargaining is recognised only for trade unions that meet the threshold 
of 50 per cent.559 
 
9.2.2.3   Swaziland 
 
A state of emergency introduced in 1973 suspended all constitutional freedoms until a 
Constitution was enacted in 2006, but this merely entrenched the political status quo in force 
since 1973. This vested executive, legislative and judicial powers in the King, while banning 
opposition parties and meetings. The new Constitution’s vague clause on ‘breaching state 
                                                          
556 Section 144 of the Public Service Regulations 2008 as pursuant to s 29 of the Public Service Act 1 of 2007. 
557 Report on SACU Countries op cit. 
558 Ibid. 
559 Section 198A (1) of the Labour Code Order: Duty to Bargain in Good Faith. 
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security’ can be interpreted broadly and subjectively. This is not to say it is unique to 
Swaziland. In Botswana and Lesotho, apart from constitutional provisions, individual 
legislation has been enacted to serve this same end and could be extended to cover other 
subjectively defined matters.560  
 
The Constitution and the law provide for the right to form and join trade unions. However, 
the requirements are tedious and exacting, as in Botswana and Lesotho. In order to be 
recognised, a trade union must represent at least 50 per cent of workers in the workplace, 
which is a high percentage. Otherwise, recognition is dependent on the employer’s goodwill. 
The new Constitution gave the employees in essential services the freedom to form unions, 
but they have no right to strike.561 Essential services include the fire brigade, the police and 
security forces, the health care sector and many civil service positions. The authorities may 
continue to refuse recognition to the Swaziland Police Association and the Swaziland 
Correctional Service Union.  
 
However, provision is made in s 27 for such associations to apply to the employer for 
recognition as a representative association. Additionally, union activity may not be 
effectively protected against employers’ interference. This could be because the unions find it 
difficult to satisfy the deliberately problematic requirements. The law may make provision 
for the protection of employees, as in the Employment Act.  However, the state is still the 
worst offender when it comes to concretising an internationally accepted fundamental floor of 
minimum rights, even if the laws protecting unions from governmental interference are cast 
in stone. 
 
It has been reported that employers’ interference with workers’ councils has contributed to 
the inability of some trade unions to negotiate collective agreements. Furthermore, there are 
reports that some employers dictate which decisions are taken in the workers’ councils. The 
law prohibits anti-union discrimination; however, private companies, especially foreign 
companies of the garment sector, continued to discriminate against unionists. Although the 
law provides for reinstatement and for fines against employers in the event of unfair 
                                                          
560 Public Order Act [Cap 22:02], Public Safety Act [Cap 22:03], National Security Act [Cap 23:01], among 
others. 
561 See ss 91 to 96 for comprehensive coverage. 
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dismissal, no such accusations were officially made.562 The Industrial Relations Act provides 
for strikes and lockouts during protected strikes. Section 40 deals with peaceful protest over 
socio-economic interests once the requirements are met. What is not clear is whether strikes 
are peaceful protests.  
 
If so, any protest that is peaceful should be lawful. In any case, union grievances are 
generally over economic or bread and butter issues. The procedures for voting for and 
announcing a strike may be complicated and may take a long time, but this is intended to 
accommodate a ‘cooling off’ period. Therefore lawful strikes are virtually impossible in 
Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho. It is alleged that the trade union leadership faces torture, 
including virtual drowning, to obtain information. In previous years union leaders were 
ordered to surrender their travel documents after attending meetings abroad.563 
 
It has been reported several times that the police and the Conciliation, Mediation and 
Arbitration Commission use employers, especially the management of foreign garment firms, 
to resist workers’ demands and thus sustain the inhumane conditions of work and low 
wages.564 The government has repeatedly failed to fulfil its promise to improve labour 
legislation based on the very many recommendations that the CEACR has made. The 
problem is the defectiveness in the philosophy and approach of the ILO. It espouses norms 
and morals, but lacks any coercive authority and expects states with entrenched socio-
economic and political interests to buckle under logic and persuasion.  
 
Although the core ILO Conventions in these areas have been ratified by Swaziland, there are 
serious violations of freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining in 
Swaziland and Lesotho. The state intrudes into unions’ activities by preferring to negotiate 
with certain unions over others. In Swaziland, violations are so serious and widespread that 
they certainly have a negative impact on wages and working conditions in every sector, 
including the export sector. As reported, 
 
                                                          
562 Ibid. 
563 Part of the updated version of   extracts from the 2009 report for the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Council review of trade policies of the five countries of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU).   
564 Ibid 
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‘In Lesotho and, to a lesser extent, Namibia, the correlation between violations of workers’ 
rights and the existence of export processing zones (EPZs) demonstrates a clearly negative 
influence of international trade and investment on workers’ rights.’565 
 
 It is therefore not the institutional structures created that are at fault but the perceived 
philosophy of the political state, shored up by the interest-driven bureaucratic elite. 
 
9.2.3           The institutional architecture 
 
The administrative and quasi-judicial capabilities of these structures have been addressed in 
this study. Their functions have been rigorously outlined and discussed. They will be 
identified again in this section, but as a collective machinery or framework. Included here are 
the most important structures in terms of current trends and reality: the Department of 
Labour, the Commissioner of Labour, the Industrial Court, the Labour Court, the Labour 
Appeal Court, the Industrial Court of Appeal, the Labour Advisory Board, the Minimum 
Wages Advisory Board, the Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration Commission, the Panel 
of Mediators and Arbitrators, the Director of Dispute Prevention and Resolution, the National 
Advisory Committee on Labour, and the Industrial Relations Council. 
 
9.2.4           Bureaucratic and administrative overkill 
 
This section presents points of observation and implied challenges.  
 
1. The most obvious issue is the sheer number of structures. This is remarkable because, 
if problems can be solved by the number of resources allocated to them, then 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland should not be experiencing an almost cyclical 
revolution of disputes. 
2.   There is a preponderance of human capital as opposed to other resources. However, 
the ground realities show that the majority of functionaries are either poorly trained or 
not trained at all. Given the government’s method of recruitment, most functionaries 
are generalist in outlook, and are expected to learn the ropes on the jobs that they are 
assigned to do. 
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3.   Labour issues are dynamic and reflect macro-level realities, such as a living wage, the 
cost of living, salary disparities, occupational health and safety, social security, 
industrial psychology, attrition, retrenchment and retention. These cannot be tackled 
by just any employee, whether classified as a labour officer or not.  
4.  One perspective is that purporting to make rules that touch on constitutional and 
fundamental human rights can only lead to juridification, not comprehension, 
applicability and relevance. 
5.    The spectrum of issues that arise in the workplace show that the workplace is a 
microcosm of the wider society.  
6.   An important issue is the orientation and attitudes of those attempting to intervene in 
labour disputes. Most functionaries forget that they are employees and not employers. 
Because of their varied backgrounds, they cannot have been trained in the details of 
labour law and employment relations. 
7.  In simple terms, therefore, those charged with preventing and resolving disputes 
easily turn out to be the causes of disputes and the delay in their resolution, and are 
agents of confusion as to substantive issues pertinent to their brief. 
8.  The state creates a multiplicity of structures in reaction to episodes in the employment 
relationship. It does not engage in long-term tripartite consultation as to policy 
direction which a law might then be enacted to support. 
9.  The institutionalised directions prescribed by the state to field officers should not 
create space for discretion because the performers lack the capacity and integrity to 
wield discretionary authority. 
10.  On the basis of the facts, the observation above applies across the wide range of these 
bureaucratic and administrative adjuncts, to ministers, labour court judges, directors 
and commissioners. For example, the question of whether a labour court is a court or 
an administrative tribunal should never have been allowed to arise. The creation of 
specific levels at which types of dispute may be resolved may have checked forum 
shopping, but cases still end up in the appeal court, suggesting that forcing the parties 
to go through conciliation and mediation before compulsory arbitration does not 
generate any more trust than the system conveys or portrays. Alternative dispute 
resolution should satisfy parties as an alternative step, not a preliminary step. Case 
management has not solved any problems either.  
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11.  The Commissioners of Labour are overloaded with both administrative and judicial 
authority, without any proper grounding in the substance of hard law, the normative 
basis of soft law, and the actual objectives of their authority. 
12.   The tendency to meet every challenge with new legislation and new structures is not 
only counter-productive, but also results in jockeying for more staff, more resources 
and more attention, budgetary considerations, the creation of bases for parochial 
power  and a reward system.   
13.   Essentially the tragedy is the inability of labour law to provide a framework for the 
practical deliberative resolution of disputes, because of the untenable assumption of a 
free market for transacting business between two equals: the potential buyer of labour 
power and the seller of labour power. 
14.   In all these matters, the political state prefers to maintain the status quo rather than 
meet the challenges of governance and accountable leadership. 
15.  Issues such as the imposition of wage ceilings and the arbitrary determination of 
essential services that underpin employment relations become pawns in the political 
game. Such a game is played according to the whims of the state, particularly de facto 
one-party states. 
 
9.2.5           Employer and employee relations 
 
At this point, an illustration from Botswana should suffice as an indicator of the scope of the 
problems created by workplace interruptions. 
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 Botswana Department of Labour and Social Security Annual Labour Report (2011) 7. 
 
It is reported that a total of 11,971 trade disputes were reported at District Labour Offices 
nation-wide during 2011. 940 cases were pending as at December 2010, and these were 
carried over to 2011. The total caseload for the reporting period was therefore 12,911.  
With regard to reported, settled and pending disputes, from 2003 to 2005 there was a decline 
in the number of reported disputes, while from 2006 to 2010 reported disputes increased. 
There was a significant decline in 2011, the year in which the latest and largest strike by 
public sector workers occurred. 
 
9.2.6           Recommendations and the challenges ahead 
 
This study regards recommendations as methods that can be used to achieve more effective 
ways of dispute prevention and resolution. In the previous section, this study did not 
apportion blame as this was not the aim of the exercise. That said, the key objective was to 
determine why labour disputes appear to have developed a resistance to the several 
approaches being adopted. The issue that needs attention is the modalities and mechanisms 
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for the resolution of disputes. It is doubtful that even if several procedures and stages are put 
in place, disputes will abate or subside. 
 
This study suggested that addressing the symptoms instead of the root causes cannot cure an 
ailment. Disputes are responses, reactions and manifestations. The causes may be historical 
or contemporary but man-made. This is because disputes started with man as a gregarious, 
social and greedy animal. Therefore, the problem lies with humanity at various levels of 
social organisation. The conceptualisation, transformation and creation of the interventionist 
mechanisms that have been dealt with in the study suggest that these interventions might even 
contribute to the exacerbation of disputes. This is the source of a lack of faith in the efficacy 
of a treatment. Therefore, this study makes the following proposals: 
 
Education and acculturation 
All who are concerned with labour issues, including the key actors in employment relations, 
need a different orientation to such relations. The workplace is not a theatre of war. Ideally, 
the state should stop thinking like an employer under siege. It should lead and initiate a new 
orientation. Such an orientation is needed to visualise the work environment as a place that is 
conducive to constructive participation in generating the resources for collective growth and 
the development of a society. 
 
Deconstruction and reconstruction 
Unions and employer associations should come to terms with two facts. The first is that 
disputes are inherent to any socialisation process. Secondly, employees should not have to 
use their leave days before engaging in genuine and lawful activities. There is a need to 
deconstruct the employment relationship so as to eliminate the over-emphasised distinction of 
the prerogative of the master–employer and the notion that the employer commands and the 
employee must obey. A new ethos must be constructed and nurtured where workers are 
respected and accorded recognition for their indispensable contributions and are also 
regarded as equal to the employer in terms of dignity. 
 
De-politicisation of the workplace and work relations 
Workers and employers should be free to engage amicably in the internal politics of the 
workplace. The ideological and political preoccupation of partisan politics should be 
prevented from defining work relations, economic concerns and the organisation of 
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production. Employers and employees should be free to regulate their own internal processes 
and relations, together with their terms and conditions of service. This should complement 
the house-keeping that is internally driven. The state should refrain from its persistent 
intrusion and interference as some of these interventions have turned out to be extremely 
damaging. 
 
Training and skills acquisition 
For the worker and those claiming management status, requisite skills acquisition should be a 
life-long activity to ensure proper socialisation, and ultimate marketability and versatility in 
the labour market. Such transformation of value can minimise the perception of exploitation. 
 
Collaborative and deliberative policy formulation 
Assuming that the insecure state insists it has the right to dictate labour policy, it should 
accommodate the other social partners in a collaborative derivation of policy. Such a step 
results in collective ownership and legitimisation. The state’s penchant for leadership and 
dominance alienates the workplace actors. The state might assume juridical authority but 
knows very little about the dynamics and realities of work and the economics of production. 
This, it is submitted, is one of the critical challenges for employment relations. 
 
Rationalisation of juridification and discretionary authority 
 The plethora of rules and regulations results in juridification. The present state of 
economic production in these countries does not need neo-liberal deregulation. The 
issue is not deregulation from a globalization point of view. That is economic 
strangulation. 
 The multiplicity of agencies making often contradictory rules and offering 
problematic interpretations should be rationalized. 
 Currently, there is excessive rule-making, superfluous institutionalization, and 
consequent over-administration.  
 Delegated authority must be accompanied by oversight and accountability. For 
example, a minister should not be able to amend a statute simply by asking the 
government printer to gazette such change.  
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 The clandestine enactment of laws at political party leadership caucuses, including the 
determination of salaries, should be discouraged. There are constitutionally created 
bodies responsible for such activities. 
 
Democratic social dialogue 
Industrial citizenship should be the goal of any entity that claims the right to dictate how all 
aspects of social interaction should be policed. For the workplace to transform into an 
environment that is conducive to dialogue, a minimum floor of rights should be mandatory. 
Social dialogue should be promoted. At the shop floor level, dialogue should be an integral 
part of the terms and conditions of service. In an ideal situation there will be a formal 
recognition of ‘representativity’. 
 
A new trajectory and role for domestic labour law 
Finally, labour law must be re-cast. While it would be preferable to craft a home-grown 
framework, current structural and ideological changes are headed towards forms of regional 
and sub-regional integration. It is therefore preferable to open the domestic labour law 
environment to the total influence of international labour standards via the ILO. 
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